File #3445: "di-0352_ref.pdf"

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE ON EL SALVADOR

April 30, 1990

EMBARGOED UNTIL 11am , Monday, April 30

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April 30, 1990
The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
The Speaker
u. s. House of Representatives
Washington, o.c. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
We, the undersigned members of y~ur Special Task Force on El
Salvador, submit the following report for your review and
consideration. Based on our information-gathering and deliberations,
we all concur with the findings outlined in this report.
Sincerely,

~i.~n11e\~ Barbara Kennelly

Lee H.
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{JJin P. Murtha

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Members of the Speaker's Special Task Force on El Salvador

Joe Moakley (0-MA)

Chairman

David E. Bonier (D-MI)
George

w.

Crockett, Jr. (D-MI)

Dan Glickman (D-KS)
Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN)
Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)
Barbara Kennelly (D-CT)
H. Martin Lancaster (0-NC)
Mel Levine (D-CA)
Frank Mccloskey (D-IN)
Dave Mccurdy (D-OK)
Jim McDermott (D-WA)
Matthew F. McHugh (0-NY)
George Miller (D-CA)
John P. Murtha (D-PA)
David E. Obey (0-WI)
Lawrence J. Smith (D-FL)
John M. Spratt, Jr. (D-SC)
Gerry E. studds (D-MA)

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Table of Contents

Introduction .•.•..•.....••••.....•.••...••.••••.••.•.••.• 1
List of Key Persons •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
Exec u t i v e Sum.ma r y • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6

The Murders at the University
of Central America .................................... 13
Related Issues ••••.•.••••••••.•••••.•••••••••••••••••••• 50

Appendices

Statement by Congressman Joe Moakley

I am deeply honored by your recognition and support. However,
it is important to note that all the victories we have achieved on El
Salvador this year could not have been possible without you.
It was a small group of area residents who first brought to my
attention the plight of Salvadoran refugees -- way back in 1983.
And, as you know, 1983 was the first year we filed the so-called
Moakley-DeConcini bill to provide Salvadorans with temporary safe
haven. We passed that bill 4 times in the U.S. House of
Representatives by large margins, due -- in large part -- to the
tremendous grassroots work of lawyers, activists, refugees and
concerned citizens here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. And,
just a couple of weeks ago, we succeeded in attaching the MoakleyDeConcini bill to the omnibus immigration bill
and I expect any
day that the President will sign it into law. We won -- and I
couldn't have done it without you.
Nor could we have cut -- by 50 percent -- U.S. military
assistance to El Salvador without you.
For the first time since the
United States became embroiled in the Salvadoran conflict, the U.S.
Congress said no -- and that's because the American people said no.
All of you who have struggled so long and hard for peace in El
Salvador should pat yourself on the back because we are finally
moving toward that goal. We are moving in the right direction
because of the letters, the phone calls, the petitions, the seminars
and the meetings that you have all organized.
It worked.
Finally, I want to thank you for your support for my efforts in
trying to bring about a just resolution to the Jesuits case.
I
always tell people that I am a bread and butter politician from South
Boston who feels more comfortable talking about jobs than foreign
policy. However, nothing has enraged me more than the brutal murder s
of those six holy men, their housekeeper and her young daughter
and the Salvadoran military's blatant cover-up of these crimes.
Those who pulled the trigger and committed this heinous crime
included men trained with American money, by American servicemen, on
American soil. We all must bare some responsibility for this crime - in much the same way we must bare some responsibility for the war
and the refugees that war has created.
So, I thank you for honoring me. But it is really I who should
honor you for your commitment, your compassion and for your
determination to bring peace to El Salvador and common sense to U.S.
policy in the region.
Thank you.

- l -

INTRODUCTION
Early on the morning of November 16, 1989, six Jesuit priests,
their cook, and her daughter, were brutally murdered at the
University of-Central America (UCA) in San Salvador, El Salvador.
On December 6th, House Speaker Thomas Foley appointed a Special
Task Force of 19 Democratic Members of the House, chaired by Rep.
Joe Moakley, to monitor the Salvadoran government's investigation
into that crime and to look into related issues involving respect
for human rights and judicial reform in El Salvador.
Over the past four months, the Task Force has held a series of
informal meetings and interviews with U.S. and Salvadoran
officials and others with knowledge of the investigation of the
Jesuits' case and related matters. From February 11-14, ten
Members of the Task Force joined five Republican Members of the
House in a visit to El Salvador. Staff delegations from the Task
Force visited El Salvador in January and April. The Task Force is
especially grateful to Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani,
Jesuit Provincial Fr. Jose Maria Tojeira, UCA Rector Fr. Miguel
Estrada, Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, Army Chief of Staff
Col. Rene Emilio Ponce, and U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
William Walker and his staff for their courtesy and cooperation
during these visits.
Most of the information contained in this report was obtained
during interviews or meetings involving Members or staff of the
Task Force, or from documents provided to the Task Force by the
Salvadoran government, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense
or other sources. In some cases, the individuals providing
information or making statements cited in the report are not
specifically identified either out of concern for the safety of
those individuals or because it was a condition of obtaining the
information, or both.
It is important to emphasize that the mandate of the Task Force
is to obtain information concerning the investigation into the
Jesuits' case and related issues and to share that information

- 2 -

with the Speaker, other Members of the House and the public.
Obviously, the Task Force does not, itself, have either the
responsibility, or the capability, of carrying out its own
investigation of the crimes.
Further, it is not the job of the Task Force to recommend
specific changes in U.S. policy towards El Salvador or to examine
the full range of issues that are relevant to that policy. For
that reason, the Task Force does not examine the many crimes
perpetrated by the extreme right or the FMLN in recent years.
Although it is not part of our mandate to investigate the human
rights abuses committed by the FMLN, the Task Force recognizes
that the guerrillas have played an instrumental role in the
violence that has afflicted Salvadoran society for the past
decade. FMLN actions such as the assassination and attempted
assassination of civilian political leaders (including attempts
on the lives of President Cristiani and Vice-President Merino at
the start of the November offensive), kidnappings, the use of
mines, sabotage and the attempted .disruption of elections have
contributed greatly to El Salvador's misery.
Accordingly, the Task Force emphasizes that what is omitted from
this report does not reflect a lack of concern on the_part of
Task Force members with these or other violations of human rights
that have occurred in El Salvado~, or with . the larger policy
issues that affect relations between our two countries. We urge
those who read this Report to consider its findings, as we will,
in the context of other information and other issues relevant to
U.S. policy towards El Salvador.
As discussed below, the investigation into the murders at the
University of Central America is not yet complete. In addition,
the Task Force continues to seek information concerning a few
recent cases that raise issues related to those in the Jesuits'
case. These include allegations made by Cesar Vileman Joya
Martinez, a deserter from the Salvadoran military, concerning the
alleged operation of a death squad within the Salvadoran First
Brigade during the 1988-89 period, and the murder in Guatemala in

- 3 -

January, 1990, of Salvadoran political leader Dr. Hector ~:ueli.
For that reason, this should be considered an interim, not a
final, report of the Task Force.

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LIST OF KEY PERSONS MENTIONED IN REPORT

Officials of the Government of El Salvador:
o President, Alfredo Cristiani
o Attorney General, Mauricio Eduardo Colorado
o Majority Leader of the Assembly, Roberto D'Aubuisson
Leaders of the Armed Forces:
o Minister of Defense, Gen. Rafael Humberto Larios Lopez
o Vice-Minister of Defense, Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda
o Chief of Staff, Col. Rene Emilio Ponce
o Commander, Air Force, Gen. Rafael Antonio Villamariona
o Chief of Personnel, Col. Nelson Ivan Lopez y Lopez
o Chief of Psychological Operations, Col. Carlos Amanda Aviles
Buitrago
Victims of the Murders at the University of Central America:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Dr. Ignacio Ellacuria
Dr. Segundo Montes
Dr. Ignacio Martin-Baro
Dr. Amanda Lopez Quintanilla
Dr. Juan Ramon Moreno
Dr. Joaquin Lopez y Lopez
Mrs. Julia Elba Ramos
Ms. Celia Marisette Ramos

Those currently under arrest:
Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Morales
Lt. Yusshy Rene Mendoza Vallecillos
Lt. Jose Ricardo Espinosa Guerra
First. Lt. Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos
Sgt. Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
Sgt. Thomas Zarpate Castillo
Cpl. Angel Perez Vasquez

- 5 -

Pvt. Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi
Pvt. Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio (deserted)
Head of the Special Investigations Unit:
Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio Rivas Mejia
Judge, 4th District San Salvador:
Dr. Ricardo Zamora
Officials, U.S. Embassy, San Salvador:
Ambassador, William Walker
Deputy Chief of Mission, Jeffrey Dietrich
Head of Military Group, Col. Milton Menjiva~

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Purpose. The central purpose of the Speaker's Special Task Force
on El Salvador is to monitor the investigation by Salvadoran
authorities into the murder of six Jesuit priests, their cook and
her daughter, at the University of Central America (UCA) on
November 16, 1989. The Task Force was also asked to consider
issues related to those killings, including respect for human
rights in El Salvador and the need for judicial reform.
General Findings. The most important general findings of the Task
Force, to date, are that:

1. The murders of the Jesuits reflect problems within the
Salvadoran armed forces that go far beyond the actions of a
particular unit on a particular night. Major reforms within the
· military are necessary to make a recurrence of such crimes
unlikely; to insulate the judicial process from military
pressure; and to strengthen Salvadoran democracy.
2. A serious effort was made to identify those who actually
killed the Jesuits and, for a time, good police work was done.
These facts reflect an advance from the early 1980's in El
Salvador when similar crimes would not even have been
investigated. We attribute the progress to positive efforts by
the civilian leaders of El Salvador and to an understanding on
the part of some within the military that aid from the United
States would be affected by its actions in this case.
3. Despite the good
might not have been
not come forward in
alleged involvement
case.

police work, those now charged with the crime
arrested if an American military officer had
early January with information concerning the
of Salvadoran Col. Alfredo Benavides in the

4. The investigators have made little effort to determine whether
senior military officers other than Col. Benavides might have had
a role in ordering, or in covering up, the crimes.

-

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5. As of mid-April, the investigation and preparations for
prosecuting the case have come to a virtual standstill. This is
true both with respect to any investigation of possible senior
officer involvement in the crimes, and to the gathering of
further evidence against those already arrested. This lack of
continued progress, coupled with certain aspects of Salvadoran
law, make it less and less likely that full justice will be done.

Discussion. As of mid-April, when this report was prepared, the
investigation in the .Jesuits' case had led to the arrest or
charging of 9 members of the Salvadoran armed forces, including
Col. Benavides, commander of the Military School from which the
operation that allegedly carried out the murders was launched.
Col. Benavides and the others arrested are currently being held
by the National Police and Treasury Police pending the completion
of the investigative phase of the judicial process. Once that
phase is complete, a decision will be made as to whether some or
all of the prisoners should stand trial.
Evidence contributing to the arrests was gathered by the Special
Investigations Unit (SIU}, a U.S.-fu~9ed group of
specially-trained military officers located within the Salvadoran
Ministry of Justice. The second, more formal, investigatory phase
is being conducted by Judge Ricardo Zamora, of the Fourth Circuit
of San Salvador, with the assistance of the SIU.
There was widespread skepticism from the outset that a thorough
inquiry into potential military involvement in the crimes would
be attempted or allowed. There is evidence that the SIU
investigators, themselves, were unsure what the consequences of
alleging military involvement might be.
Despite these doubts, the Task Force believes that Salvadoran
President Alfredo Cristiani has made a sincere effort to
encourage a professional investigation into the murders, and
that the SIU carried out its basic police work in a competent
manner. Ballistics evidence, handwriting samples, and

-

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discrepancies in the statements of those who allegedly committed
the crimes were obtained and used as a basis for the arrests that
were made.
Both U.S. and Salvadoran officials have told the Task Force that
this "good police work" was solely responsible for the arrests.
The Task Force believes that other factors may have also played a
part.
On January 2, an American military officer assigned to the U.S.
Embassy came forward with information indicating that Col.
Benavides had told the head of the SIU not long after the murders
occurred that he was responsible for the crimes. Embassy
officials immediately confronted the Salvadoran High Command with
the information, and five days later the Salvadoran government
announced for the first time that the military had murdered the
priests. As a result, the Task Force believes that although "good
police work" was important, it may have been the American
officer's decision to come forward that actually precipitated the
arrests.
Although the Task Force was pleased with some aspects of the SIU
investigation, we were very disappointed by its failure to
investigate seriously the possibility that military officers
senior to Col. Benavides may have ordered or otherwise had prior
knowledge of the crimes. That disappointment extends, as well, to
the efforts made by Judge Zamora subsequent to the arrests.
Even today, a series of questions about the possible involvement
of higher officials in ordering the crimes remain unanswered and,
as far as can be determined, unasked. The investigators have not
questioned senior officials about a meeting of the Armed Forces
High Command, at which Col. Benavides was present, on the night
of the murders; they have not questioned them about other
conversations they might have had with Col. Benavides shortly
before, during or shortly after the night on which the murders
were committed; they have not questioned them about the reasons
for the assignment and re-assignment of the commando unit that

-

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allegedly carried out the murders; they have not investigated a
radio call that was made while the meeting of the High Command
was going on and that apparently set the murders in motion; they
have not investigated the presence of a military intelligence
officer during a search of the UCA two and a half days before the
murders took place; and they have not questioned military
officials about their possible involvement in withholding
information or attempting to cover up the crimes.
The Task Force is particularly disturbed by the failure of the
investigation to make significant progress in any area since the
arrests were made in January. Judge Zamora has only met with SIU
investigators once to coordinate further efforts to gather
information. Numerous suggestions for interviewing potential
witnesses have not been acted on by either the Judge or the SIU.
Now, there is a possibility that Judge Zamora will be replaced by
a new judge, resulting in additional delay. Meanwhile, legal
experts are concerned that Col. Benavides will benefit from
certain provisions of Salvadoran law that render inadmissible the
testimony of co-participants in a murder. Given the lack of
on-going efforts to gather new evidence against him, Col.
Benavides may not even stand trial.
During its inquiry, the Task Force was asked repeatedly by U.S.
and Salvadoran officials to view the murder of the Jesuits as a
crime committed by individuals, and not an indictment of the
armed forces as an institution. Unfortunately, the Task Force
believes it is both.
We believe that the murder of the Jesuits grew out of an attitude
of suspicion and anger towards activist segments of the church
that remains all too widespread within the armed forces and
certain other sectors of Salvadoran society. Because of this
attitude, too little effort is made to distinguish between those
who use non-violent methods to advocate or achieve change, and
guerrillas who take up arms against the government.
During its visit to El Salvador, Task Force members heard the
'

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murders of the Jesuits described by high military officials as
"stupid", "self-defeating", and "dumb". But no senior military
official with whom we talked said it was wrong. This lack of
outrage or moral condemnation is further illustrated by the
treatment of Col. Benavides since his arrest, reportedly
including one or more trips to an Army-owned vacation facility on
El Salvador's southern coast.
The Task Force is concerned, as well, by the failure of
individuals within the military to come forward with information
concerning the murders. Literally hundreds of military personnel
were deployed in the area around the University on the night of
the crime. There are allegations that some in military
intelligence may have witnessed the crime and reported their
knowledge to superior officers. And other military personnel may
have been told of the murders by the 45-50 soldiers who actually
participated in the operation.
Despite this, not one member of the Salvadoran armed forces has
voluntarily provided information of real value, for the record,
in this case. Even the head of the SIU, Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio
Rivas Mejia, has refused to give a formal statement concerning
the allegation that Col. Benavides confessed to him his guilt.
The .institutional nature of the problems in El Salvador is
demonstrated, as well, by the fact that the Jesuits' case
reflects the Salvadoran justice system at its best, not its
worst. This is one of a handful of the human rights cases in El
Salvador over the past decade that has received enough
international attention to be taken seriously by Salvadoran
authorities. Thousands of other crimes, some perpetrated by the
FMLN, some by the military, some by forces unknown, have not even
been investigated. Despite a decade of promises, tens of
millions of dollars in U.S. aid and repeated statements that
progress is just around the corner, the Salvadoran justice system
remains essentially an oxymoron--neither systematic, nor just.
The Task Force is also concerned by the continued abuse of human

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rights by military forces in El Salvador despite receiving
hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. aid and training over the
past decade. All of the soldiers charged with murdering the
Jesuits, except Col. Benavides, received at least some U.S.
training, including four who received training in the United
States. Sadly, the entire unit that allegedly carried out the
crimes was participating in a U.S. training exercise during the
two days immediately prior to the murders.
Finally, the Task Force is disturbed by the reluctance of the
leadership of the armed forces to accept the need for change. The
murder of the Jesuits was a symptom of a too-frequent failure
within the military to accept civilian authority and to pattern
its own actions on the requirements of law. Progress within the
armed forces is hampered by its continued allegiance to the
so-called "tanda" system, which places seniority above ability in
promotions, and loyalty to a classmate above loyalty to law. As a
result, some officers are kept in key jobs despite being
perceived by those both within and outside the armed forces as
corrupt, incompetent or criminal.
Despite our strong feelings about the need for military reform,
the Task Force does not wish this report to be read as a
criticism of all members of the armed forces of El Salvador. On
the cont;ary, _the Task Force recognizes that there are many
officers and enlisted men and women in the Salvadoran military
who carry out their duties in a professional and responsible
manner.
Next Steps. It is not the responsibility of this Task Force to

make specific recommendations governing U.S. policy towards El
Salvador. Those judgments require a broader focus than that dealt
with in our deliberations or in this report. Nor is it our
responsibility to make policy recommendations to the government
of El Salvador. It is our hope, nonetheless that:
o those arrested in the Jesuits case will be prosecuted and, if
found guilty, punished in accordance with the serious nature of

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the crimes;
o the investigation will continue and the focus will be broadened
both to establish the strongest possible case against those
arrested and to examine the possibility that officers senior to
Col. Benavides or others may have ordered or otherwise
participated in the crimes;
o serious efforts will be made to increase civilian control over
the armed forces, resulting in the removal of incompetent,
corrupt or criminal officers; the replacement of the present
''tanda" system with a promotion system based on merit; and the
establishment of independent, civilian-controlled police and
criminal investigative forces;
o renewed efforts will be made to institute ·judicial reform,
including increased training, recruitment and protection of
judges; and
o serious negotiations for a peaceful settlement to the war will
proceed.

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THE MURDERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA

BACKGROUND
The brutal murder in San Salvador on November 16, 1989 of six
Jesuit priests, their cook and her daughter, did not occur in
isolation. To military leaders, the Jesuit fathers had long been
figures of suspicion. They were thought to be, in the words of
Deputy Minister of Defense, Col. Orlando Zepeda, "advisers to the
FMLN", and their university "a center of information inclined to
the left where a certain concept of the revolutionary struggle
began."
Of those killed on November 16, the most prominent was the UCA's
rector, Father Ignacio Ellacuria. Fr. Ellacuria was considered to
be one of the leading intellectual and political thinkers in El
Salvador. His teachings had influenced the lives of many younger
Salvadorans, including some who had become leaders of the FMLN,
and others who had joined the armed forces.
In the months prior to his death, Fr. Ellacuria became deeply
involved in efforts to initiate and sustain serious peace
negotiations between the Salvadoran Government and the leaders of
the FMLN. In so doing, he traveled on several occasions to
Managua to talk to the FMLN. According to U.S. officials, these
visits were viewed by at least some military officers as the
actions not of a man interested in promoting peace, but of an
adviser to terrorists. They felt this way despite the fact that
Ellacuria had become increasingly critical of the FMLN.
Father Ellacuria's effort to promote a dialogue was dealt a
series of blows during the late fall of 1989. Meetings between
the government and FMLN in Mexico City in September, and in San
Jose in October, produced some optimism but no real progress. The
optimism evaporated quickly, however, following an outbreak of
the kind of tit-for-tat terrorism that has plagued El Salvador
for years. The FMLN murdered the daughter of Salvadoran Col.

