Text
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
September
(House)
20,
1995 (SENT)
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
(Trns
S1'ArP.Mf7.NT 11"5 Rl'J1N
(.'()01{0!~1\T}'.l)
BY
0MB
WITH THB CONCERNBD AOnNC:lfl-'1.)
H,R, 927 - Cuban Liberty and Democratic solidarity Act
(Burton (R) IN and 43 cosponsors)
The Administration supports the central objective of H.R. 927,
i.e., to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.
However, H.R. 927 contains a number of seriously objectionable
provisions that would not advance U.S. interests in Cuba and
would damage other U.S. interests. Therefore, the President's
senior advisers would recommend that H.R. 927 be vetoed unless
the following provisions are deleted or amended:
The bill would encroach upon the President's exclusive
authority under the constitution to conduct foreign
affairs, or otherwise unduly limit tha President's
flexibility, by purporting to require the President or the
Executive branch to pursue certain courses of action
regarding Cuba. Mandatory provisions should be replaced
with precatory language in the following sections: 102(b);
104(a); llO(b); 112; 201; 202(e); 203(c)(l); and 203(c)(3).
The exemption in section 102(d) trom civil penalty
authority for activities related to research, education and
certain other purposes, and the burdensome requirement for
an agency hearing for civil penalties in other cases,
greatly limits the effoctivQnQss ot civil penalties as a
tool for improving embargo enforcement. Section 102(d)
should be amended to address this shortcoming.
Section 103 should be amended to make the prohibition of
certain financing transactions subject to the discretion of
the President.
Section 104(a) should be amended to urge U.S. opposition to
Cuban membership or participation in Intornational
Financial Institutions (IFis) only until a transition
government is in power to enable the IFis to support a
rapid transition to democracy in CUba. Section 104(b),
which would require withholding U.S. payments to IFis,
could place the U.S. in violation of international
commitments and undermine their effective functioning.
This section should be deleted.
Sections 106 and llO(b), which would dany foreign
assistance to countries, if they, or in the case of
2
section 110(b), private entities in these countries,
provide certain support to Cuba, should be deleted.
Section 106 would undermine important U.S. support for
reform in Russia. Section llO(b) is cast _so broadly as to
have a profoundly adverse affect on a wide range of u.s.
Government activities.
Section 202(b) (2) (iii), which would bar transactions
related to family travel and remittances from relatives of
Cubans in the United States until a transition government
is in power, is too inflexible and should be deleted.
Sections 205 and 206 would establish overly-rigid
requirements for transition and democratic governments in
Cuba that could leave the United States on the sidelines,
unable to support clearly positive developments in Cuba
when such support might be essential. The criteria should
be "factors to be considered" rather than requirements.
By failing to provide stand-alone authority for assistance
to a transition or democratic government in Cuba, Title II
signals a lack of U.S. resolve to support a transition to
democracy in Cuba.
Title III, which would create a private cause of action tor
U.S. nationals to sue foreigners who invest in property
located entirely outside the United States, should be
deleted. Applying U.S. law extra-territorially in this
fashion would create triction with our allies, be difficult
to defend under international law, and would create a
precedent that would increase litigation risks tor U.S.
companies abroad. It would also diminish the prospects of
settlement o! the claims of the nearly 6,000 U.S. nationals
whose claims have been certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. Because U.S. as well as foreign
persons may be sued under section 302, this provision could
create a major legal barrier to the participation of U.S.
businesses in the rebuilding ot Cuba once a transition
begins.
Title IV, which would require the Federal Government to
exclude from the United States any person who has
confiscated, or "traffics" in, property to which a U.S.
citizen has a claim, should be deleted. It would apply not
only to Cuba, but world-wide, and would apply to foreign
nationals who are not themselves responsible for any
illegal expropriation of property, and thus would create
friction with our allies. It would require the State
Department to make difficult and burdensome determinations
about property claims and investment in property abroad
which are outside the Department's traditional area ot
expertise.
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3
Pay-As-You-Go scoring
H.R. 927 would affect receipts; therefore, it is subject to the
pay-as-you-go requirement of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OB.RA) of 1990. OMB's preliminary scoring estimate is that
receipts would be insignificant. Final scoring ot this proposal
may deviate from this estimate.