- 14 -

Oscar Casanova Vejar. Someone, presumably from the right, bombed
the house of opposition political leader Ruben Zamora. The FMLN
attacked the houses of relatives of several senior military
officers. And finally, the headquarters of the leftist labor
confederation FENESTRAS was bombed, killing nine. In the midst of
this, the FMLN withdrew from the negotiations and--on November
11--launched the fiercest offensive of the war.
The murders of the Jesuits occurred on the fifth night of that
offensive, at a time when the outcome of the fighting was far
from clear. The FMLN had established and was holding positions
throughout the northern and eastern part of the area around San
Salvador, in neighborhoods that included San Sebastian,
Soyapango, Zacamil, Cuidad Delgado and Mejicanos.
On November 11, the night the offensive began, a government-run
radio network began broadcasting threats, apparently from radio
listeners, that were directed by name at persons they associated
with the political left. Those threatened included Fr. Ellacuria
and another of those murdered on the 16th, Fr. Segundo Montes.
That same night, a group of guerrillas fled through the UCA
grounds after setting off a bomb at the gate to force it open.
Two days later, according to Colonel Ponce, the military received
information that mortars and machine guns were being fired from
the UCA. Acting under guidelin·es instituted by President
Cristiani that required a specific authorization from the High
Command before the military could enter the UCA, a unit of the
Atlacatl Battalion went to the university for the purpose of
determining whether the reports were accurate. Before entering
the UCA, the unit was joined by Lt. Hector Ulises Cuenca Ocampo
of military intelligence (DNI). The unit was escorted during its
search by Fathers Ellacuria and Segundo Montes, checking
classrooms and the living quarters of the priests. No evidence of
mortars or machine guns was found.
The unit of the Atlacatl that conducted the search had arrived in

- 15 the area at 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the 13th. It was one of
several units that had been assigned to the command of Col.
Alfredo Benavides, director of the Salvadoran Military School.
The mission of these units--which were drawn not only from the
Atlacatl, but· also from the Treasury Police, National Police and
various Army detachments--was to defend what Col. Ponce termed
"the military head of the country." The sector included the
headquarters of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the
Intelligence School, and the homes of senior military officials,
as well as the Military School and the UCA • .As a result, the
area around the UCA and the military complex was one of the most
heavily guarded in the city.
Salvadoran military leaders told the Task Force ·that the commando
unit of the Atlacatl Battalion, led by Lt. Jose Ricardo Espinosa
Guerra, was one of the best and most experienced units in the
Salvadoran armed forces. Lt. Espinosa and Lt. Guevara Cerritos,
his second in command, were both graduates of the Salvadoran
Cadet Preparation Course given at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Lt.
Espinosa had also attended the Special Forces Officer's Course at
Fort Bragg. Sgt. Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas and Cpl. Angel
Perez Vasquez had also received training at Fort Benning. A
scheduled ten day special forces training course for the entire
unit, which had begun on November 11, was interrupted after two
days by the guerrilla offensive. (Note: the American Green Beret
unit that was conducting this training course spent a day
barricaded in the San Salvador Sheraton as the result of an FMLN
attack soon thereafter).
On November 15th, the High Command met, as it had every night
since shortly before the offensive began. That night, the meeting
began around 7:30 p.m. Those pres~nt included the Minister and
two Vice-Ministers of Defense; the Chief of Staff, Colonel Ponce;
the heads of the joint commands; the commanders of the various
security forces; the commanders of units in the metropolitan
area, including Col. Benavides; and a press officer.
According to those who attended the meeting and with whom the

- 16 -

Task Force spoke, the mood was grim. There was a real fear that
the guerrillas' effort to spark a popular insurrection might
succeed.
From the beginning of the offensive, there had been concern about
the difficulty of dislodging the guerrillas from areas where
large numbers of civilians lived. As a result, an effort had been
made to encourage the civilian population to leave the
conflictive areas. Now, the decision was made to use heavy
airpower against FMLN-held positions. Area commanders were
instructed to locate and take action against guerrilla command
centers in their sectors. Minister of Defense Larios, among
others, gave what amounted to a "pep talk", and urged those
present to fight back hard. The meeting ended with joined hands
and a prayer for God's help. Around 10:30 p.m., President
Cristiani was asked to come to the High Command where he
personally authorized the selective use of air and artillery
power. The meeting broke up around 11:00 p.m.
THE MURDERS
The following account of the murders and surrounding events is
taken primarily from the testimonies given by those who
participated in the events, as published in the proceedings of
the Fourth Criminal Court of San Salvador on January 18, 1990.
These testimonies were used as a basis for the arrests that have
been made in the case. The Task Force notes that no statement
from Col. Benavides was published and that he has not publicly
admitted any responsibility or guilt.
According to the testimonies, Col~ Benavides arrived at the
military school shortly after the meeting of the High Command
ended at 11:00 p.m. There, he met in his office with Lt. Yusshy
Mendoza Vallecillos (assigned to the military school), Lt.
Espinosa and First Lt. Guevara Cerritos, both of the Atlacatl.
About 45 minutes earlier, Lt. Espinosa had been given an order by
radio to assemble his troops at the military school.

- 17 -

Now, Col. Benavides told the lieutenants that, "this is a
situation where it's them or us; we're going to begin with the
ringleaders. Within our sector, we have the university and
Ellacuria is there."
Turning to Lt. Espinosa, he continued:
"You conducted the search and your people know the place. Use
the same tactics as on the day of the search and eliminate him.
And I want no witnesses. Lt. Mendoza will go with you as the man
in charge of the operation so that there will be no problems."
The lieutenants left Col. Benavides' office and mustered their
men into two beige Ford vans for transportation to the UCA, where
they would link up with other patrols from the Atlacatl. Before
leaving, Lt. Mendoza asked if any of the men knew how to use an
AK-47, which is a weapon sometimes used by the FMLN.
An enlisted man, Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi, said that he knew
how to use the weapon, and the ~roup was delayed for
approximately ten minutes while he cleaned it. Amaya was told by
Lt. Espinosa that the purpose of the mission upon which they were
about to embark was to kill "some terrorists who were inside the
UCA."
Not long after midnight, as many soldiers as could fit into the
two vans (20-25) drove to some empty apartment buildings located
on the west side of the UCA where they met up with two Atlacatl
patrol units that Lt. Espinosa had instructed to take up
positions near the UCA earlier in the evening.
Now, Lt. Espinosa told the patrol leaders that they had been
given an order "from above" to eliminate the intellectual leaders
of the guerrillas, who were inside the UCA. He said that at the
moment of withdrawal there would be a flare and later a
simulation of a confrontation would take place. It was around
1:00 a.m. when the entire group of 45-50 moved towards the
university.

- 18 -

After soldiers began banging on the doors, one of the Jesuit
fathers emerged, went to the front gate and let some of the
soldiers inside.
Soon afterwards, Fr. Martin Baro went with a soldier to open the
other gate. Not far away, in a small house bordering the Jesuit
property, a young woman who did cleaning for the Jesuits was
sleeping with her husband and young daughter when she was
awakened by the noise. The woman, Mrs. Lucia Cerna, says she
heard Fr. Baro say to the soldier, "This is an injustice. You
are scum."
Five of the priests were gathered on a small plateau of land just
above the backyard entrance to the living quarters. The five were
instructed to lie face down. Lt. Espinosa inquired of Sub. Sgt.
Antonio Avalos when he was going to proceed. Avalos interpreted
this as an order to kill the priests. Accordingly, Avalos
approached Amaya Grimaldi (the soldier with the AK-47) and said
to him:
"Let '·s proceed."
And they began shooting. Avalos shot Fr. Juan Ramon Moreno and
Fr. Amando Lopez Quintanilla with an M-16. Amaya, using the
AK-47, shot Fr. Ellacuria, Fr. Martin Baro and Fr. Montes.
While this was going on, another soldier, Tomas Zarpate "was
providing security" for the Jesuits' cook, Mrs. Elba Julia Ramos,
and her 15 year old daughter Marisela who had been discovered by
the soldiers in a guest room at the far end of the building where
the Jesuits lived. On hearing the voice ordering: "Now," and the
ensuing shots, Zarpate shot the two women.
It was at this moment, immediately after the shooting, that a
sixth priest, Fr. Lopez y Lopez, appeared in the door of the
residence. The soldiers called to him and he responded:
"Don't kill me because I don't belong to any organization."

- 19 -

He then went back inside the house, where he was pursued by a
soldier -- still unidentified -- and shot. Another soldier, Perez
Vasquez, was leaving the building when he felt Fr. Lopez's hand
grabbing for his ankle. Perez Vasquez shot him four times.
While leaving, Avalos Vargas -- nick-named "Toad" and "Satan" by
his comrades -- passed in front of the guest room where the two
women had been shot and heard them moaning in the darkness. He
lit a match and saw the two women on the floor embracing each
other. He then ordered a soldier, Jorge .Alberto Sierra ·Ascencio,
to "re-kill" them. Sierra Ascencio shot the women about ten
times, until they stopped moaning. (Sierra Ascencio deserted the
· ·Army in late December. His whereabouts are not currently known).
Their · grim mission accomplished, the soldiers, as ordered, shot
off a flare as a signal for the unit to withdraw.
The soldiers then feigned a firefight, using an M-60 machine gun,
an anti-tank rocket, the AK-47 and other weapons. As they left,
one of them turned a sign around on the pedestrian gate to the
UCA and wrote, "The FMLN executed the enemy spies. Victory or
Death, FMLN."
In his testimony, Lt. Mendoza said that he saw a soldier, whose
identity he did not know, carrying a light brown valise. The
Jesuits believe · that the valise contained $5,000 which had been
given to Fr. Ellacuria a few days earlier in recognition of his
work on human rights.
The unit then proceeded back to the Military School where the
lieutenants, after some effort, were able to locate Col.
Benavides. Lt. Espinosa said "My Colonel, I did not like what was
done."
Benavides told him to "calm down, don't worry. You have my
support. Trust me."
.

"I hope so, . Colonel," Espinosa replied.
my
.

- 20 At approximately 5:00 or 6:00 a.m., the unit left the Military
School, pursuant to orders from the High Command, to re-join the
main part of the Atlacatl Battalion in the northern part of the
city near the First Brigade.
THE INVESTIGATION--THE TECHNICAL SIDE

The bodies were discovered at approximately 7:00 a.m., after the
curfew ended, by the fath_ r and husband of the two murdered
e
women.
At 8:30 a.m., the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), under the
direction of Lt. Col. Rivas, arrived at the murder scene.
Although the site had already been disturbed by Jesuits,
neighbors, the press and others, the SIU began the process of
gathering physical evidence, taking photographs, preparing maps
and interviewing potential witnesses. Neighbors confirmed the
sound of gunfire and explosions during the night, but no one
claimed to have seen the murders take place.
On November 22, six days after the killings, the first
acknowledged eyewitness, Mrs. Lucia Cerna, testified at the
Embassy of S9ain that she had seen uniformed men and heard shots
near the scene of the murders during the early morning hours of
November 16. Her testimony there and in subsequent interviews is
discussed below in the section entitled, "the witness".
From the beginning, the SIU focused on three possible suspects:
the FMLN, the armed forces, and a death squad, which might or
might not have included military personnel, acting on the
instructions of someone on the extreme right.
Other than the sign left at the premises, the use of an AK-47,
and the attempt to feign a firefight, the SIU uncovered no
evidence indicating involvement of the FMLN.
Speculation about the possible involvement of ARENA party leader
Roberto D'Aubuisson increased when a report appeared in Newsweek

- 21 magazine, ascribed to "U.S. intelligence sources", saying that
D'Aubuisson had said at a meeting the day before the crimes that
''the Jesuits must go". However, no supporting evidence that such
a meeting took place has come to light and D'Aubuisson
subsequently denied making the statement.
The investigation of possible military involvement began slowly.
According to the SIU's own chronology, it was not until December
5th, almost three weeks after the murders, that the SIU asked the
High Command for a list of those who carried out the search of
the UCA on November 13 and not until December 11 that the list
was received. It was not until December 7 that a request was made
for confirmation as to whether the types of ammunition found at
the scene were used by the military. And it was not until
December 11, almost four weeks after the murders, that a request
was made for a list of the military personnel assigned to the
area around the UCA on the night of the crimes.
By late December, however, the SIU had taken 385 ballistics
samples and 385 sets of fingerprints from soldiers assigned to
the area of the UCA on the night of the murders, including 45
from members of the Atlacatl unit that actually perpetrated the
crimes. In addition, 14 people had been polygraphed, 11 of whom
were military officers, and 86 depositions from military
personnel had been taken.
In the course of taking statements, the SIU noticed that
discrepancies had begun to emerge in statements made by members
of the Atlacatl unit. While describing their participation in the
search that had been authorized on November 13th, some soldiers
made reference to conditions--such as the lack of
electricity--which had existed on the 15th. Suspicions were also
aroused when Lt. Espinosa managed to frustrate three efforts to
polygraph him, citing each time a different excuse.
On December 28, according to Lt. Col. Rivas, his ballistics
experts noted some similarities between cartridges found at the
UCA and those belonging to members of the Atlacatl. A decision

- 22 -

was made to run new tests using a burst of fire rather than
single shots. The results of those tests became available on
January 5, and showed a match between the AK-47 used to commit
some of the m~rders and one of four AK-47's belonging to the
Military School. No match was established, however, for the
M-16's that were used to kill the other Jesuits and the two
women.
On January 7, President Cristiani announced on national
television that the investigation now indicated that the armed
forces had been responsible for the murders. He also ordered that
45 members of the Atlacatl, and Col. Benavides and Lt. Mendoza of
the Military School, be held for questioning. The next day, it
was announced that a special military honor board would begin
questioning those who had been held.
THE WITNESS
There has been much controversy surrounding the testimony of Mrs.
Lucia Barrera de Cerna--the first witness to come forward with
information on the Jesuit murders--and her treatment by those who
~nterrogated her.
Summary of the Facts. In brief, Mrs. Cerna's testimony is that at
approximately 1:00 am on the morning of the murders, November 16, she
was awakened by gunfire and saw five men, some of them dressed in
camouflage uniforms, standing at the main entrance gate that led to
the residence of the Jesuits. She heard more gunfire and the voice of
Father Ignacio Martin-Baro shouting the words, "This is an
injustice ••• you are scum"; and then more gunfire. According to her
testimony, she did not see the actual murders take place, and she
could not identify the faces of the men at the gate or the insignias
on their uniforms. Members of the Task Force who traveled to El
Salvador attempted to retrace Mrs. Cerna's steps the night of the
murders in accordance with her testimony and, in our judgment, there
is no question that she could have seen and heard what she said she
saw and heard that night.

- 23 On November 23, after making a declaration to the investigating judge,
Mrs. Cerna and her family agreed to arrangements made by the Spanish
and French Ambassadors to go to Miami and stay with Jesuits there.
Ambassador Wa!ker, upon learning of the arrangements, asked the French
Ambassador to allow representatives from the United States Embassy and
the FBI to be present on the plane, which was a French military
aircraft. According to Embassy officials, the purpose of this request
was to "facilitate a smooth entry into the United States''. There was
no mention made to the Cerna family or to the Jesuits in San Salvador
that the Cernas would be interrogated further in Miami.
Once in Miami, the Cernas were under the care of the U.S. Department
of State. Between November 27 and December 3, they were interrogated
at length by two agents of the F.~.I. and by the head of the
Salvadoran SIU, Lt. Col. Rivas. The only other person present during
the questioning was the legal officer from the U.S. Embassy in San
Salvador. The Cernas were not asked if they wanted to have an
attorney, a member of the Jesuit community, or some other trusted
person with them during the lengthy interrogations.
Mrs. Cerna told the Task Force that -she ultimately changed her story
because she felt that the interFogators did not believe her original
one. She said, "I f- t pressured ••• they scared me, and I have
el
hypertension and I am v~ry excitable." She said that at one point an
F.B.I. agent quickly turned toward her, changed his line of
questioning, and asked, "This Estrada (the riew rector of the UCA), is
he or isn't he a guerrilla?" Mrs. Cerna answered that he was not.
However, she said that her interrogators continued to ask the same
questions over and over, and "then I became scared of these men. I
didn't have any confidence anymore. And then I said, no sir. I don't
know anything. Don't ask me any more questions. I don't know
anything." Ultimately, both Mrs. Cerna and her husbandi Jorge Cerna,
were subjected to a series of polygraph tests in which deception on
their part was indicated.
Word of the interrogations quickly spread to El Salvador. Salvadoran
President Cristiani said in a press interview that Mrs. Cerna had
changed her ~tory and that she had failed several polygraph tests.

-

24 -

.

The Salvadoran Attorney General issued a statement saying that Mrs.
Cerna was now a "very unreliable witness."
Members of the Jesuit order and the Catholic Church hierarchy in El
Salvador were furious. They said they felt betrayed and deceived by
the actions of the United States government. On December 10,
Archbishop Rivera y Damas publicly accused the State Department of
"brainwashing" Mrs. Cerna and of subjecting her to ••aggressive and
violent interrogation." On December 12, Father J.M. Tojeira, the
Jesuit Provincial for Central America, issued a public conununique
which stated:
At times we have even been deceived with regard to
certain aspects of the investigation. The clearest instance
of this is in the way in which the witness, Lucia Barrera de
Cerna, has been manipulated by the United States.
11

•••

In effect, the U.S. Embassy made a conunitment to accompany
the witness to Miami and to hand her over there to the
priests of the Society of Jesus. Instead, the witness was
handed over to U.S. police agents for 8 days under the
pretext of watching out for her security and with no
attention to the wishes which had been expressed here."

In an effor.t to arrive at the truth concerning these allegations, the
Task Force asked the F.B.I. to allow Members to question the two
agents who interrogated the Cernas, and to provide copies of the
transcripts of those interviews. Although these requests were refused,
the F.B.I. did provide a number of documents, including the
transcripts of the interviews, to the Subconunittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Conunittee. In addition,
Chairman Moakley received a copy of a letter, dated March 12, from
F.B.I. Director William Sessions to Reverend Patrick J. Burns, S.J.,
President, Jesuit Conference, which explains the F.B.I.'s view of the
interrogation of the Cernas.