*
*
* * *
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
September
(House)
20,
1995 (SENT)
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
(Trns
S1'ArP.Mf7.NT 11"5 Rl'J1N
(.'()01{0!~1\T}'.l)
BY
0MB
WITH THB CONCERNBD AOnNC:lfl-'1.)
H,R, 927 - Cuban Liberty and Democratic solidarity Act
(Burton (R) IN and 43 cosponsors)
The Administration supports the central objective of H.R. 927,
i.e., to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.
However, H.R. 927 contains a number of seriously objectionable
provisions that would not advance U.S. interests in Cuba and
would damage other U.S. interests. Therefore, the President's
senior advisers would recommend that H.R. 927 be vetoed unless
the following provisions are deleted or amended:
The bill would encroach upon the President's exclusive
authority under the constitution to conduct foreign
affairs, or otherwise unduly limit tha President's
flexibility, by purporting to require the President or the
Executive branch to pursue certain courses of action
regarding Cuba. Mandatory provisions should be replaced
with precatory language in the following sections: 102(b);
104(a); llO(b); 112; 201; 202(e); 203(c)(l); and 203(c)(3).
The exemption in section 102(d) trom civil penalty
authority for activities related to research, education and
certain other purposes, and the burdensome requirement for
an agency hearing for civil penalties in other cases,
greatly limits the effoctivQnQss ot civil penalties as a
tool for improving embargo enforcement. Section 102(d)
should be amended to address this shortcoming.
Section 103 should be amended to make the prohibition of
certain financing transactions subject to the discretion of
the President.
Section 104(a) should be amended to urge U.S. opposition to
Cuban membership or participation in Intornational
Financial Institutions (IFis) only until a transition
government is in power to enable the IFis to support a
rapid transition to democracy in CUba. Section 104(b),
which would require withholding U.S. payments to IFis,
could place the U.S. in violation of international
commitments and undermine their effective functioning.
This section should be deleted.
Sections 106 and llO(b), which would dany foreign
assistance to countries, if they, or in the case of
2
section 110(b), private entities in these countries,
provide certain support to Cuba, should be deleted.
Section 106 would undermine important U.S. support for
reform in Russia. Section llO(b) is cast _so broadly as to
have a profoundly adverse affect on a wide range of u.s.
Government activities.
Section 202(b) (2) (iii), which would bar transactions
related to family travel and remittances from relatives of
Cubans in the United States until a transition government
is in power, is too inflexible and should be deleted.
Sections 205 and 206 would establish overly-rigid
requirements for transition and democratic governments in
Cuba that could leave the United States on the sidelines,
unable to support clearly positive developments in Cuba
when such support might be essential. The criteria should
be "factors to be considered" rather than requirements.
By failing to provide stand-alone authority for assistance
to a transition or democratic government in Cuba, Title II
signals a lack of U.S. resolve to support a transition to
democracy in Cuba.
Title III, which would create a private cause of action tor
U.S. nationals to sue foreigners who invest in property
located entirely outside the United States, should be
deleted. Applying U.S. law extra-territorially in this
fashion would create triction with our allies, be difficult
to defend under international law, and would create a
precedent that would increase litigation risks tor U.S.
companies abroad. It would also diminish the prospects of
settlement o! the claims of the nearly 6,000 U.S. nationals
whose claims have been certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. Because U.S. as well as foreign
persons may be sued under section 302, this provision could
create a major legal barrier to the participation of U.S.
businesses in the rebuilding ot Cuba once a transition
begins.
Title IV, which would require the Federal Government to
exclude from the United States any person who has
confiscated, or "traffics" in, property to which a U.S.
citizen has a claim, should be deleted. It would apply not
only to Cuba, but world-wide, and would apply to foreign
nationals who are not themselves responsible for any
illegal expropriation of property, and thus would create
friction with our allies. It would require the State
Department to make difficult and burdensome determinations
about property claims and investment in property abroad
which are outside the Department's traditional area ot
expertise.
.,. ,. · -
,...,,TTni'P"'\I"\
• r,1 r , 1 'f
r r• . ,..,
~T T •r,.f
~r. • r -
,.. ... -. -
~-
· - ....
3
Pay-As-You-Go scoring
H.R. 927 would affect receipts; therefore, it is subject to the
pay-as-you-go requirement of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OB.RA) of 1990. OMB's preliminary scoring estimate is that
receipts would be insignificant. Final scoring ot this proposal
may deviate from this estimate.
*
*
* * *