- 25 -

The letter states:
"During the course of the FBI's contacts with the Cerna
family, they were treated in a courteous and professional
manner . • • • All interviews and polygraph examinations were
consistent with our procedures for direct contact interviews
and were conducted in a professional manner. Throughout the
several interviews, great care was taken to ensure that the
witnesses were comfortable with the interview process and the
office environment •••• All of the witness interviews were
limited to normal business hours. Additionally, FBI
personnel took the Cerna family to sightsee various parts of
Miami or to visit Jesuit acquaintances during extended lunch
breaks or on weekends."
Of particular concern to me were the allegations of witness
mistreatment through "abusive incommunicado interrogation" by
Special Agents of the FBI. Our inquiry determined these
allegations to be totally without factual support and are in
complete contradiction to the actual treatment afforded the
Cerna family."
Ambassado r · Walker has stated that the purpose of the further
questioning of Mis. Cerni in Miami was to obtain additional
information that might be useful during future legal proceedings on
the case. The presence of Lt. Col. Rivas, in his view, was appropriate
because Rivas was the chief invest·iga_or. Ambassador Walker says that
t
Mrs. Cerna was polygraphed only after having provided three differing
versions of what she had observed the evening the crimes occurred, but
that Mrs. Cerna's failure to pass the polygraph tests does not mean
that she is lying. He said that the witness may have been nervous and
all that can be concluded is that · it is not clear which version of
events she offered is the most accurate.
Discussion and Findings. In view of the conflicting statements that
have been made, and because we were unable to review the tapes and
other relevant material concerning the treatment of the Cerna family,
it is impossible for us to resolve fully the discrepancies in the

-

26 -

various accounts of what happened in Miami.
However, it is reasonable to believe that Mrs. Cerna, a cleaning woman
with hypertension, a limited education, and no experience with
airplane trips, big hotels, murder investigations, or the United
States, was scared and nervous during her ordeal. This alone may
explain the differing accounts she gave of what she did and did not
observe. Given the fact that she was not a criminal suspect and given
the grisly nature of the crime she was testifying about, it is
disturbing that she was interrogated for so long, and especially that
she and her husband were subjected to polygraph examinations, without
being offered access to an attorney.
"

The Task Force also believes that U.S. officials should have informed
Mrs. Cerna and the Jesuits in San Salvador o~ exactly what they wanted
to do in Miami and asked for their cooperation. There was no reason
to believe that Mrs. Cerna would not cooperate. She, in fact,
voluntarily cooperated with Salvadoran authorities and provided a
statement to the judge; she did her duty. One regrettable result of
this affair is that witnesses in this or other human rights cases in
El Salvador may be less likely to come forward or to accept assurances
of protection from the United States.
While the Task Force believes that U.S. officials should have acted
with greater sensitivity, we do not have a basis for concluding that
their actions were abusive or part of a conscious plan to discredit
Mrs. Cerna's testimony. Given the limited nature of what Mrs. Cerna
actually saw on the night of the murders, there would have been no
motive, even under the most cynical of circumstances, for the U.S.
Embassy or others to have sought to discredit her statement. The fact
that Mrs. Cerna never claimed to be able to identify the military unit
or individuals involved in the crimes is one of the ironies of this
whole controversy.
COL. AVILES AND THE AMERICAN MAJOR.
Background. Throughout the early part of December, a tense
relationship~existed between the Jesuits at the UCA and Army

- 27 -

investigators. That relationship was gravely complicated by hard
feelings over the alleged mistreatment of Mrs. Cerna. On December
19th, the investigators attempted to ease the situation by arranging a
meeting between two Jesuit leaders, Fr. Tojeira and Fr. Estrada, and
the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Ponce. Col. Carlos Aviles, a
Jesuit-educated officer who was well-connected to the Jesuits and a
former head of the SIU, also participated in the meeting.
As a result of the meeting, the SIU held a full briefing for the
Jesuit leaders on December 22 to report on the progress of the
investigation. According to Lt. Col. Rivas, a spirit of full
cooperation between the Jesuits and the SIU emerged after the briefing
had taken place.
At about this same time, but before the SIU's briefing of the Jesuits,
a conversation is alleged to have taken place between Col. Aviles and
an American Major assigned to the military group at the Embassy.
The Major's Account. The following account is based primarily on
the sworn statement of the American Major that was provided to
the Salvadoran High Command on January 3, 1990 and an interview
conducted by some Members of the Task Force with the Major on
March 22. In deference to a request from the U.S. Department of
Defense, the name of the Major is not cited in this account.
Col. Aviles and the American Major worked together closely. Their
joint. task, among other things, was to improve the image of the
Salvadoran armed forces and demoralize the guerrilla opposition.
In both respects, the murder of the Jesuits, and the accompanying
suspicion of military involvement, was a serious problem.
The two discussed the case frequently. But according to the
Major, on or about December 20th, Col. Aviles said something that
went far beyond their earlier talks.
According to the Major, Col. Aviles said .he had something to say
that should be used on, in his words, a
"break - in-case-of-emergency" basis. The Major interpreted this to
'

- 28 -

mean that the information should only be used if something were
to happen to Col. Aviles and the investigation were not going
forward as it should.
Col. Aviles said that his information was based on a conversation
that he had had with Col. Lopez y Lopez, a friend and--like Col.
Aviles--a former head of the SIU. In early December, Col. Lopez y
Lopez had been assigned to assist Lt. Col. Rivas in the Jesuits'
case.
According to Col. Aviles, Col. Benavides had approached Lt. Col.
Rivas about the time the investigation started and said something
to the effect of "I did it ••• what can you do to help me ..• what
can we do about this?"
The American Major asked Col. Aviles, "What do you mean? Did
Benavides kill the Jesuits?"
The answer was, no, a special operations group from the Atlacatl
Battalion, headed by a lieutenant, had done the killing. But the
Major understood Col. Aviles to be saying that the lieutenant had
been acting under orders from Col. Benavides.
The Major asked "Who else knows? (Colonel) Ponce?" Col. Aviles
said he did not know . He thought. Col. Ponce had been told by Lt.
Col. Rivas or Col. Lopez y Lopez, but was not sure.
The Major asked why an arrest had not been made. The answer was
that Col. Benavides could not be arrested until the investigation
had been completed.
According to Col. Aviles, SIU director Rivas was scared after his
conversation with Col. Benavides. As a result, the investigation
slowed. This prompted Col. Lopez y Lopez to initiate a
conversation with Lt. Col. Rivas during which Rivas cited his
discussion with Col. Benavides. Col. Lopez y Lopez subsequently
passed on the information to Col. Aviles who then told the
American Major.

-

29 -

During the next ten days, the Major shared the substance of his
conversation with two individuals on the same
''break-in-case-of-emergency" basis that Col. Aviles had used to
convey the information to him. But he did not tell his superiors
in the embassy.
According to the Major, there were three reasons he did not come
forward immediately. First, he felt a strong sense of loyalty to
Col. Aviles, who had requested his silence. Second, he believed
that the Salvadorans were committed to finding and prosecuting
those involved in the crimes. Those in charge of the
investigation already had this information, so there may have
been no need to tell anyone else. The Salvadorans had the
responsibility to follow up on this information and he believed
that they would. Finally, he felt it would be better for the
Salvadoran armed f6rces if it was clear that they had solved the
case on their own.
According to the Major, he and Col. Aviles continued to discuss
the case. The Major was told that the investigation was going
well; that a lieutenant from the Atlacatl was having trouble with
his polygraph tests and kept making excuses about it; that the
cartridges found ~t the scene were starting to show similarities
to those fired from weapons belonging to the Atlacatl; and that
there were some discrepancies in other testimonies given by
members of the commando unit.
Despite this, the Major was concerned that no arrests had been
made. He was troubled that when the Jesuits were officially
briefed on the case on December 22nd, they were not told about
the conversation between Col. Benavides and Lt. Col. Rivas. The
Major asked again who in the Salvadoran leadership knew about
that conversation, and Col. Aviles told him again that he did not
know who knew.
On January 2, the Major finally told his immediate superior,
Colonel William Hunter, about his conversation with Col. Aviles.
Col. Hunter immediately told the head of the Military group, Col.

- 30 -

Milton Menjivar.
Without notifying either the Ambassador or the Deputy Chief of
Mission, Col._Menjivar immediately went with a political officer
from the Embassy to Colonel Ponce's office at the High Command.
According to Col. Menjivar, Col. Ponce reacted first with
disbelief, then with disappointment and finally with anger. He
asked Col. Menjivar the source of the allegation, and Col.
Menjivar told him about the conversation between Col. Aviles and
the American Major.
Col. Aviles and the Major were summoned, and a meeting was held
in Col. Ponce's office. At that meeting, Col. Ponce summarized
the allegations and asked Col. Aviles t~ iespo~d. Col. Aviles
admitted discussing the case with the Major, but denied telling
him about any conversation between Col. Benavides and Lt. Col.
Rivas. At one point, Col. Aviles said, "if I knew this
information, why would I risk my career by telling (the Major)?"
The Major then told his story again, after which Col. Ponce
dismissed the meeting.
The next day, Col. Menjivar briefed the Salvadoran High Command
on the allegations and the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy, Jeffrey Dietrich, did the same in a meeting with
President Cristiani. The American Major wrote a sworn statement
that was submitted, along with a cover letter from Col. Menjivar,
to Defense Minister Larios and the High Command.
Also on that day, an American Embassy officer informed Lt. Col.
Rivas of the American Major's allegations. Lt. Col. Rivas denied
having any conversation with Col. Benavides in which Col.
Benavides ·admitted ~uilt, a denial which Lt. Col. Rivas
subsequently repeated to Members of the Task Force. Col. Lopez y
Lopez also denied having a conversation either with Lt. Col.
Rivas or with Col. Aviles of the nature described in the American
Major's account.

- 31 -

On January 5, the Major took a polygraph examination administered
by the FBI. At about the same time, Col. Aviles took a polygraph
test administered by Salvadoran authorities. The polygraph
results indicated some deception ln both cases.
On January 6, the Major left for the United States where he has
taken additional polygraph examinations. The Task Force
understands that these tests have not resolved the issues raised
in the first exam.
The next day, President Ctistiani announced that the
investigation had concluded that the Armed Forces were
responsible, and Col. Benavides and the others were arrested
shortly thereafter.
Col. Aviles' Account. The Task Force did not have an opportunity
to discuss this affair with Col. Aviles until April 20, during a
visit by a staff delegation to San Salvador. On that date, Col.
Aviles described this entire incident as a ''night~are" that has
had a serious effect on his family and his professional career.
He said he was shocked that the American Major had made the
allegations, and that the only information he had provided to the
Major about the case was that investigators were focusing on the
FMLN, the armed forces and a rightwing death squad as possible
culprits. He regretted that the affair has become "politicized'',
and said that he feared most Americans would almost certainly
take the word of an American officer against the word of a
Salvadoran.
When asked why the American Major might have made up such a
story, Col. Aviles said "I wish I . had a crystal ball that would
help me learn the answer."
Both Col. Aviles and other senior Salvadoran military officials
with whom the Task Force spoke denied published reports that Col.
Aviles had ever been "arrested" or "detained" as a result of this
incident.

- 32 -

Discussion and Findings. If the story of the American Major is
accurate, and if what Col. Aviles said to the American Major was
also true, the entire investigation of the Jesuits' case appears
in a differen~ light. It means, for example that:
o Lt. Col. Rivas, the head of the SIU, was aware from the early
stages in the investigation that Col. Benavides and the Atlacatl
were involved in the murders;
o Col. Benavides, a senior military officer of the same rank and
class as those in the leading positions within the Salvadoran
military, approached Lt. Col. Rivas, soon after the crimes, to
seek assurance that he would be protected;
o the investigators, Lt. Col. Rivas and Col. Lopez y Lopez, and
former investigator Col. Aviles, may have been uncertain whether
they had enough support within the armed forces and the
Salvadoran government to accuse Col. Benavides;
o notwithstanding these doubts, the investigators continued to
gather evidence that was tending, more and more as the days went
by, to implicate the commando unit of the Atlacatl;
o Lt. Col. Rivas is perhaps the strongest potential witness in
the case against Col. Benavides; and
o the timing of events is such that it is not clear whether the
case ever would have broken if the American Major did not come
forward.
The Task Force believes that the American Major is telling the
truth. It is simply not credible to imagine that he concocted a
story that just coincidentally happened to be true about the
identity of those responsible for the murders. This premise is
supported by the fact that, in coming forward ten days to two
weeks after the event, he was subjecting his own actions to
potentially serious criticism. Further, the Major did not even
know Col. Benavides, Col. Lopez y Lopez or Lt. Col. Rivas and had

- 33 -

no personal or professional reason for involving them. In
addition, there is nothing in his statements that is contrary to
facts otherwise known.
Having accepted the validity of the American Major's account, the
Task Force concludes it is probable that what the Major says he
was told by Col. Aviles is also true. We find it very unlikely
that Col. Aviles would have been able to identify Col. Benavides
as the culprit if he had not been told about the Colonel's
alleged "confession" to Lt. Col. Rivas. Nor does there exist any
incentive for Col. Aviles to have made such a potentially risky
allegation if it were not based on fact. Moreover, even if Col.
Aviles was aware of information that directly implicated Col.
Benavides, why make up such a complicated story?
Col. Aviles was Jesuit-educated and was the individual selected
to help secure cooperation from the Jesuits in the investigation.
Despite his denials, the Task Force believes it is very possible
that his concerns about a potential cover-up, coupled with the
weight of his own knowledge, led Col. Aviles to share the
information with the American Major "for use in an emergency
only."
The evidence provided by the polygraphs of the American Major and
on Col. Aviles are wholly inconclusive. The Task Force is
concerned that, despite the obvious importance of this incident,
no serious effort beyond these po~ygraph tests has · been made to
discover the truth. Lt. Col. Rivas told the Task Force that he
would not take a polygraph because he is in charge of the
investigation and such a test would impugn his honor. Col. Lopez
y Lopez simply said that such a test would not be conclusive even
if he were to take one.
There are two final questions, about which the Task Force can
reach no firm conclusion. First, why did Col. Benavides admit his
guilt to Lt. Col. Rivas if, in fact, he did? The Task Force has
been told by sources in El Salvador, but has been unable to
confirm, that Col. Benavides was aware very quickly after the

- 34 -

murders that his involvement was no secret within the military.
He may have believed, in any case, that his involvement in the
crimes could not be concealed from senior military officers. If
true, it would have been logical for him to seek an assurance
from Lt. Col._Rivas or a more senior military officer that he
would nevertheless be protected in any investigation. And the
fact is that no accusation was made against the Colonel or his ·
unit until after the American Major came forward.
Second, would Col. Benavides and the others have been arrested if
Benavides' alleged confession had not been raised so directly by .
Am,e r ican officials with the Salvadoran armed forces?
It is clear that the SIU investigation had p~oduced some evidence
against the Atlacatl unit before the arrests were made. In
December, the SIU had obtained Col. Benavides' operations book
indicating that a confrontation had occurred at the UCA on the
night of the murders. However, the SIU did not disclose this fact
to anyone until after the arrests, did not cite it as evidence at
the time of the arrests, and never questioned Col. Benavides
about it. The most damaging evidence cited at the time of the
arrests was that provided by ballistics. However, the results
from the ballistics tests which led to the arrests did not become
available until at least January 5, three days after the American
Major came forward.
Although the question of whether the arrests would have occurred
if the Major had not come forward is extremely important, the
Task Force can reach no conclusion on it. It may be that even
those most directly involved, the leaders of the SIU, are not
certain how this question would have been answered if the
conversation between Col. Aviles and the Major had not taken
place.
AFTER THE

ARRESTS

The Honor Board. President Cristiani announced on January 6 that
the armed forces were involved in the crimes. That same day, he

- 35 -

appointed a military honor board to review the evidence in the
case. The honor board included five Salvadoran officers of
different ranks, and was headed by General Rafael Antonio
Villamariona, the Air Force Chief of Staff.
On January 7, the SIU briefed the honor board on the evidence it
had gathered in the case. On January 13, President Cristiani
announced that nine soldiers had been charged with participation
in the crimes. What happened during the intervening five days is
not clear.
According to the chronology of events that was provided to the
Task Force by the U.S. Department of State, President Cristiani's
announcement was based on the findings of the military honor
board. The Director of the SIU, Lt. Col. Rivas, also stated that
the honor board had questioned the soldiers from the Atlacatl and
obtained confessions from them. General Villamariona, however,
told the Task Force that the honor board obtained no confessions.
Another honor board member, Col. Dionisio Machuca, said that the
honor board did not even questi9n the soldiers that had been
detained. Instead, said Col. Machuca, the honor board sought to
"motivate the soldiers to tell the truth."

Neither U.S. nor Salvadoran officials with whom the Task Force
spoke could explain how President Cristiani was able to announce
the names of those to be charged with the crimes if those names
were not provided to him by the honor board, and yet the honor
board denies doing anything of the kind.
It is also unclear how the soldiers now charged with the crimes
were "motivated" to admit their involvement in detailed
statements made at National Police . Headquarters on January 13 and
14, immediately after the honor board had completed its work.
There is no known record of any kind concerning the proceedings
of the honor board. Because of the confusion surrounding its
role, Judge Zamora reportedly intends to ask the members of the
board to come forward and present testimony in the case.

- 36 -

Gathering Evidence. Those arrested as a result of the statements
given at the National Police Headquarters on January 13-14 were
Col. Benavides, Lieutenants Espinosa and Cerritos from the
Atlacatl, Lt. Mendoza from the Military School, and five
soldiers, including the deserter, Sierra Ascencio.
On January 16, the accused appeared before Judge Ricardo Zamora
to give formal declarations in the case. Col. Benavides,
accompanied by the Director of the National Guard, Col. Juan
Carlos Carrillo Schlenker, ·testified for more than two hours and
reportedly denied all charges.
On the 19th, Judge Zamora announced his finding that there was
sufficient evidence to hold all the prisoners under provisional
arrest for the next stage in the judicial process, called the
"investigative phase". The proceedings in the case currently
remain in the investigative phase.
During the investigative phase, the judge attempts to gather evidence
to determine whether a trial is warranted. The investigative phase in
the Salvadoran judicial process is slated to last a maximum of 120
days after the provisional detention of the suspects begins, which in
this case was o~~anuary 19. After 120 days, the judge is supposed to
decide whether to conduct a trial or release the detainees. In
practice, the investigative phase often exceeds 120 days, and
detainees are kept in confinement until a decision on whether to
conduct a trial is made by the judge. As a result, there is no
effective deadline on when a decision to go to trial in the Jesuits'
case will be made.
At the present time, Judge Ricardo Zamora is directing the
investigation into the Jesuits' murders and is reportedly interviewing
two or three witnesses (from a list of 180) per day. In addition to
interviewing witnesses, the Judge is empowered to request additional
investigative assistance from the SIU and other elements of the
security forces. For this system to work effectively, a high degree of
cooperation between the judge and those with investigative capability
is required. Unfortunately, a high degree of cooperation has yet to

- 37 materialize in this case.
Since the arrests were made in January, the judge and the head of the
SIU, Lt. Col._Rivas, have only met once (in late March); and that
meeting was arranged by the U.S. Embassy. According to Lt. Col.
Rivas, the meeting concluded with a promise from Judge Zamora to
follow-up with additional requests for information. To date, that has
not happened.
During the past three months, the SIU has taken only two initiatives
with regard to the Jesuits' case. At the urging of a U.S. Senator, it
is seeking to question the participants in a meeting of military
intelligence that took place at 7:30 a.m. on the morning of the
murders. And at the request of the judge, it has asked the Salvadoran
Military School to provide its vehicle log book for the night of the
murders. The process of questioning those at- the intelligence meeting
has just begun; the log books have disappeared.
In the meantime, both the SIU and the Judge have failed to act on
numerous suggestions from the U.S. Embassy and others that certain
individuals be questioned in the case. It has been suggested, for
example, that the investigators S?Ould question l) individuals who may
have talked to Col. Benavides and the others arrested about their
possible involvement in the crimes; and 2) officers assigned to the
Military School on the night of November 15-16, including Lt. Col.
Camilo Hernandez, the second in command, about any information they
might have concerning events at the School before, during and after
the time the murders took place.
Problems for the Prosecution.
a. Co-defendant testimony. On March 21, Salvadoran President Cristiani
said in an interview that he is "not confident that (Col. Benavides)
is going to be convicted." The President added, "I'd be sad if he is
acquitted because I think he is guilty based on the investigation."
The reasons for President Cristiani's skepticism are found in several
characteristics of the Salvadoran judicial system. One of the rules
'

-

38 -

of evidence in El Salvador is that the testimony of one co-defendant
is not admissible as evidence against another person charged in the
same crime. This rule, which has hindered criminal proceedings in
several other prominent human rights cases involving military
personnel, prevents the testimony of soldiers who may have committed
murder from being used to incriminate those who ordered them to do so.
The prohibition on co-defendant testimony in Latin American law
originated in a desire to prevent "biased" testimony in court--i.e.,
testimony from persons who stand to benefit or lose from the outcome
of the trial. Most Latin American legal systems now allow the judge
at least some flexibility in determining whether co-defendant
testimony should be allowed. However, this is not the case in El
Salvador.
In 1986, the Salvadoran Assembly did modify the co-defendants rule for
some crimes. At the time, criminal proceedings were beginning in a
case in which military personnel and right-wing paramilitarists were
accused of kidnapping wealthy civilians for ransom while making the
crimes appear to be the work of' the FMLN. Prosecution of the case had
the backing of some of the wealthiest members of Salvadoran society,
and yet the prosecution had been stymied by the rule against
co-defendants testifying against each other. As a result, the
Assembly passed a law allowing co-defendant testimony in cases
involving extortion, drug trafficking, and kidnapping only. Cases
involving murder or other heinous crimes were not included in the law.
Despite this change, the kidnapping-for-profit case has not come to
trial and, just this past week, charges were dropped against all but
two of those arrested.
The question prosecutors will face in the Jesuits' case is whether
there is enough evidence, other than that provided by his
co-defendants, to force Col. Benavides to stand trial. The current
admissible evidence against Col. Benavides appears to be
circumstantial and consists solely of the facts that he was the
commander of troops within the sector where the Jesuits were killed,
that some of those troops have admitted carrying out the murders, and
that there is physical evidence linking those soldiers to the crimes.
'

- 39 -

El Salvador's Attorney General, Mauricio Eduardo Colorado, told
the Task Force that he believes the evidence currently available
would not be sufficient to convict Col. Benavides. However,
Ernesto Altsc~ul, Vice Minister of the Presidency, urged the Task
Force not to conclude that Col. Benavides will be released for
lack of evidence.
It is possible that Judge Zamora or the SIU will be able to
uncover other evidence implicating Col. Benavides. If not, some
have suggested that the prosecutors should drop the charges
against one of the accused triggermen and then use his testimony
to build a stronger case against the Colonel •
.

In the U.S., charges might even be dropped against someone at
Benavides' level if he presented firm evidence that superior
officers ordered him to carry out the murders. In El Salvador,
though, there is no tradition of this type of plea-bargaining or
granting of immunity. There is, however, precedent for dropping
the charges against individuals with minimal culpability in a
crime in exchange for testimony against others more seriously
involved. One possible option for the judge in this case might be
to drop the charges in excha~ge for testimony against one of the
three lieutenants who was present when Col. Benavi~es allegedly
gave the orders, provided there is no evidence that the
lieutenant shot, or ordered the shooting, of any of the victims.
b. Venue. One other potential problem for the prosecution,
primarily because of the delay it would cause, is a motion from
defense attorneys to have the jurisdiction of the case changed to
a court in Santa Tecla, which is where the UCA is located. The
defense claims that the current court does not have jurisdiction
because the crimes were committed in Santa Tecla, not San
Salvador.
Upon the request of Judge Zamora, Attorney General Colorado
submitted an advisory opinion on the motion, finding that a
change of venue is warranted under the law. In late April, Judge
Zamora issued a ruling in which he disagreed with the Attorney

- 40 -

General. Judge Zamora's ruling remains subject, however, to a
possible appeal to the Supreme Court.
Discussion and Findings. The Task Force has reached three
principal findings concerning the more recent stages of the
investigation as it affects those currently under arrest.
First, the Task Force hopes that President Cristiani, the armed
forces, and Judge Zamora will work to clear up the mystery
surrounding the actions of the Military honor board during the
week of January 7-13. This critical period in the investigation
resulted in a narrowing of the range of suspicion from 45 members
of the Atlacatl unit, plus two officers from the Military School,
to the nine who were arrested. All information provided to the
honor board by any of the soldiers involved s~ould be available
to the judge and the prosecution. Instead, there is currently no
record of its actions and no admission on the part of the honor
board that it gathered any information, at all. This is not
credible, and in a serious investigation, not acceptable.
Second, the Task Force hopes that the investigators, including
both the Judge and the SIU, will begin to work more closely and
that they will actively seek new evidence against those arrested,
including Col. Benavides. Given the legal difficulties resulting
from the prohibition on co-defendant testimony, an ongoing effort
to gather additional evidence is required if justice is to be
done.
Finally, the Task Force hopes that the investigators and
prosecutors in this case will take advantage of every option
within the Salvadoran legal code that would permit them to make a
strong case against Col. Benavides, the most senior officer
currently charged. Specifically, this means that consideration
should be given to dropping charges against one of the
lieutenants in return for his testimony against the Colonel.

'

- 41 -

WERE OTHERS INVOLVED? THE INVESTIGATION'S GREATEST FAILURE.
From the day ~he murders occurred, Jesuit leaders and others have
expressed doubt that a crime of such gravity could have been
committed without the knowledge and consent of high officials
within· the Salvadoran armed forces. The High Command, on the
other hand, has denied ordering, consenting to, or covering up
the murders. The Task Force is very concerned that no serious
effort has been made by the investigators to determine whether or
not the possibility of higher level involvement is supported by
fact.
Need for Further Investigation--Specific Issues.
The need to consider the possibility of higher level involvement
would not arise if it were clear, from the facts already
established, why, how and by whom the decision to murder the
Jesuits was made. In this case, however, it is not clear. A
number of issues have come to light since the investigation began
that bear on this question, but which have not been seriously
investigated. The following is a discussion of some of these
issues.
a. The Meeting of the High Command. As discussed earlier, a
meeting of the Salvadoran High Command, including Col. Benavides,
began at 7:30 p.m. on November 15.
According to the military officers who attended the meeting and
with whom we spoke, the subject of the Jesuits did not come up at
this meeting. Salvadoran authorities argue that the meeting ·was
so large, in any event, that a decision to murder the Jesuits
would not likely have been made or announced at such an event.
In addition, one of those present, Col. Heriberto Hernandez,
then-director of the Treasury Police, later took a polygraph
examination in which he was asked about an order to kill the
Jesuits and--according to U.S. officials--showed no deception
when he denied knowledge of such an order.

- 42 -

Despite this, the Task Force believes that a meeting held
immediately prior to the murders, involving the individual
charged with ordering them, is of obvious importance to the
investigation. To date, not one of those who attended the meeting
has been required to give a formal statement concerning the
meeting, itself, or any conversations they might have had with
Col. Benavides before or after it.
In this connection, the Task Force notes that Col. Sigfrido Ochoa
(ret.), a senior official of the ARENA party, has alleged
publicly that a second meeting was held that night involving the
High Command, Col. Benavides and others with direct operational
responsibility in San Salvador. Neither Col. Ochoa, nor those
alleged to have participated in such a meeting, have been
questioned by investigators.
b. The Radio Call. Lt. Espinosa was allegedly assigned by Col.
Benavides to lead the operation against the UCA. According to his
own testimony, the lieutenant received a radio instruction at
10:15 on the night of the murders to assemble his troops at the
military school. Lt. Espinosa did not identify who gave him the
order. This means that the radio call was received either from
Col. Benavides, while he was still at the . meeting of the High
Command, or from someone else. In either case, serious questions
are raised. If Col. Benavides made the call while still at the
High Command, did he do so with the knowledge, or at the
direction, of others? If someone other than Col. Benavides made
the call, who was it and why would his instructions have been
obeyed by Lt. Espinosa?
To date, neither the SIU nor the judge has made any effort to
investigate this radio call or to .identify the radio operator who
may have made it.
c. The Atlacatl Unit. The Commando Unit of the Atlacatl Imrnediate
Reaction Infantry Battalion is one of the best-trained and most
experienced units in the Salvadoran armed forces. The question is
why this elite unit was assigned to the Military School when the

- 43 -

remainder of its battalion was engaged in heavy fighting against
the FMLN elsewhere in the city. It is worth noting, in this
context, that the first action undertaken by the unit after it
was assigned to the Military School on the afternoon of November
13 was to search the UCA. The last action it took before
rejoining the rest of the Atlacatl about 6:00 a.m. on the 16th
was to murder the Jesuits.
To date, the investigators have not questioned those in the High
Command who ordered the assignment and re-assignment of the unit
about their motives for doing so.
d. Military Intelligence and the Search of the OCA on November
13th. The same unit that allegedly carried out the murders
searched the UCA on November 13th, less than three days before
the crimes were committed. The SIU took detailed statements from
members of the unit about that search. Despite this, none of the
statements mentioned the presence throughout the search of an
official from Salvadoran military intelligence named Lt. Hector
Ulises Cuenca Ocampo. According to later testimony provided by
Lt. Espinosa of the Atlacatl, his unit was about to enter the UCA
on the 13th when it received a radio call from Lt. Ocampo, who
asked him to wait until he arrived. Lt. Espinosa complied.
To date, the investigators have not attempted to establish how or
why military intelligence got involved in the search of the UCA,
whether a report on the search was filed, or whether any actions
were ordered as a result. Not even Lt. Ocampo has been
questioned.
e. Armed Forces Reaction. Almost i.mmediately after the bodies .
were discovered, the Armed Forces released an official communique
stating their condemnation of "the treacherous murder committed
by the FMLN guerrillas." A similar communique was issued the
following day.
The investigators have made no effort to determine whether these
communications were simply a reflexive reaction on the part of

- 44 -

military propagandists to the crimes, or part of a planned
effort, crudely begun at the scene of the crime, to strike back
at the Jesuits and gain public relations mileage by blaming the
FMLN at the same time.
Need for Further Investigation--General Issues.
The need to investigate questions such as those listed above is
strengthened by other factors. These include the nature of the
. crimes committed, the history of ill feeling between the Jesuits
and some in the armed forces, the past record of Col. Benavides
and the manner in which the operation that allegedly resulted in
the killings was conducted.
a. Nature of the crimes. The murders of the Jesuit fathers were
crimes of immense national and international importance. The
possibility that Col. Benavides would personally conceive of and
execute an operation of this magnitude and brutality struck
virtually everyone with whom we talked who knew Col. Benavides as
extremely remote.
Unlike several other senior officers, Col.
Benavides did not have a history of political activism; he had
not been accused of human rights violations in the past; he was
not known to make public statements crit~cal of the Jesuits, or
for departing from the chain of command in carrying out his
military responsibilities.
Col. Benavides is a member of the Tandona, the powerful 1966
graduating class of the Salvadoran Military Academy. He was a
classmate of Chief of Staff Ponce, Deputy Defense Minister Zepeda
and then-Chief of Operations, Col. Cerna Flores, all of whom were
in positions senior to him when the crimes took place. These are
people with whom he has worked on ~lose terms all his adult life.
Even if he had considered ordering troops under his command to
murder the Jesuits, it would have been consistent with Salvadoran
military tradition and his own personal history to have checked
first with his superiors to determine whether their judgment
confirmed his own. Why risk his career on an action that seemed
likely, at a minimum, to prompt grave suspicion of the armed

- 45 -

forces as an institution?
When asked by the Task Force, neither Col. Ponce nor Col. Zepeda
could answer these questions. Instead, they expressed the same
puzzlement that Members of the Task Force felt about Col.
Benavides's possible motives. They argued, however, that they
themselves understood the negative repercussions that murdering
the Jesuits would have and said that, for that reason, they would
never have ordered or consented to such a crime.
Three theories about Col. Benavides' motivation have been put
forward by U.S. and Salvadoran officials with whom the Task Force
has talked. The first is that Col. Benavides was experiencing
great stress as the result of a serious illness to his son which
became evident shortly after the guerrilla offensive began. They
suggested that Col. Benavides might have attributed his son's
illness in some way to the offensive and felt a personal
grievance against the guerrillas as a result.
The second theory, which is not- inconsistent with the first, is
that Col. Benavides may have erroneously interpreted a general
exhortation on the part of his superiors to "strike back hard at
guerrilla command centers" as an order to kill the Jesuits • . _ One
military officer told us that "although Benavides didn't have any
'command centers' in his sector, he did have the UCA, and for
some that was the same thing."
Finally, Col. Zepeda, among others, suggested that Col. Benavides
may have acted in response to pressure from younger officers
under his command.
Col. Benavides has not volunteered any information that would
prove or disprove the theories or suspicions thus far put
forward. The Task Force believes that the doubts about his
motivation in the case provide an important additional reason for
investigating the possibility that other senior military officers
were involved.

- 46 -

b. History of Military Hostility towards the Jesuits. The
long-standing suspicion within the military that the Jesu i ts were
aiding the guerrillas has already been discussed. Col. Zepeda,
among others, _has made statements to this effect. Threats
directed at Father Ellacuria and other Jesuit leaders were
broadcast over government-controlled radio soon after the
offensive began on November 11. There was an incident at the UCA
that same night during which the armed forces pursued FMLN forces
across the campus. Two days later, the military reported that
firing was coming fro~ inside the UCA and a search was
undertaken. A large number of military units were deployed close
to the UCA throughout the period in question.
By the 15th, the armed forces were, by all accounts, seriously
worried that the offensive might succeed. The decision made at
the High Command meeting that night was to strike back hard at
guerrilla command centers with air power. Some observers have
suggested that the anger and desperation of the armed forces had
reached the point where rational political calculations had been
superseded by a simple desire to strike back. The Task Force
believes that this possibility should be fully explored by the
investigators.
3. Conduct of the Operation. Col. Benavides and his troops
apparently made a crude effort to frame the FMLN for the murders.
One of the soldiers chosen as a triggerman was given an AK-47,
often used by the guerrillas. A fake firefight was staged at the
scene of the crime. A sign, purportedly written by the FMLN, was
left behind. And Col. Benavides wrote in his operations book that
a confrontation with the FMLN had occurred at the UCA at 12:30
a.m. on the 16th.
Col. Benavides made little apparent effort, however, to conceal
from other military officials what he had decided to do. Instead,
if the testimonies provided thus far in the case are accurate, he
ordered a unit numbering more than four dozen men, commanded by
two lieutenants who had been under his own command for only two
days, to assemble in an area heavily populated by other military

- 47 units, murder the Jesuits, fire a flare and then return to
headquarters.
Whether or not Col. Benavides was acting under orders, it can be
argued that he behaved as if he were. He promised his
lieutenants that they would be protected and solicited from them
no vows of silence or secrecy. He used forces that could be
traced directly to him. He turned over his operations book and
the AK-47 allegedly used in the murders to the SIU. And the
efforts to pin responsibility on the FMLN were so rudimentary
that only an all out effort by the military to block a serious
investigation could have made them hold up.
All of these circumstances contribute to the Task Force's view
that a full investigation into the possible involvement of other
senior military officers is needed.
d. Possibility of a Coverup. The possibility that senior officers
may have ordered the murders is both strengthened by the failure
of individuals within the military to come forward with
information about the crimes, and weakened by the apparent
cooperation of the High Command in the investigation.
To our knowledge, virtually no one in the Salvadoran armed forces
has voluntarily come forward with information that has helped
significantly in the investigation. More than 200 military
personnel were deployed in the area immediately around the UCA on
the night of the murders, presumably with instructions to be
awake, aware and watchful. In addition, 45-50 members of the
Commando Unit of the Atlacatl participated directly or indirectly
in the murders and it is probable--given human nature--that at
least some of them shared the information with others in the
military.
In addition, the Task Force has been told that three members of
military intelligence (DNI) witnessed the crimes from a nearby
building, briefly surveyed the murder scene after the curfew was
lifted at 6:00 a.m. and informed their superior officers at DNI

- 48 -

upon returning to headquarters. If this account is accurate, it
means that military intelligence knew which unit had perpetrated
the crimes shortly after the event. This leads, in turn, to the
question of whether this knowledge was disseminated within the
military, especially at the higher levels, and--if so--how
broadly.
The possibility that military officers may have participated in a
coverup, or otherwise failed to come forward with information in
the case is, to a certain extent, separate from the question of
who ordered the crimes. There exists, however, a stronger
incentive for those who are guilty than for those who are
innocent to cover up the facts in a murder case. In this
connection, the Task Force notes that Col. Ponce and the High
Command appear to have cooperated fully in responding to requests
for information and evidence from the SIU. This cooperation
included the transfer of one of the murder weapons to the SIU for
ballistics tests, along with the operations book belonging to
Col. Benavides.
The expressed willingness of the members of the High Command to
cooperate makes it even less easy for the Task Force to
understand the reluctance of the investigators to question them
individually about any additional knowledge they might have in
the case.
Discussion and Findings.
In our judgment, the investigation in the Jesuits' case has
failed to delve in any serious way into the possibility that
individuals other than Col. Benavides may have ordered the
murders. This contention is not disputed by the investigators
from the SIU. They consciously adopted a "from-the-bottom-up"
approach to the investigation, beginning with the physical
evidence and continuing up to Col. Benavides, whose refusal to
talk has apparently stopped them cold.
The SIU director, Lt. Col. Rivas# and others have argued that it

-

49 -

is not logical to question senior military officers in the
absence of evidence that they participated in the crimes. From
the viewpoint of the Task Force, however, that is not the issue.
The purpose of an investigation should be to explore all logical
possibilities concerning the identity of those directly or
indirectly responsible for the murders. The nature of these
particular crimes, coupled with the nature of the military
command structure and Col. Benavides' past history, lead us to
believe that higher orders could have been given. Exploring that
poss i bility does not require · the investigators to make
accusations; it simply requires them to seek information. This,
they have not done.
At a minimum, the Task Force hopes that the Judge, in cooperation
with the SIU, will proceed immediately to question the
appropriate officials, including those in military intelligence,
concerning:
o the meeting of the High Command on November 15th;
o the radio call to Lt . Espinosa at 10:15 on the night of the
murders;
o the reasons for the assignment and reassignment of the commando
unit of the Atlacatl during the period immediately preceding and
subsequent to the murders;
o the p r esence of an agent of military intelligence during the
search of the UCA two and a half days before the murders; and
o the possibility that information concerning the identity of
those who participated in the crimes was withheld by military
officers.

- 50 -

RELATED ISSUES

During the course of its inquiry into the Jesuits case, the Task
Force also examined, in less detail, a number of related issues
concerning the judicial system, the military as an institution,
human rights and the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the
war.
Judicial Reform.
It is vital, we believe, that the high degree of public concern
about the Jesuits' case, both in our own country and around the
world, not obscure the need for reforms that go far beyond the
success or shortcomings of a single criminal investigation. The
purpose of a judicial system is not to ensure justice in one case
or a few cases of special notoriety; it is to ensure professional
and systematic efforts to provide justice in all cases.
Unfortunately, the Salvadoran justice system flat out does not
work. Although this report will not attempt a comprehensive
analysis of that system or of the issues that need to be
addressed in order to reform it, there are two matters that are
directly related to the Jesuits' case and that are worthy of
mention here.
First, El Salvador desperately needs independent criminal
investigative capability. The SIU, which was created as part of a
U.S.-financed judicial reform effort begun in 1984, is neither
independent enough, nor large enough, to meet the nation's needs.
Although the SIU has made an important contribution to the
Jesuits' case, among others, it has done so despite an inherent
conflict of interest. SIU investigators are military officers. If
they want to be promoted, they must have the support of their
fellow officers and of the High Command. In the Jesuits' case,
the fact that Lt. Col. Rivas has been put in the position of
investigating officers of higher rank has gravely complicated his
task.

- 51 -

The Task Force hopes that President Cristiani will pursue plans
to develop an independent civilian police, with full powers of
investigation and full authority to gather evidence in criminal
cases. Unlike the SIU, its mandate should be to provide an
investigative capability in all cases, not just those of
particular political importance.
Second, the Task Force has learned through its inquiry in the
Jesuits' case that the Judge plays a role in the Salvadoran
justice system that is even more central and more important than
in ours. The system simply cannot work if the judge does not make
it work. Unfortunately, judges in El Salvador are under-paid,
under-staffed, under-equipped and under-protected. They are
highly vulnerable--and highly susceptible--to bribery. They are
frequently threatened. And they are sometimes killed.
The Task Force hopes that the Cristiani government, with support
from the U.S., will develop and implement a systematic program
for recruiting, training and protecting judges and other court
officers in El Salvador, building on the preliminary steps that
have thus far been taken.
Military Reform.

The need for reform within the military is obvious and admitted
by the civilian leadership of El Salvador.
The Tanda System. A central feature of the Salvadoran military is
the tanda system. A tanda is a graduating class of officers from
the Salvadoran military school. By tradition, members of a tanda
help each other, advance within the armed forces together, and
are loyal to each other. The class of 1966 was particularly large
and is known as the Tandona. Its members currently hold most of
the key positions within the armed forces.
Loyalty to one's classmates is natural within any institution.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the loyalty among tanda
members, and especially members of the Tandona, has overridden

- 52 -

questions of competence, integrity and even criminality of
behavior.
Under the tanda system, the most severe punishments accorded even
those who commit serious abuses are job reassignments which do
not affect rank or pay or prospects for a comfortable retirement.
Recent examples of this involving Tandona members include the
reassignment of Col. Carlos Guzman Aguilar, who is believed to be
corrupt, as military attache in Costa Rica; the reassignment of
Col. Hector Heriberto Hernandez, who is believed to be both
corrupt and brutal, as commander of the Sixth Brigade; and the
continued assignment of Col. Roberto Mauricio Staben, who is
believed to be corrupt, brutal and criminal, as commander of the
7th Detachment. Numerous other members of the Tandona remain in
positions of authority despite reputations for incompetence,
corruption, brutality or all three.
The willingness of the Salvadoran armed forces to tolerate
unprofessional behavior from its senior officers damages its
military effectiveness, demoralizes its younger officers and
diminishes its support among the Salvadoran people. Two groups
within the military, one consisting of captains and the other of
majors, submitted reports to the High Command last fall
complaining about corruption and urging that promotions be based
more on merit and less on standing within a tanda. This exercise
in internal criticism is encouraging, but it is not clear that
the recommendations contained in these reports will be taken
seriously.
Human Rights. The most serious test of the professionalism of the
military arises when its own members are suspected of involvement
in a significant abuse of human rights. Despite the all too
extensive experience that the armed forces of El Salvador have
had with such suspicions, they have permitted their forces to be
investigated only when external pressures forced them to do so.
The Jesuits' case is an illustration of this.
Moreover, the armed forces have not yet learned the advantage of

- 53 -

candor in dealing with the public or with their own government
when controversial cases arise. During the Task Force's visit to
El Salvador in February, for example, a refugee re-settlement
village in Ch~latenango was rocketed by the Air Force, killing
six civilians, following a fight with guerrillas in that same
province. Despite abundant physical evidence to the contrary, the
armed forces immediately denied responsibility for the attack and
blamed the FMLN. Its version was quickly disproved.
This type of denial and subsequent retraction has been repeated
many times, including another case that the Task Force looked
into, the murder of two suspected FMLN agents near the village of
Tres Ceibas in July, 1989. In that case, the two _victims were
beaten to death separately, one buried at the scene, the other
returned to the headquarters of the First Brigade where he was
kept without medical care for a week before being transferred to
a hospital, where he died. The initial explanation provided by
the military was that the two victims had "fallen off a truck".
In September, 1988, soldiers from the Fifth Brigade murdered ten
campesinos near the town of San Sebastian. The military
immediately said that the deaths occurred during a "firefight"
with guerrillas. After the bodies were exhumed and shown to have
been executed at close range, the military argued that the FMLN
had dug up the bodies, shot them in the head, and re-buried them
to make it look as if the Army had done it. Strong pressure from
U.S. Ambassador William Walker, coupled with ballistics evidence,
ultimately led the military to admit responsibility, but no trial
has yet been held.
Discussion and Findings.
From the time it was created, our Task Force has been asked by
U.S. and Salvadoran officials to consider the Jesuits' case and
other problems involving the Salvadoran military in isolation. We
were asked to believe that the difficulties that have arisen were
caused by individuals acting on their own, and that they should
not reflect ~adly on the institution, itself. The Deputy

- 54 -

Minister of Defense, Col. Zepeda, attempted to illustrate this
point by telling the Task Force that "it would be wrong to blame
all the apostles for the actions of Judas."
Without taking Col. Zepeda's comparison too literally, the Task
Force agrees that it would be wrong to hold other members of the
armed forces personally accountable for the actions of those who
murdered the Jesuits, or who have committed other serious human
rights abuses. We also believe, however, that it would be wrong
to ignore the need for institutional reform within the Salvadoran
military.
We are convinced that the military's contribution to the problems
of human rights and a paralyzed judicial system are not caused by
a few renegade officers; they reside at the heart of the armed
forces as an institution. Decades of power, tempered only by the
need to maintain a working alliance with wealthy landowners and
businessmen, have created an upper echelon within the armed
forces that too often finds deference to civilian ·authority
neither necessary nor desirable. The tanda system has insulated
many senior military officers from responsibility for their own
actions, harming discipline, undermining morale and eroding
professionalism. As a result, the armed forces remain unwiliing
to police themselves, and only accept · the right of others to do
so when enormous pressure is applied.
The Task Force hopes that the civilian leadership within El
Salvador will make a stronger effort to encourage reform within
the armed forces, including-o the removal of corrupt, incompetent or criminal officers;
o the replacement of the tanda system with a system based on
merit;
o the adoption of new internal procedures for dealing with
allegations that members of the armed forces have violated human
rights; and

- 55 -

o the implementation of recommendations by younger officers to
reduce opportunities for corruption and to increase
accountability throughout the armed forces.
The Need For Peace.
The political extremes in El Salvador feed each other while those
in the center starve. With each bombing or land mine or offensive
or murder, the space for peaceful political debate diminishes and
the progress towards democracy slows.
A negotiated settlement of the war in El Salvador is essential
because far too many people have already died or been crippled or
driven into exile; because economic and social progress is not
possible in the midst of civil war; because neither side can win
on the battlefield; because the vast majority of the Salvadoran
people are sick of the violence; and because the opportunity for
a settlement that meets the minimum conditions of both sides has
never been greater.
Peace, if it comes, could--and should--have a profoundly positive
effect on some of the problems discussed in this report.
Peace could lead, as President Cristiani told the Task Force, to
a restructuring of the military, including the transfer of the
security forces to direct civilian control.
It could lead to the removal or retirement of senior officers
with less than distinguished records from the armed forces.
It could result in a diminution in the size, and therefore the
influence, of the military.
It could help create a political process capable of debating
constitutional and legislative questions, including those
concerning the proper role of the military in a democracy.
It could spur a serious effort at judicial reform.

- 56 -

It could magnify the effectiveness of the foreign assistance
provided to El Salvador, and permit a greater portion of that aid
to be used for economic rather than military purposes.
It could reduce or eliminate entirely the physical and economic
threats posed by assassination, sabotage and military actions
perpetrated by the FMLN.
It could, in short, lend added meaning to Salvadoran democracy;
opportunity to the Salvadoran economy; hope to the Salvadoran
people; and life, itself, to a nation that has been paralyzed for
a decade by a brutal civil war. Both the region and the world
within which El Salvador exists are changing; the promise of
democratic and nonviolent change has never been stronger or
nearer or more important; and the possibility of peace has never
been greater.
The Task Force's most important finding, therefore, is also its
simplest. El Salvador must have peace.

APPENDICES

APPEND I X A

tqt jptzsktr'• ~am•
,.j. ~ouu of ~pn1tnbrtiun
)llu~iJtston, c!)AI. 20515

December 5, 1989
Dear Joe:
on November 20, the House adopted H. Con. Res. 236 condemning
the recent violence in El Salvador and expressing its revulsion at
the mnrder ot six Jesuit priests and two women. In light of the
critical importance the resolution places on a satisfactory
prosecution ot thia case, and in an effort to ensure that any
progress is carefully monitored; I am appointing a special
committee composed of committee chairmen and members who closely
follow Central American issues. It will be part of and report to
the leadership's Central American Task Force, which has been
chaired since 1985 by Chief Deputy Whip David Bonior. I invite you
to chair this spacial committee.
The committee should employ the resources of the relevant
House committees and of its members to gather all available
information about the murders, those responsible and the process
undertaken to apprehend and bring them to justice.
Since the
murders were preceded by other unsolved political killings and
deteriorating human rights conditions, and by the failure of the
Salvadoran judicial system ~o offer either remedy or redress, the
committee should examine the way in which these factors contributed
or are relevant to the murders. I would expect the chairman to
keep me informed ot all developments in the case and that the
committee would make periodic reports to ma as well as to the Task
Force.
It is my sincere hope that the murderers ot these innocent
victims will be tried promptly and punished for their crime and
that the committee's efforts will contribute toward this end.
With warmest personal regards, I am

Hon. John Joseph Moakley
221 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

)

APPENDIX B
~

(

·

CRS

Congressional Research Service• The Library of Congress• Washington, D.C. 20540

(Translation • Spanish)

FOURTH CRIMINAL COURT: 'San Salvador, at 3:45 p.m., January 18, 1990.
The legal period having expired for investigation or the accused present, Angel Perez
Vuquea, 30 years or age, student, native of Barrio El Trllnsito, San Miguel Tepezontea,
Department of La Paz, resident in the same place; Toma Zarpate Castillo, 28 years of age,
staff sergeant in the Army, native of Ahuachapan, resident on Final lat Street East, Barrio
La Vega, Ataco, Department of Ahuachapan; Antonio Ramiro Avaloe Vargu, 21 years of
age, soldier, native of Lourdes, Col6n, Department of La Libertad, resident on Fifth Street
West, House No. 1-6, Lourdes, Col6n, Department of La Libertad; Gonzalo Guevara
Cerritoe, 27 years of age, soldier, native of Santa Marla Oatuma, Department or La Paz,
resident in Colinas de San Francisco, Street No. 5, lot No. 4, house No. 16, San Salvador;
Jos4 Ricardo F.spinoza Guerra, 28 years of age, soldier, native of Son.sonata, resident on San
Antonio Abad Street, No. 2425, Colonia Las Roas, or this city; Oecar Mariano Amaya
Grimaldi, 26 years or age, soldier, native or Jiquilisco, Department of Usulutan, temporary
resident in the barracks or the Atlacatl Battalion; Yuaaby Rem Mendoza Vallecill~ 26
years of age, Army Lieutenant, native of La Uni6n, resident at Reaidencial Betania, building
No. 4, house No. 1, Nueva San Salvador; Guillermo Al&edo Benavides Moreno, 44 years
of age, soldier (Colonel), native or this city, resident in Colonia General Arce, Capitan
Douglas Varela Street, housing development "E,· house No. 7, of this city; and Jorge
Alberto Cierra Ascencio, personal data unknown, since he is absent; they are charged with
the crime provisionally termed as murder, described and sanctioned in Art. 154, par. 1,
related to Art. 153, Nos. 2 and 6, of the same body of laws, against the persons Ignacio
Ellacurla; Ignacio Martfn Baro; Joaqufn L6pez y L6pez; Juan Ram6n Moreno Pardo;
Segundo Montes Mozo; Amando L6pez Quintanilla, all the above former members of the
Society of Jesus; as well as of Mn. Elba Julia Ramoe and her daughter Celina Marisela
Ramos; events occurring on November 16, 1989, in the early morning hours inside or the
residence of the Jeauit priesta, located next to the campus of Jose Sime6n Canas Central
American University (UCA), of this capital city.
From the evidence that appean in the information to date, the following is resolved:
The existence or body of the crime in the eventa that are being investigated has
been established in the corresponding lepl steps through the inspection made at the place
of the events, whose written record appears on pgs. 1151
and which in the pertinent
section states:

nt

•... On the eastern aide or Jose Sime6n Cafta.8 Central American University, the Jesuit
University Residence, at 10:10 a.m. of November 16, 1989... on the upper floor oC that
building there is a grassy area next to the building in which are found four numbered

CRS-2
corpses which were identified through priests Miguel Francisco Estrada and Francisco Javier
lbisate, thu,:
Body· number 1 corresponds to Amando L6pez, priest, 54 years of age, of Spanish
citizenship, who is found in the following position: head to the west, feet pointed to the
east, mouth down, left arm bent toward the west, right arm bent to the east; dressed in
striped shorts, green terrycloth poncho and green jeans;

Number 2 corresponds to Ignacio Martm Baro, priest, Vice Rector of this University,
46 years of age, bom in Spain and naturalized in El Salvador, who ii found in the
following position: head to the west, feet to the east, left arm to the west, right arm bent
to the north, right foot on the left, mouth down; wearing blue sport shirt, black leather
belt, gray pants, black shoes and socks.
Number 3 corresponds to Segundo Montee, priest, 56 years of age, born in Spain and
naturalized in El Salvador, who is found in the following position: mouth down, feet
extended to the northeast; head to the southwest, left arm and right arm bent below the
bead with direction to the south; wearing beige sborta, beige shirt and green jean,.
Number four corresponds to Ignacio E1lacuria, priest, Rector of thia University, 59
years of age, bom in Spain and naturalized in El Salvador, who i1 found in the following
position: mouth down, head to the north, feet to the south, left arm to the north, right
arm bent toward the face; wearing brown bathrobe, beige shorts with vertical stripes, blue
shoes.
In the northern part, one and a half meters away, approximately, from those bodies,
is a wall with multiple blood stains of different sizes and near the bodies particles of
encephalic mass; entry is made of the mixed construction described previously, to a hallway
one and a half meters wide by 20 meters long, approximately, indications being found of
blood as if a person were dragged toward the inside of the corridor. Next to the entrance
to the corridor, a brown Hush Puppy shoe is found.

In this place, upon inspecting the second room on the right side, the place where
the blood indications lead, another body is found, which, according to the priest Miguel
Francisco Estrada, belongs to Juan Ram6n Moreno Pardo, priest, 55 years of age, and of
Spanish citizenship, who ii found in the following position: mouth down, head to the west,
feet to the eut, arm, extended toward the southwest, dressed in black corduroy pants,
black belt, long-sleeve blue shirt, purple short.a, brown leather shoe on the right foot, Hush
Puppies, the same u the one found in the corridor.
And in the third room on the let\ another body ii found, which, according to the
priest Miguel Francisco Estrada, belongs to Joaqufn L6pes y L6pes, 71 years of age, priest,
of Salvadoran citizenship, Director of Obra Fe y Alegria /lit: faith and happiness/, who i•
found in the following position: mouth up, head to the east, feet to the west, arms bent
over the chest at the level of the nipples, and hands semi-closed; wearing a white sleeveleu
undershirt, brown pants, black belt and shorts with vertical stripe,.•.

CRS-3
Then we went to the west side of the construction, where the kitchen is, and in an
adjoining room are found the bodies of two women, who, according to the priest Francisco
Javier lbisate, belong to the cook, Elba Julia Ramoe, 40 yeare of age, approximately, and
other general data unknown, who is found in the following position: mouth up, head to the
north, left foot to the south and right foot to the southwest, right arm to the northwest,
left arm to the southeaat, both extended; she is wearing: a blue dreu, beige slip, black
leather shoe1, white bra; and her daughter, named Celina Ramoe, 15 yeare of age,
approximately, and other data unknown, who ia found in the following position: mouth up,
next to the body of the first, head to the north, feet to the south, right arm over the chest,
left . arm perpendicular to the left side with direction to the north; wearing blue shorts,
black, orange, red and beige vertically 1triped blouse, white leather shoea with laces.
Next, we proceeded to inspect the lower part or the building, finding on the inside
passage an undetermined amount of heavy calibre rifle cartridgea.. .-: and, through the legal
medical examinations made on the bodies of those now deceased, added to pgs. 1153, 1183,
1188, 1186, 1158, uosm, 1104 and 1187 /!/, in which the respective forensic doctors
determined that the cause of death of the priest Joaquin L6pes L6pes was the lesions
produced with a firearm and which damaged lunp, heart and liver, this causing at the
same time irreversible thoracic-abdominal hemorrhagic shock; of Juan Ram6n Moreno, the
destruction of the encephalic mass, caused by firearm lesion,, which in tum caused
irreversible cerebral hemorrhagic shock; of Ignacio Ellacwia, severe cranial encephalic
traumatism produced by firearm lesions which caused the destruction of the encephalic
mass and irreversible cerebral hemorrhagic shock; of Amando L6pes, severe cranial
encephalic traumatism produced by firearm lesions, which · caused destruction of the
encephalic mass and irreversible cerebral hemorrhagic shock; of Segundo Montes, severe
cranial encephalic traumatism, produced by a firearm, which caused irreversible cerebral
hemorrhagic shock; of Ignacio M.artm-Baro, severe cranial encephalic traumatism produced
b,1 a firearm, which caused irreversible cerebral hemorrhagic shock; of Mrs. Elba Julia
Ramos, destruction of the encephalic mass produced by firearm, which caused irreversible
hemorrhagic shock; and of the minor Celina Marisela Ramoe, severe thoracic and cranial
encephalic traumatism produced by firearm, which in tum produced irreversible
hemorrhagic shock; the violent death to which the murder victima were subjected being
established with the above.
The material participation of the accused Angel Phes Vuques was proven
sufficiently through hil own out-of-court confeuion, rendered at the General Office of
National Police, at 8 a.m. on the 14th or this month and year, which in the pertinent
section aaya: •...That he admit.I responsibility in having killed a person who was at the
UCA facilitiN, and about that he can aay the following: That he is on duty with the fourth .
company and stationed in the Commando Section of the Atlacatl Battalion, with
headquarters at the Sitio del Niiio in the ·Department of Libertad... that on the 15th at 6:00
p.m. Lt. Espinoza gave the order for them to leave the Military School and take a position
on the west side of UCA, because of having knowledge that in it there waa a concentration
of subversive, and that they had personnel wounded; so that they left through the back
door of that school, they walked along a street that passes by a champedo /meaning not
found/ until reaching the Southern Expressway and they posted themselves on a street

(..

CRS-4

that lead, to a theater. They bad as an order to return at 8:00 p.m. if there were no
problems, but 1ince there was a small confrontation in the sector around the theater, where
a member of the National Guard died, the Commander of the patrol decided to take
positions o~ the south side of the theater, that be remembers that around midnight a
soldier came to call them and took them around the corner of the theater where the rest
of the section wu located, Lt. Espinoza and Second Lieutenant Cerrito• and another
lieutenant who the speaker saw for the first time and apparently he is on duty in the
Military School; that Lt. Espinoza gathered some of them together and told them that he
had received an order, without specifying from whom, but that it dealt with eliminating the
intellectual leaden of the guerrillas and that they were inside the UCA, that in addition
the soldier Amaya Grimaldi, aliu "Pilijay" had the mission of murdering those who were
there and that he would do it with an AK 47 rifle, which had been assigned to him for
some three month,. He also told them that at the moment of withdrawal there would be
a flare and later a simulation of a confrontation would take place; later the entire Section
of Commandoe, plus the soldiera that had been added before that, approached the south
side entrance to that university, that since it wu closed, the soldiers that went first opened
it by force. Now being inside in a disorderly form they advanced to the building where the
persona were that they were going to eliminate for which purpose a group of soldiers
advanced along the lefl aide and others along the right u if trying to surround the place
of their interest; that the declarant remained on the left side in front of a glaaa door, that
in that place there wu no electrical energy, being able to observe that several of hi•
companions broke the glass door and entered the lower level, where they proceeded to bum
documents. Then the declarant entered through the same door together with Sgt. Molina
Aguilar and they opened a wood door by force where there were only books; it was at that
time that he beard several shots in the upper part of the building, that about eight
minutes later the declarant went up to the second floor of that building and entered a
hallway where there were several rooms. When he left for the other side, i.e. outside of
the building, be was able to observe several dead persona in that same instant he saw that
from the hallway was leaving a tall man with white clothing, that man left and observed
the bodies, returning immediately to the inside of the building. It was then that several
soldiers were speaking to him saying to him, "Pal, come here,• and the man paid no
attention. When he wu now going to enter a room there was a soldier that fired at him,
not remembering if it wu shot to shot or in a burst, the speaker being able to observe
that the man fell to the floor; the reason why the declarant went near that room in order
to carry out the aearch. And when he was passing over the man at whom they had tired,
he felt him grab hia feet, to which he stepped back and fired at him, shooting four
times ...immediately be heard that bi, companion1 were saying that it waa now time to
withdraw, the reuon wh7 he left through some stain until reaching a street where some
vehicle1 were parked, observing that at that moment they set off the flare, be also observed
that several of hia companiona, without knowing who, were destroying the glass of the
window• of the vebiclea and that in addition a group was simulating a confrontation ..."
A confession that wa, ratified by the eye-witnesses to it, Juan Pablo Uribe Vargas and Luis
Alonao Garda Gonzilez, of ps. 1320 fl/ and 1326, respectively.

CRS-5
With re,pect to the criminal participation of the defendant Tomu 1.arpate Castillo,
the neceeaary evidence bu been established through bis own out-of-court confession
rendered at the General Office of the National Police, at 5 p.m. on the 13th of this month
and year, which, in the essential, says, ~ ...that he takes responsibility for the crime with
which he iB charged in these and on them he can say the following: That he is on duty
in the Eighth Company and stationed in the Commando Section of the Atlacatl Battalion,
with headquarters in Sitio del Nino, Department of La Libertad, u a staff sergeant... that
not until the 15th at 7:40 p.m. did he receive the order from Lt. Espinoza to go with his
patrol and to take a position on the south side or the University that is mentioned above
i.e. by the street light that is located on the southeast side or said University, since there
was knowledge that at that center or studies they were going to take some wounded
delinquents/terrorists (Dtr), having been led on foot, leaving through the rear door of the
School, go1ng to near the Torre Democracia, then he continued crossing the expressway and
took a direct street, i.e. on the southern side of that tower until reaching the area of an
alleyway that is located on the right side of that street and which leads to another street
that ends up at the southern door of that University. In that place, around the alley, he
remained until 9 p.m. Then he moved and remembers that he passed by the main
southern door that is mentioned before until reaching the Colonial Theater, where he
remained until 1:30 a.m. on the 16th, that at that time Lt. Espinoza Guerra talked to him
by radio to tell him to move to the east side of his poaition, remembering that he walked
some 100 meters, reaching a wide street that -leads to the bank, observing that in that
place was part of the Commando Section, Lt. Espinoza, 2nd Lt., Cenitoi and another
officer that he does not know, but that later he learned that he was from the Military
School, that upon his arrival he was introduced to Lt. Espinoza and he told him that they
were going to mobilize at the University since they had knowledge that the people staying
there were terrorists and that it was necessary to eliminate them, that after that all the
section moved··toward the UCA facilities, the speaker recalling that his patrol entered
through the south door of that university, which was open, then he went down some stairs,
reaching a wide street he crossed to the right until reaching a door of metallic mesh, upon
reaching it he entered and walked a few meters until reaching another door that is on the
left side and which is of wood, in that place the lieutenant of the Military School ordered
him to remain in it and not to let anyone leave, that at that moment he heard a sound
and on turning his sight to the inside of the room, he was able to see two women, one of
them seated on a bed and the other wu lying down, that he could see that through the
clarity of the moon that wu entering the room, later be heard a noise and a shout and
several 1hota, then be heard the voice of someone that was saying ffNow: as if he was
giving a voice or command and that immediately be heard a round of shots, so that the
speaker ,ayt that he tired at the two women that he was watching over, not remembering
the amount or lhota be tired, but that it was shot to shot, that upon being sure that those
women had died since they no longer were complaining, he began the retreat through the
same door of metallic mesh ... that then he went to the main door where he had entered,
being able to observe that the rest of the Section simulated a confrontation and they set
up a flare, not knowing who did it..:; out-of-court confession that was legally ratified by
the eye witnesse, to it, Luis Alonso Garcfa Gonzalez and Jose Fredia Retana Chavez, of pa.
1334 and 1318, respectively.

CRS-6

With reepect to the criminal participation of the accused Antonio Ramiro Aval<>1
Varga, the necessary evidence has been established in a legal form through his own outof-court confeNion rendered at the General Office of th~ National Police, at 3 p.m. on the
13th of this month and year, that in the pertinent part says: •... That he takee responsibility
for having participated in the crime that is being investigated and with respect to it he
states the following: That he has about five years of being on duty in the previously
mentioned Battalion, forming part of the Commando Company, which is commanded by
Lieutenant Josi Ricardo Espinoza Guerra and as executive Second ·Lieutenant Gonzalo
Guevara Cerritos, the sergeant of that company being Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel.
That the declarant has the nickname of "Sapo• or "Satanu:.. .He remembers that on the
15th of November of last year, at about 10:00 p.m. · they were formed opposite the
Prevention Guard of the Military School and at which were present the patrol, number 3,
4, 6, and the one of the speaker, and in addition two patrols more were added of 15
members each, still of the Atlacatl Battalion, since the first and fifth patrol of his company
had previously left in order to carry out a counterinsurgency mission since he recalls that
from the day in which they arrived at that School there had been continuous
confrontations with the delinquents/terrorists (D/I') who were attacking the city; that when
they were formed, together with the two officers from his company, these two officera took
the chiefs of the patrols present there out of the formation and a abort distance from that
place got them together, recalling that the heads of patrols were: Sergeant Zarpate Castillo,
of the .third patrol; Sergeant Molina Aguilar, of the fourth patrol; and Sergeant Gonulez
Rodriguez, who at that time was a corporal, of the sixth patrol; all of his company, as well
as also in the command of another patrol added was a sergeant who they called "Salvaje,•
not knowing the name or nickname of the head of the other patrol, but they also did fonn
part of that gathering; that being together, the Company Commander told them that they
would go out to carry out a delicate mission and one that was ordered from above, the
senior officers not specifying who was giving that order; then they told them that the order
was to 1ocate some priests who were in the UCA University, because they were the leaders
of the Dtrs, whom they were supporting with everything, whether in the logistical,
transmissions, suggestions for the attacks on military installations and the civilian
population; that this mission was going to be carried out secretly, since there too they
would find subversive material that would be useful to them, among this medicine, shoes
and clothes. So the declarant and his other fellow patrol commanders as soldiers and
subordinate, that they are, agreed to carry out that order, since if they did not do it the
speaker thought that they could classify him as a traitor and as he again repeats, he is a
soldier loyal to bi, superiors and because in addition, they understood that those persons
that they would confront were Dtr, or the FMLN. After that they Jen in two Ford 250
pickups, beige, which are auigned to that achool, that being in the vehicles, a lieutenant
of that School arrived, whose name he does not know but he can recognize him if he sees
him, who was in military uniform, not remembering if olive green or camouflage, who
came out or the inside or the building of the School where the Guard Commander was and
who had in his bands an AK 47 rifle or the small type, also carrying in his hands some
long chambers for the same rifle and carrying an M16 rifle of the small type on hi•
shoulder; be then approached where they were in the vehicles and asked:"Whicb or you has
knowledge and can handle this weapon?· He showed them to them at that same instant,
so that everyone eaid aloud, "Pilijai can handle that weapon; referring to the soldier of his

CRS-7
patrol with the Jut namea of Amaya Grimaldi, observing that the soldier mentioned got
out of the vehicle and went to take the AK 47 with the chambers, proceeding to handle
it and at the same time be made the comment that the rifle waa completely dirty and that
it was not going to operate at the moment it was used, so that immediately Sergeant
Solorzano Esquivel, who was in one of the vehicles, got out and provided that soldier with
oil and other tool• so that he would clean that weapon, taking some 10 minutes in the
cleaning of it, and after that he tried it again, being satisfied with the cleaning he had
done ...that when they reached UCA it was about 1:00 a.m. already o1 November 16; that
immediately and after going down those steps they took the right along a paved street until
reaching where there waa an open shed and there he saw some vehicles parked, then they
continued the march and a few meters from that place they crossed to the right, passing
in front of a chapel, upon turning right, they went up some steps, coming to a main door,
observing that it was locked and with a key, and alongside this door there was metallic
mesh that surrounded the residence where the Lieutenant of the Military School said the
terrorist priests were living, so that they decided to jump that fence on the right side or
that door, the officers entering and the speaker accompanied by his patrol through that
place, now inside or the property, they surrounded the rooms of it; thee they bepn to beat
on the doors and windows of it, observing that one or his soldiers, cot recalling who ht
was, was beating with a piece of wood that they had found along the east side or the room
where the priests were sleeping, he was beating a door that was behind and to the aide ot
the residence, but after about 10 minutes ·of beating on those doors ansf windows the door
that they were beating with the chunk of wood was opened by a blond man in pajamas,
not recalling their color, who told them not to continue beating the doors and windows
because they were aware of what would happen to them; then the speaker led that man
to the part in front of the residence and where there is grass, observing that at that time
also coming through the door that is in the front part of that residence were four other
men, among them some dressed in pajamas and others in pants, some with sandals and
others with shoes, who were also gathered together next to the one he had under his
custody and on seeing that just he together with Amaya Grimaldi were watching over the
five men and that they lacked trust, that they could react against them, they chose to have
them lie down on the grass, at that instant, Sergeant Solorzano Esquivel entered the
rooms, with four more aoldiers of that patrol, to see if there were more persons inside; a
few minutes later after Sergeant Solorzano Esquivel had entered with the soldiers,
Lieutenant Espinoza Guerra, who was with the lieutenant of the Military School along the
steps at are at the entry to that residence, called him, so that immediately the speaker who
wu in Cront of the door to that residence walked a few steps to the step,, leaving Amaya
Grimaldi watchiDg over the five men, that on reaching where Lieutenant Espinoza wu, be
told the apeaker: ·At what time are you going to proceed,• the speaker understanding 81
an order to eliminate the five men that they had face down, so that be went back where
Amaya Grimaldi was; that the five men· were face down, lined from north to south, with
their heads toward the west, and their feet stretched toward the east; that the soldier
Amaya Grimaldi waa on the side of the heads of the first three who were from south to
north and the declarant was located in front of the other two who were on the north side
of the row; then he approached that soldier and in his ear said to him in a low voice:
"Let's proceed,• so that immediately Amaya Grimaldi, with the AK 47 rifle that the
lieutenant from the School had given him, began to fire at the three men that be had in

CRS-8
front and the speaker with his M16 rifle proceeded to fire at the head and body of the
other two that he had in front of him, at that moment he also heard shot, inside that
residence and that it waa where Sergeant Solopzano Esquivel had entered with the four
soldiers ...so the speaker began to walk toward the entry door of the residence on the side
of the chapel, it being at that time that he wu joined by the soldier Jorge Alberto Sierra
Ascencio, who wu providing security, but before reaching that main door, which wu now
open, he heard that from the inside of a room that is near that door, some persona were
moaning, so that be immediately thought that it wu persona at whoqi they had tired and
they were not dead, that on looking toward that place he observed that the room wu
without the light on and with the door open, so that he told the soldier Sierra Ascencio
to go to see and being at the door of that room, .the declarant lit a match, observing that
inside of it there were two women spread out on the floor and who were embracing,
moaning, so that he ordered the soldier Sierra Ascencio to rekill them, so that the soldier
with his M 16 fired a round like ot 10 cartridges toward the body of those women until
they no longer moaned ... that now being in front of the parking lot that is by the chapel,
one of the officers, not remembering who, told Corporal Cota Hernindez to fire his 40 mm
grenade launcher of illumination, which would serve u a signal for uniting the rest of the
staff that still had not arrived: The above transcribed out-of-court confesaion wu ratified
in legal form in this Tribunal by th, eye witnesses to it, Edgar Guzm4n Urquilla and
Mario Rems Ortiz Fabi4n, pa. /illeg./, respectively.
With respect to the accused Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, his criminal participation in
the crimes that are being investigated has been established sufficiently, through his own
out-of-court confession rendered at the General Office of the National Police at 1:00 p.m.
on the 13th of this month and year and which, in the essential part, says: •... that he does
not take responsibility for the acts with which he is charged in these proceedings, but
about it he can relate the following: that on Novembe: 13 of the recently past year, at
about 4 p.m. the declarant left the Atlacatl Battalion together with Lieutenant Jos~ Ricardo
Espinoza Guerra, Commander of the Commando Section, and 135 troop members, in some
four military vehicles headed for the Capitan General Gerardo Barrios Military School, the
place where they would remain in reserve under the command of Col. Alfredo Benavides
Moreno, Director of that School...that it wu not until the 15th of November at about 10
p.m., that being in the Colonia Arce together with six soldiers oC the troop and Lieutenant
Espinoza, a call wu received by radio to reconcentrate at the School, being Cor that reason
that the order wu obeyed, Lieutenant Espinoza reporting to Colonel Benavides that they
were now present, three patrols missing with which it bad not been possible to make
contact, they being those of Sergeant Cordova Monge, located around the Colonial Theater,
and the one of Sergeant Haum y Samson, who were around some old buildings located on
the west side of UCA University; that after that they went to rest at the place that they
had assigned at that School and that at about midnight of that day, the 15th, the Director
of it, ordered them called and upon reaching where he wu, with him wu Lieutenant
Mendoza Vallecill<>1, Colonel Benavides telling them, "Well, gentlemen, we're staking it all,
it's either us or them, since they have been the intellectuals that have led the guerrillas
for a long time: 'lbat in addition, after stating that he added ·that there wu Lieutenant
Mendoza and that since he is a comrade of Lieutenant Espinoza and bu more seniority,

CRS-9

he would be the one that was going to direct the operation, since already Espinoza•s
soldiera know where the Jesuit fathers sleep and I don't want witnesses: Then the three
officera left, being led by Lieutenant Mendoza, towards his tent; then the declarant with
Espinoza gathered together the chiefs of patrols that were there and relayed to them the
order that they had received from Colonel Benavides; ... that now being ready. in two Ford
pickups they went until getting to the west side of UCA University, between the old
buildings and the Colonial Theater, since there they got out of the vehicles and joined the
other patrols that were posted near that place... that it wu there where Lieutenant
Mendoza communicated to all of them the order that had been received from the Director
of the School and at the same time began to give the instructions, leaving on foot for the
southern entrance to said University... that when the speaker got to where there is a roofed
parking lot, he observed that some soldiers were jumping over a metallic mesh, which is
to the right of a two or three-story building. in which he supposes the Jesuit fathera
lived ... after being in that parking area some two minutes, he went toward a garden that
is near a traffic circle, staying some 30 meters away from the previously mentioned
building, where he observed some steps to the side of where he was; that being in that
place. he heard shota on the other side of that building, not being able to specify what
calibre the detonations were, since they sounded as if they were inside a building, so that
the declarant was afraid and decided to look for the exit, i.e. the part through which he
had entered, running into Lieutenant Espinoza, who was aro~nd where there are some
steps near that main door...but when they were some 100 meters "before getting to it, there
were loud explosions, rounds of machine gun, shots from an M 16 rifle, supposing that the
loud explosions were Law anti-tanks, not knowing if he was hearings shots from an AK
47, but he did observe that they sent up a flare inside the UCA ... this shooting for a period
lasted some 15 minutes more or less..." The out-of-court confession above was legally
ratified by the eye witnesses to it, Jod Lazaro Martinez and Milton Oswaldo Escalon
Fuentes, whose judicial statements are found on pa. 1341 and /ille~, respectively.

I

\

With respect to the accused JOM Ricardo F.spinoza Guerra, his criminal or .material
participation in the crimes being investigated has been established sufficiently through his
own out-of-court confession offered at the General Office or the National Police, at 11
a.m. on the 13th of this month and year, where however he does not take responsibility
for the acts or which he ia accused, in the course or it he admitted having participated in
the crimes for which they are being tried; said statement, in the essential part, says: •.. that
he does not auume re,pomibility for the acts or which he is accused in these proceedings,
but about them he can ltate the following: That he is on duty as Commander of the
Company or the Commando Unit of the Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion,
with headquarters in the canton Sitio El Nino, Department of La Libertad...over the course
of the 13th, 14th and the 15th of November of last year, recalling that this latter day, at
about 5 p.m., all the unit was occupying several positions in different sectors of the
periphery of the Military Complex ... it being about 10:15 p.m. oC the same day, the 15th of
November, when the unit was still occupying the previously described positions, that he
received an order by radio to regroup with his unit at the installations of the Military
School, so that the declarant began to radio all the patrols, but it became impossible to
sustain communication with Nahum, Salvaje, and Samson, as well as with Lagarto•a patrol,

CRS-10
so that he only returned to the Military School with the patrols or Satanas, Maldito, Rayo
and Aconalado, including with Second Lieutenant Cemtoa and Sergeant Solorzano Esquivel,
now being in that institution, at about 10:30 or 11 p,m. or the same day, the Logistical
Officer or _the Battalion, gave him the supplies ... that at about 11 p.m. on the same day,
Nov. 15, be received the order to appear before the Director or the Military School, Col.
Benavides, who was at the OperatiQns Center or that school, 80 that the speaker headed
for that place, then Lieutenant Yuashy Ren, Mendoza Valleci1101 anived1 who asked him
about Lt. Cemtos, the speaker answering that he waa around there, to which Lt. Mendoza
told him, "My Colonel Benavides wants to talk with you; 80 that he ordered Lt. CenitOI
called, the latter coming at that moment and with the three together, i.e., Lt. Mendoza, Lt.
Cenitos and the declarant, at about 11:15 p.m. on the 15th, Colonel Benavidea appeared
in the room where they were, who told them that they would go head for the main office,
because there were a lot or people there, that was how Lieutenant Mendoza, Second
Lieutenant Cemtos and the declarant accompanied Colonel Benavides, toward the office,
then in that place, Colonel Benavides told them the following: "This ia a situation where
it's them or us; we are going to begin with the leaders, inside the sector or ours we have
the university and there is Ellacurra: after this ha pointed to the declarant and told him,
"You did the search and your people know that place, use the same force aa the day or the
search and he must be eliminated and I don't want witnesses, Lieutenant Mendoza is going
to go with you as the one in charge of the operation 80 that there won't be any problema:
So that the speaker told Colonel Benavides that that waa a serious problem and the
Colonel answered him: ·Don't worry, you have my support.• That after having received the
above order, Lieutenant Mendoza Vallecillos offered the speaker and Lieutenant Cenitos
some camouflage bars...moments later Lieutenant Mendoza appeared, who asked the soldiers
if one of them could handle the AK4 7 rifle, observing that the soldier Oscar Mariano
Amaya Grimaldi answered that he could handle it, to which Lieutenant Mendoza told the
soldier, -Vitiri, you are the key man; taking him away immediately; that at s.bout 12:10
a.m. on November 16, the unit now being ready to leave and formed opposite the
Prevention Guard of the- Military School, he observed that the soldier Amaya Grimaldi was
seated along some steps of the Prevention Guard and that at that same moment he saw
that Lieutenant Mendo1:a was coming from inside the school installations, carrying an AK
47 rifle, which he immediately handed over to the soldier Amaya Grimaldi; Lieutenant
Mendoza immediately ordering taking up the trip on board two Ford 250 pickups, the
speaker recalling that at that moment they were a total of 36 people, but since not all the
people fit, part or the group remained, awaiting a second trip, the first group leaving
immediately together with Lieutenant Mendoza and the speaker in the second vehicle
Lieutenant Cerrito,, having taken the road toward Santa Tecla...then they take
Mediterrinao St., until reaching the pedestrian entry to UCA, the soldiers having forced
the door, then they entered the facilities of the Univenity until reaching the two-story
building belonging to the residence of the priests, observing that Amaya Grimaldi was going
alongside Lt. Mendoza, as well as his assistant, whom the speaker does not know, that at
about 1:15 a.m. on the same day, the 16th, he observed that the personnel were beginning
to bring a group of priesta, not counting how many there were and they ordered them to
spread out on a lawn in front of the building, 80 that on seeing thi1 the speaker opted to
withdraw little by little from that building, since he felt bad about what he was observing,
withdrawing with his eyes tearful, but when he had reached the step• that are located

CRS-11
about 15 meten from the building, he heard some voices, not being able to identify them,
and they aa.id: ·Quick, Quick, let's give it to them quick,• so.then he began to hear several
shots one by one but quick, not recalling if he had _heard bursts .. and when they were
around the Colonial Theater, they heard detonations of Law rockets, grenades and burst.a
of rifles and M 70 machine guns, ... and on looking to the facilitiee of UCA, the speaker
managed to observe that the sector was illuminated by flares ... then the declarant sought
Colonel Benavides, in order to complain to him, since he was indignant about what had
happened but upon not finding him, he chose to meet with his sta1t and moments later .
Colonel Benavides arrived, who told him, "What's wrong with you, you're worried,· to which
the speaker answered him, "My Colonel, I haven't liked this thing that'• been done.• ?And
he told him;Calm down, don't worry, you have my support, trust me,• to which the
speaker answered, "I hope so, my Colonel..• The out-of-court confesaion above, which hu
been ratified in legal form in this Tribunal by the witnesaes that have witnessed it, Jose
... Reta... Chavez and Douglas Alberto Tejada Maldonado of ps. 1332 and 13/?/, respectively.

(

With respect to the accused Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi, in this report hil
criminal participation has been established sufficiently, through his own out-of-court
confession rendered at the General Office of the National Police, on the 14th of thi1 month
and year at 10 a.m., who, in the pertinent part, stated: •... that he takes responsibility for
having participated in the death of three Jesuit priests, whose names he does not know;
that on that same event he can say the following: ...but he doe, remember that it wu
about midnight of the 15th of that month, on the occasion when he was asleep, his patrol
commander woke him up and at the same time told the declarant that he had received the
order that they were going to kill some Dtrs who were inside the UCA University, recalling
that they gathered together the troops of his battalion somewhat near the headquarters of
the Guard of that School, and being in that place, an officer arrived, who is from the
Military School, w'1ose name he does not know, but he is of· the following description:
medium height, slim, clear dark skin, young appearance, whom he could point out in case
it should be necessary, who had an AK-47 rifle in his hands, which was handed over to the
speaker, not remembering at this moment if it was this officer that handed it over to him
directly or if it was Lieutenant Espinoza, since he wu next to the officer from the school;
but he doea recall that the chambers for this weapon were banded over to him by the
official whose name he does not know; that before going to carry out this mission, the
declarant did not know directly whom they were going to go to eliminate, but he did
suppose that really it was terrorist leaders, due to the situation that was occurring in those
days, referring to the ofrensive launched by them; that now everyone in the School being
ready they boarded two Ford 250 pickups and together with the three officers already
mentioned, they left for the university, having .gotten out of the vehicles where the old
previously described buildings are, where .the declarant saw that there were more personnel
of the same, i.e. those that previously had been posted in that place; that it wu there
where be received the latter instructions, the declarant asking his section commander with
whom he was going to go, if he was joining his patrol, since be saw that it wu the one
that wa, heading the column for the place indicated. It wa, at that moment that the
officer of the school said to him, "You 're the key man,• the speaker understanding that he
was the one who would be in charge of killing the persons that were in that place; so that

CRS-12
f'rom there the speaker went together with the officer from the school and Espinoza, since
with them he entered through the previously mentioned door, but along the way Lieutenant
Espinoza told the declarant, "Hide that shit,• referring to the AK47 rifle that he waa
carrying; that arriving at the door it was already open, not knowing what was done to
open it by the first who arrived, going down some steps just after entering this, then
walking passing by a parking lot, then be crosses to his right and at that instant observe,
that now the officers have not remained behind him, that be reache, some steps that are
on the west side of a chapel, goes up the steps and reaches a metallic· mesh which he
jumps, beading along a covered passageway that leads to some dorm,; but when he reached
that place there were already troops up ahead; since he was bearing a disturbance around
those places such as if they were breaking window glass; that he continued through a
green zone until arriving at a door where he saw a hammock; which was empty; that being
in that place the speaker said ·Let's see what time they leave here, according to you I have
time to be waiting for them: being able to observe that at the same moment a man came
out who he could not figure out f'rom what place he had exited; but be stopped oppoaite
the hammock and said, •wait for me, I'm going to open for you, but don't go on creating
that disorder.• That this man was dressed in a brown night shirt; but at the same time
after having said that they would open he withdrew, the declarant remaining standing ln
front of that door that is transparent, balcony type; that when he wu waiting be beard
the voice of someone that told him, ·Hey, Pilijay, they're coming out here,• calling him
since he is known by that name, not recognizing the voice of the companion that called
him, but in going to the place that was the end of the corridor from which he had passed,
he saw that already outside was the person that he had seen before and near him was
Sergeant Oscar Solorzano Esquivel called Hercules, Avalos Vargas and another one whose
name he doesn't remember, then other persons, all male, began to come out; since he saw
a total of five come out, whom sergeant Avalos Vargas ordered to spread out on the
ground, so that they spread out, falling on the grass; that at those precise instants in that
place is the speaker with Sergeant Avalos Vargas, not knowing what is done with the other
two that are mentioned bef'ore; that in that moment the speaker felt that those persons
were delinquents/terrorists, that when they were now spread on the ground; the speaker
saw the officer from the school and Espinoza, that they were some 10 meters away from
where he was; that also at that moment the speaker places himself in front of them, i.e.,
of the civilians, and observed that Avaloa Vargas began to fire at those that he had the
closest and the declarant also, ·on seeing that he had begun, fired at the other three that
he had the closest, observing that the ones that he shot he wu getting in the head, then
he fire• at all of them or in other words the five, but in order to get the ones that Avalos
Vargu had f1red at, he hit ·a a wall behind; that he does not remember if those person,
said some words before they were killed; that among the three men that the speaker shot
first wu the one who wu wearing the brown night shirt previously mentioned; that the
declarant fired the shots with the AK 47 rifle and Avalos Vargas with his M 16 rifle; also
in those instants he heard the voice of Lieutenant Espinoza, who gave the order to corporal
Cotta Hernandez, telling him, ·Put them inside even if dragged,• the speaker not observing
the position that the corporal had; also at that moment he saw that a sixth person also
of the same sex wu coming out of those facilities along the same passageway, who said,
·oon't kill me because I don't belong to any organization,• and immediately he returns
inside. Then the declarant leaves that place for where some vehicle& were, where he
I

\

CRS-13

,·

remained a few minutes; but being in that place, he heard several shot.a inside the
premise,, in the place where the person that returned had gone; that the shot.a heard were
supposedly from an M 16 rifle from where they had jumped over the metallic mesh,
opposite the- walkway, not knowing at that moment who was shooting.. that after having
had a beer, the declarant left that place, observing that in those momenta the School
Lieutenant comes and Espinoza, who asked if they had not observed the sign for retreat,
which ahead of time they had agreed on, that he was going to send up a. flare; but until
that moment the speaker had not observed such a signal, hearing that Espinoza, now in
the street says to Lieutenant Cerritos to fire the other flare and this one the speaker does
observe that he fires it ... then the officers leave the facilities and the patrol of the sergeant
called "Salvaje• stays, to which the declarant added bimselt voluntarily and he fired with
his weapon against the building from which the civilian persona had come; that in addition
the speaker fired a Law anti-tank that he was carrying; that after firing against the
building they left those facilities through the same entry gate, observing that a fire had
started on the lower floor of that same building... that this operation at the Cacilitiea lasted
for a period ot more or less an hour, since he recalls that the military school, they returned
at about three in the moming... that now being at that school the speaker went to the
guard headquarters and picked up his weapon and equipment that he bad left there at the
time or receiving the AK 47 from the officers of the school that had handed it over to him:
Out-of-court confession that. has been ratified legally in this tribunal by the eye witnessea
to it, Joa, Lazaro Moreno Martinez and Milton Oswaldo·Escal6n Fuentes, 1341 and 1313,
respectively.

I

With respect to the accused Yusshi Rent§ Mendoza Vallecilloe, his material
participation in the events investigated was proved in the corresponding legal step through
his own out-of-court statement, in which he confesses to his participation in them and
which he rendered at the General Office of the National Police ot this city on January
13 of this year at 9 a.m. and that, in the pertinent part states: ... that he does not confess
to having participated in the death of the Jesuit Priests, but with respect to this event he
can relate the following: that he is on duty as the Section Commander, in the Capitan
General Gerardo Barrios Military School; that on November 15 of last year, at about 11
or 12 midnight, approximately, he received an order to appear before Colonel Guillermo
Alfredo Benavidea Moreno, Director of the Military School, in hia office, i.e. in the
Directorate, ao that be immediately beaded for the office, observing that in the corridor
of that omce wu Colonel Benavides Moreno, together with two officers, of which be wu
able to recognize Lieutenant Espinoza Guerra, since he is bis cl881mate, but not the other,
but he later beard them call him Lieutenant Cerritos; that upon approaching them, he gave
the message to Colonel Benavides that he was present, and immediately atler that the
colonel touched him on the back and said; "Look, Mendoza. Are yo1,1 going to accompany
Espinoza to carry out a mission? He already knows what it is,• to which the declarant
responded, "That's fine, my colonel.• That after receiving that order, they all Jen, but when
going down the steps that are by the office, Espinoza addressed the speaker, asking him
where be was going to be, answering him that he would be in his tent, then Espinoza told
him that he would go to prepare his people, the speaker withdrawing to his tent, where
he began to camouflage his face and about 20 minutes later Lieutenant Espinoza arrived

CRS-14

at hia tent, and asked him to lend him a camouflage bar, with which be too camouflaged
hia face; that about five minutes later, Second Lieutenant Cerritos also showed up at his
tent, who wu accompanied by two more people, unknown to the declarant, but be deducea
that they were from Espinoza's unit, then they remained in hi, office, which consists of
his bedroom, and his office, divided by some walla and door; that after Lieutenant Cerritos
and the other two arrived, the speaker went inside hia bedroom to continue preparing hit
equipment and being in this place with the door closed, he managed to hear Lieutenant
Espinoza say, "Remember where we went the day before yesterday,: no~ recalling if he
mentioned the word mission or search to them; momenta ·later the declarant left his tent,
leaving Espinoza, Cerritos and the other two in hi, office, heading to the sector of the
Guard Command of that School, observing that in the parking lot in front of the Command
there were two Ford 250 pickups parked and aboard ·them were between 10 and 15 soldiers,
completely equipped; that when he had been about 5 or 10 minutes approximately at the
Prevention Command, he observed that Lieutenant Espinoza, Second Lieutenant Cerritos
and the two strangers were coming toward ·him, Espinoza saying to him, "Now we're ready,
we're going to go in those two vehicles; pointing to him the two vehicle, that · be
mentioned previously, so that at that moment the declarant boarded the latter of the two
vehicles, getting on the floor of it, so that he was unable to observe it more penonnel were
in the cabin, not knowing in which of the two Espinoza wu or the other two ltranpra
that were with Cerritos. Leaving the School at about 1:15 a.m. ot the 16th, taking tlie
following route; they lef't through the main gate of the Military School, they traveled OD
the street to Santa Tecla until reaching the tum around the Church of Guadalupe, crossing
to the South Expressway, going to the Mortgage Bank, where they croaaed on the atreet
that leads to Colonial Theater, unloading opposite some uninhabited buildings, those
vehicles returning; that when they were opposite those buildings, Lieutenant Espinoza
whistled at the personnel that were in that sector, the declarant observing that immediately
between 20 and 25 members of the troops joined them; then the speaker saw that
Lieutenant Espinoza met with some 7 or 8 men and began to talk to them. He could not
hear what he was saying to them, siru:e the speaker was some 10 meters away; After the
meeting, Lieutenant Espinoza. approached the speaker they told him that they were going
through the UCA sector, without specifying to him what it was they were going to do.
Then Lieutenant Espinoza gave the order to march and the unit formed a column and
began to walk, arriving at the Colonial Theater, cro11ing on Meditemneo St., until
reaching the south entrance to UCA, the declarant having gone to the end of the column,
observing that through that door the personnel were entering, since it was open. Then the
declarant folJowed the column, which was making ita journey along a 1treet that borders
all of the southern side ot UCA, passing opposite some tall buildings, which were to the
left side, where they were walking, passing by some houset that are OD the right side, until
reaching oppo,ite a house that seemed to be ot two stories, seeing that at the end of this
house the soldiers were penetrating the second floor, it being the case that OD observing
that Lieutenant Espinoza was surrounding the building, he decided to follow him, arriving
at the back part of the house, entering through a mesh door, which was open, seeing that
Lieutenant Espinoza was going some five meters ahead of him and crouing a covered
corridor, but now he didn't follow him and he entered the two-story building, through a
door that was open, seeing that inside oC the first room, some soldiers were searching it
and that in it seated on the bed were a fat woman and another that was covered with her,
I

I

\

CRS-15

i

I

whom be illuminated with a lamp that he was carrying, leaving the soldien in that room,
and the speaker continued walking, passing through a kitchen, then through a dining room
and a laundry, getting to the clothesline, places where he didn't find anyone; that when
he waa areund the clothesline, he heard a series of shots, in a continuous form, not aa a
burst, by the outside part of the two-story building, so that the speaker thought that they
had been surprised by the enemy and be chose to leave the building, doing it through the
first door that be found more or lesa around the kitchen, ao that he could no longer see
the two women and the soldiers that were in the room, going out to ..the covered corridor
and he went searching for the place where he had heard the shot,, but on getting almolt
to some stepe, he observed that Lieutenant Espinoza was returning along the same corridor
and be told the speaker, "Let's go; ao that on seeing that he wu retreating, he opted to
follow him, but when they went out to the street that ia in front of the building, be heard
other shots in the same form as the first ones, continuing his march pauing by a parking
lot where some vehicles were parked. He also saw that several soldien were there and
others that were now in retreat searching for the exit through the south door; that when
he waa now outside of the UCA installation.a he heard bursts of shot.a, distinguilhing an
M 60 machine gun, law rockets, explosion.a such aa of grenades and he saw flarer, thai be
remembers having seen smoke from the building, around the place where the soldien bad ·
entered; that the withdrawal from the University he made along the aame Mediterrineo ~
until reaching the Colonial Theater, crosaing the street that pane, in front of the
unoccupied buildings an~ upon reaching these buildinp he obeerved that the two pickupa
were parked, the declarant having boarded one, remaining something like a period of five
minutes to wait for all the personnel to arrive; that after that Lieutenant Espinoza boarded
another vehicle or the other pickups and ordered them to withdraw from that place, the
speaker observing that most of the soldiers remained in that sector, while others got in the
pickups they began the trip to the Military School, passing in front of the Colonial Theater
on Mediterr!neo St., going by the Guadalupe Basilica, then they went along the street to
Santa Tecla until reaching _
the main entry to the School, where he saw that Lieutenant
Espinoza headed for the office of Colonel Benavides Moreno, not knowing what they talked
about. The speaker then headed for his tent to rest. The speaker adds that when he met
up with Lieutenant Espinoza in the covered corridor at the UCA installation.a, after having
heard the first shota, he asked him, "What's going on here?· to which Espinoza answered,
"Let's go, let'a go, here they're giving it to some terrorist leaden: He also remembers that
when they met by the south entrance to UCA, he observed that a soldier he doea not know
was carrying a liibt brown valise, as he managed to see, not knowing the contents or
destination ot that vali,e.•.• Out-of-court conte11ion that bu been ratified in each and
every 0111 or the part, by the witnesses to it, in thia Tribunal, Luis Irineo Dru Hernmdez
and Julio C.. Polio G6mn, pa. 1316 and 1320, respectively.

or

Out-of-court confeuiona
the previously mentioned accused, which meet each and
every one of the requirements established by Art. 496 Pn. Pr. through which they are
evaluated by this Tribunal as sufficient evidence of their material participation in the
crimes with which they are charged; the above complemented with the court statement
rendered by the witne11ea Eduardo Antonio Cordova Monce, which is added to pa. of the
case, and the technical expertise used on the sign found the day of the events on the
pedestrian gate of UCA, which is added to pa. 640 and 88. or the caae, where it ia

CRS-16
determined that the writing of Second Lieutenant Gonzalo Guevara Cerrito, and the
writing of Sergeant Antonio Ramfrez Avalos Vargas present similar characteristic, to the
writing on the previously mentioned poster.
With respect to the absent accused person, Jorge Alberto Cierra Aac:enc:io, data on
whom are unknown because of his absence, sufficient element.a of ju<!gme~t exist through
the stepa taken in order to calculate that he had participation in the event.a investigate,
so that the procedural case ia considered established.
With respect to the accused Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, sufficient element,
of judgement exist in the case in order to consider established his participation in the
events investigated; in the first place, the statement rendered through 1worn certification
by the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, Artillery Colonel of the S~ Rel»
Emilio Ponce, which is added to pgs. 1221 and sub. of thi1 report and, in which he. atatee:
•...as a consequence ot the terrorist actions that were af'f'ecting thil capital city t'rom.. ti».
hours of the night of the 11th day ot November, I ordered reinforcement of the aecurity
deployment for the defense of Coloniaa Manuel Joalt Arce and Palermo, u well u pf die
military complex formed by the National Intelligence Directorate, the Cap. Cral. Gerardo
Barrios Military School, the San Benito Battalion ot the National Police, the Joint Stafl'
of the Armed Forces and Ministry of DetellN and Public Security, since they evidently
constitute objectives of that terrorist aggression; in addition; in order to coordinate that
security directly, I ordered the formation or a Security Commando, with headquarters in
the Military School listed above, under its director Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides
Moreno, which began to operate in the aflemoon of the 13th of the same month; that
security deployment, established with the goal indicated, included the area of the Jo8'
Sime6n Canas University, detailing below the Military Units, their location and list of their
members, who, in compliance with their mission described above remained in places near
that university in the period included from 6 p.m. of the 15th until 7 a.m. on the 16th,
both date, of the same month, according to registries at the Staff..: and, in second place,
with the out-of-court confesaiona of the accused, Yusshi Ren, Mendoza Valleci1101, Jos6
Ricardo Espinoza Guerra and Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, related previously, with which and
other probatory elementa collected in the process to date, have a concatenated and logical ·
relationahip ao that it i1 considered established that said accused person participated in the
acts investigated u the intermediate perpetrator or them (Art. 46 No. 2CPn.)
For the reuona given above, and on the buit or that ia contained in Art. 247 of the
Penal Code. THE PROVISIONAL ARREST IS ORDERED OF THE ACCUSED: Guillermo
Alfredo Benavides Moreno, Yusshi Ren, Mendoza Vallecillo,, Jon Ricardo Espinoza Guerra,
Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas, Tomu Zarpate Castillo and
Angel P6rez V4.squez, and of the absent accused person Jorge Alberto Cierra Ascencio, of
description mentioned previously, for the crimes termed provisionally as• murder,• (Art. 154
Penal Code) in the persons or Ignacio Ellacurfa, Segundo Montes, Ignacio Martfn Baro,
Juan Ram6n Moreno, Amando L6pez, Joaqufn L6pez y L6pez, Elba Julia Ramo, and Celina
Ramos; those accused person shall continue present in the detention in which they are

CRS-17
found on the order of thi1 Tribunal; the corresponding warrants for arrest against the
absent accuaed person shall be issued; strict compliance with Arts. 47 and 722 of the Pn.
Cd. is to be given.
According to what is provided in Art. 267, Pn. Pr., a lien ii declared on the property
of the accused Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno up to the amount of 40,000 colons for
each of the acts of which he is accused; Yusachi Ren, Mendoza Vallecillos up to the
amount of 35,000 colons for each of the crimes of which he ii accused; JON Ricardo
Espinoza up to the amount of 35,000 colons for each of the events investigated; Gonzalo
Guevara Cerritos up to the amount of 30,000 colons for each of the acts of which he is
accused; Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas up to the amount of 25,000 colon, for each of the
acts of which he is accused; Angel Pfrez Vuquez up to the amount of 20,000 for each
event and Jorge Alberto Cierra Ascencio up to the amount of ... colons for each of the
crimes of which he is accused. The Justices of peace .b eing commissioned to oversee the
respective writs of attachment: Fourth Court of thi1 judicial district to oversee that ot the
first accused person; First of Peace for the Department of La Uni6n for that of the second
accused; First of Peace of the Department of Sonsonate to overne that or the third 8CCUl8d
person; Justice of Peace of Santa Marla Ontuma, Department to issue the writ ot
attachment of the fourth accused person; Justice of Peace of la Libertad, Colon for the fit\h
accused;Juatice of Peace of Ataco, Department of Ahuachapm that of the sixth accused;
Justice of Peace of San Miguel Tepazontez, Department of La Paz for the writ of
attachment of the seventh accused and Fourth of Peace of this judicial district for that of
the eighth accused person.
Document to be sent to the Director of Penal and Readaptation Center so that he
will report to this Tribunal if the prisoners mentioned have a penal background or cases
pending or concluded against them.
Document to be sent to the justices of the criminal courts of this judicial district
so that they will report to this Tribunal if pending or concluded cases exist against the
accused mentioned.
The corresponding report of this office is to be given to CENIC, for the subsequent
legal effect.a.
·

In accordance with what is established in Art. 106 Pr. pu. this resolution shall be
made known to the accuaed and parties in the case for the purpose• of this law.

'l'ran11at14 by
Deanna 1•mmon4
cRs - Language servic••
February f, 1220

APPENDIX C

The Jesuits in El Salvador:

A Historical Perspective

Background
The Society of Jesus was founded by Ignatius of Loyola, a
Basque nobleman and courtier who underwent a religious conversion
in 1521 while recovering from battle wounds. He spent a year as
a hermit in Manresa, Spain where he underwent a series of
mystical experiences. 'l'hese experiences formed the basis of his
work Spiritual Exercises which contains a systematic aeries of
meditation and other religious practices, aimed at uniting
persons with God and making them more effective instruments of
God's will, usually during a JO-day retreat. After receiving a
university education and practicing missionary work in Italy,
Ignatius drew up a statement of purpose and preliminary rules
which were approved by Pope Paul II in 1540. In 1541 Francis .
Xavier sailed from Lisbon to Asia, establishing the tradition of
the Jesuit Missionary. By the early 17th Century, the order had
some 15,000 members and more than 500 colleges and seminaries
which educated the nobility and middle class of Catholic Europa.
'l'he Society was suppressed by the. Holy Sea from 1773 until 1814.
'l'he Society of Jesus is the largest religious order in the
Catholic Church. Its membership is all male and all committed to
the organization by life-long promises of poverty (not to own any
property), chastity (never to marry) and obedience (submission to
the authority of superiors in the Society).

(

The word "Jesuit" did not originate with the Society of
Jesus but was used in the Netherlands and Rhineland at least a
century before the Society was formed. Jesuita, was one of
several abusive terms applied to self-righteously devout
individuals who practiced novel devotions and spoke censoriously
of the clergy, religious Orders and ordinary Catholics. The
semi-official term "Jesuit", which is still defined in the
dictionary as "one given to intrigue or equivocation," ha$ now
been accepted by the Society.
Vatican II and Medellin

(

The Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, at which several
Jesuits played proainent roles, encouraged a profound rethinking
of traditional Catholic values and attitudes. Prior to Vatican
II, national churches in Latin America presented a traditional
religious image, accompanied by conservative social and political
attitudes. Virtually everywhere, including El Salvador, the
church was allied with the regime. TWo new principles would have
particular impact in Latin America. They asserted that the
church is in and of the world, with concerns well beyond the
purely spiritual. They also emphasized that the church is a
community of equals by baptism. 'l'he prelates refused to condemn
communism per se, joining criticism of certain of its practices
with an equally strong critique of capitalism's abuses.

-~

History - page 2
In 1961, three years after the end of Vatican II, bishops
from all over Latin America gathered in Medellin, Colombia for
the Second Episcopal Conference. At Med~llin the bishops called
upon the church •to defend the right• ot the oppressed;• to
promote grassroots organizations; •to denounce the unjust action
of world powers that works against self-determination of weaker
nations;• in short, to llake a •preferential option for the poor.•
According the Ignacio Martin-Baro, one of~• six Jesuits slain
last year, the pastoral approach outlined by Vatican II and
Medellin implied •an identification with the sufferings and with
the hopes of the people, especially with those of the poor and
oppressed. That made the church'• task eminently one of
promoting awareness - conscientization - ••• to create a
aociety ••• in which all injustice, all exploitation, and all
oppression would be done away with. Thia very fact, however,
would make the church a subversive influence within a social
order that was founded upon the injustice, exploitation, and the
oppression exercised against th• many by th• few.•
Th• primary means of accomplishing the goals of Medellin was
the development of Christian Base COllllunitiea (CEBs). Under tha~
CEBs, the participants began taking responsibility for important
. aspects of their own lives and for each other; they were no
· longer merely observers at a ritual conducted for their benefit
by a resident or visiting priest. CEBs are small groups, usually
no more than twenty or thirty, within a parish who meet regularly
for Bible study. This form of participation, however, has had
social consequences as CEB members have moved beyond purely
religious concerns to political issues.
Rutilio Grande
The CEB approach was most aggressively pursued in the town
of Aguilarea when Jesuit Father Rutilio Grande arrived to take up
pastoral duties in 1972. Grande set up 37 CEBs as part of his
evangelizing effort. In his sermons, delivered in the language
of the Salvadoran peasant, Goel was consistently portrayed as one
who cares passionately about the poor, and wreaks his vengeance
on the rich and powerful who became and remain that way through
the exploi11ation of others. Thia lesson was far different than
the traditional biblical message to •accept your lot here on
earth because your real reward will come in the hereafter.• CEB
members from the Aguilares area soon became involved in strikes
against low wages in the local sugarcane fields and tension with
. the authorities grew.
In 1976 government troops attacked a group of peasants who
had occupied unused land in San Vincente. The peasants, six of
whom were killed, took their action following a decision in the~r

History - page 3
CEB. FollovincJ the San Vincente attack, the Popular Liberation
Forces (PPL), a guerrilla group formed in 1970 which later joined
the PMLN, aent a letter to Chriatiana coJIIJllenting on those events
and inviting th81l to become involved in their struggle.
In early 1977 Grande was machine gunned to death as he rode
in bis jeep. Ho one was arrested for the crille but the bullets
used were of th• kind only issued to the aray. Tb• illmediate
spark for the murder may have been the previoua day'• discovery
of the.body of Roberto Palma, the head of the government tourist
agency wbo bad been kidnapped by guerrillas. Tb• army and
security forces then undertook a military aweep of the Aguilares
area in what was called Operation Rutilio. Hundreds were
arrested, including those whose only evident offense was
possession of pictures of Father Grande. Three Jesuits who
worked with Grande were expelled. In June 1977 the White
Warriors Union, a paramilitary group generally believed to be
affiliated with Major Roberto D'Aubuisaon, announced that the
Jesuits bad thirty days to leave the country or be killed.
Fliers urging Salvadorans to "Be a Patriot! Kill a Priestl"·were
circulated in San Salvador. While the threat was not carried
out, it was now clear that the right wing associated the
increasing guerrilla activity with the Jesuits.
The killing of Father Grande had a radicalizing effect on
Oscar Romero, the new archbishop of San Salvador who became
increasingly critical of the government's human rights record.
According to some State Department officers familiar with El
Salvador, the Jesuits became Romero's "ideological think tank,"
and oftc~ served ~s the authors of the political portions of
Romero's controversial homilies, which included a reading of the
names of individuals alleged to have been killed, assaulted or
tortured by security forces. The right wing came to see Romero
as a "tool of the Jesuits." According to Father Martin-Baro,
when Romero was given an honorary by Georgetown University and
nominated for a Hobel Peace Prize in 1978, the right-wing press
· in El Salvador interpreted the honors as part of a "JesuitCOJIIJllunist conspiracy" against the country's prestige. In 1980,
Romero was himself assassinated.
The Role of Jeauit Education and the UCA
Within the catholic Church, the largest role currently
played by the Jeauits is in education. In the 1940s the Jesuits
founded a secondary school, the San Jose Day School, which was
staffed largely with young Basque priests. According to Father
Ceasar Jerez, former Jesuit Provincial for Central America, the
decision of the Day School in the early 1970s to admit poor
students deeply offended members of oligarchy who wanted the
school for the exclusive education of their children. The
Jesuits also ran the national seminary, until 1972 when

History - page 4
archbishop Chavez .removed it from Jesuit jurisdiction - largely
because of the order's politics. Father Grande had taught at
both the seminary and the Day School.
In 1966 the University of Central America was established
largely as an alternative to the left wing university of El
Salvador. The Salvadoran oligarchy contributed heavily to the
construction of the new campus on the southwest side of the
capital and thus felt a strong sense of proprietorship. But in
1970, at the time of the Agrarian Refora congress, the superior
Council of UCA issued the first in a aerie• of manifestos
concerning various issues confronting the country. In this
document, the Jesuits effectively told the oligarchy that the UCA
was not its university and proceeded to take a strong position in
favor of agrarian reform. In 1975, when students staged a march
to protest the government's expenditure of $1 million in the Miss.
universe finals held in El Salvador, National Guardsmen opened
fire, killing about 30 students. By 1976, the UCA had became a
target of right wing bombing attacks.
Father Ignacio Ellacuria, a philosophy profes~or and, since:
1979, the rector of the UCA, became a world class liberation
theologian at the UCA. By all accounts he was a spell-binding
orator who urged revolutionary changes for the injustices in El
Salvador. Accounts differ as to whether be actually condoned
violent revolution. However, according to sources with the State
Department, a number of his prize seminar students became leaders
of the FPL during the 1970s.
The Je,:·its occasionally also provided meeting places for
members of the FDR, the non-guerrilla leftist coalition, later to
ally with the FMLN. On November 27, 1980 six key leaders of the
FDR were found tortured and killed after being abducted from the
Jesuit-run Day School by a band of nearly 200 men. Church
spokesmen accused the Salvadoran security forces of the crime.
The UCA's principle publications, Proceso, a weekly summary
of news developments, and Estudios centroamericanos, a monthly
analysis magazine, have consistently published articles critical
of the government and have placed the brunt of the responsibility
for the violence in El Salvador on the government and its
supporters. According to a 1982 State Department cable, •it is
the most important of the very few non-clandestine pro-FMLN\FDR
publications available in El Salvador.• Unlike other opposition
publications, they were never shut down. The UCA publications
were read in detail by u.s. Embassy staff who wrote cables
summarizing and critically analyzing the articles and editorials
on such issues as alleged electoral fraud, economic crisis, and
u.s. intervention.
The right wing responded with occasional bombing and
strafing attacks on the University ·and the homes of professors.

History - page 5
In 1981 the Salvadoran AnticoD1JDunist League circulated a leaflet
in San Salvador vbich was headed: "OUt with Marxist Jesuits!
out with the creators ot violence and crime in El Salvador. out
with the founder• ot the PPL!" The leaflet.accused the Society
ot Jesus ot, among other things, directing·subversion trom
Panama. In addition to ten individuals, it named the major
Catholic educational centers as organizations to be watched. In
1983 the Secret Anti-Communist Ar11ly (ESA) placed bombs at the
residence ot the Jesuits teaching at the UCA,. and at the home ot
UCA professor Italo Lopez Vallecillo•. An ESA communique at the
time called Lopez Vallecillo• a "spokesman tor international
communism• and accused the Jesuit• ot •open membership in the
terrorist organizations that make up the FMLN.•
· Attacks against the Jesuits decreased somewhat during the
years ot the Duarte Administration. During this period, however,
Father Ellacuria was repeatedly accused ot defending the FMLN's
use ot mines. When union groups held meetings in the UCA'•
auditorium, newspaper headlines declared that subversive
strategies were planned in the UCA. Also during this period,
however, President Duarte and the FMLN held a series ot dialogues
which were promoted by Ellacuria.

)

Interestingly, in the weeks before his death, Father
Ellacuria publicly warned the rebel leaders that they lacked
popular appeal and that their acts ot terrorism had turned many
people against them. He had also written that President
Cristian! "was successful in his first 100 days in office" and
urged support for his efforts toward a negotiated peace. At the
time of his death, Ell~curia was no longer a voice for revolution
but had become a voice ·~f moderation.
Prepared by Jeft Swedberg - Office ot Congressman Foley.

APPENDIX D
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON , D. C. 20301 -2400

1 0 APR 1990

In reply refer to:
I-90/51466
INTERNATIONAi.
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Honorable John Joseph Moakley
House of Representatives
Washington, o.c. 20515
Dear Congressman:
In response to your letter of February 26, the United States
Military Group in El Salvador has researched each issue which
you raised and provided information as detailed as their records
permit.
Each question has been answered to indicate training
provided, the U.S. instructors involved, and . information on
training of those Salvadorans implicated in the Jesuit murders.
There are several points which the attached data illustrate.
The unit in question is representative of most Salvadoran units,
inasmuch as it has a high turnover rate. This accounts, in
part, for·the periodic U.S. training of the same unit over a ten
year period. Second, human rights has been a key focus of U.S.
training and is an important component of training currently
provided by the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The importance of
human rights is emphasized to the Salvadoran recruit during
basic training at the National Training Center, and is
reinforced in the field by unit commanders. The Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces has institutionalized training by providing
publications for every field commander, including a compilation
of human rights-related laws and a guide for arrest procedures
when there are human rights implications, and a guide on proper
conduct for enlisted men. Human rights emphasis continues to
improve and become more institutionalized, due in part to the
combined efforts of the U.S. and the Government of El Salvador
to press for progress.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of training has not been
presented, because, as you are aware, our defense attaches
reporting on Salvadoran military performance in the field are
the only independent evaluation of the effectiveness of
training.
We trust that this data will be useful for your report to
the Speaker, and we are ready to clarify any additional
questions you or your staff may have.
Sincerely,

Att?chment

a/s

t:!!.:~f-

' Adina Agststant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affail'I

P.

ISSUE l: US lnun1nq rel£t.2.1.:.11'l!,hlP ~,i th the ImmerJ1ate Reaotl<'m
Infantry t3att'1l101" I S!R! > Atl.ac.stl .11'ld t1";iHHn~ received b\'

m~mber$ o~ th~ BlRI Atlacatl.
~f::SPONSt:::
':it.ited 1n ti,., 1n1'c.,rmi'!tl.on pr,,vided,; r-eb 'YO, t"IO for·mal
~dvl$OrY r~lat1on with th& BIRl Atlacatl ~Xl$t~ nor h~~ one 6V~r
f.\~

ex1~ted,

us p~rsonnel a$~1gned as trainers in El Salvador are

~~~l~ned at the Nation~l $taff level, f1~ed tra1n1n~ oentGrs,
and req1ona1 commands. · The re~ional commands are r•~pon£1ble
for· zpeoi f'io ~::ieogi-aphio ai·l!as ani:f h~ve forr.;eit pa:-manent:l. 11
i591~ned to aoeompli~h th~ir mi~sion.
Th3 f1ve SlRis are
strategic t"lat.tlonal As.t ret.,-; tn~t r·esi:iond directly to the nat1on::l
~tat, ~nd Are a$si;ned m1~$1on~ throughout the country, They do
n~t hav~ f1xe~ 3r~a~ of re~pon~1bility; thu~. US tr~iners are
net ~edlO~t~d to them.

It thould ba noted that the Immed1~te ~eaotion Infantry
Battalton Training center· (CE9Rll. wh1cn h3~ ~ us trainer
a$~1qned. 1~ 1003ted near the AtlAcatl. This trainer is not

att~ched to no~ doe• he work wit~ th& Atl~catl. A o~n~olous snd
1nteMt1onat spl1t wa~ m3de botween what is ths C£SRI tra!nln~

oent•r and what are the Atlac~tl in~tallations. This trainer is
not one of tne us tra1ner~ oharqed w1th train1n~ SAlvadoran
oombst Sattal1on~, but rath•r part of the US Nat1cnal SaE1c
Tra1 ni n~ Center- Staff whQ as. t~ts in the traini n!; of ba!..10
s

recruits..
' ·

The BIRI Atlae:atl wits in ~-taet trained by US t.o,·oai·: in 19BL
This iiifor-m.stior, wa!-· forw11rded to USSOUTHCOM

on

22. Feb ':10.

A

total of 1,383 soldier~ were trained. The tra1"1n~ w~s
conducted in F.l . Salv.ldor. The tr-:sininc; con~isted of b.i~ie
infantry tr~ln1n~ for indiv1d~Al s~ldimrs and pro~rcssed tnrou~n
comJ:)4'/'lY level

op,sratac,ns.

~

mernor-:tndvm tor· Amb.1!!,~3dor F'1.01,er1ns,

~~ted 14 Dee•mber l9S3 1nd1oat~d that of tha

l.~e~

~oldiers

trainsd in l9Sl orily 250 soldl•I"'&· 1"•m.a1ned on aotive duty in
1993·.
Th'i~ is 16% of tl'l• · foree that wss tra1ned. 1'he Atlaoatl

currently receives 64% of its total stren~th as new reoruits
1ach year. Th•refore. the battAlion that w~~ trained 1n 1981.
or 1n any ye.a,- uo thru 1987, is not ' tne battalion t.l"lat exis.t.$
tOOAY.

USMlLGP doe& not have r-~cords 1ndioating ~~ecif1oally what
oour~e~ ware tau9ht. the unit which ~rov1dGd th• trainin~, name~
of ti-a1.ners wt,o oonduoted t.he t,·a1n:1.n,;:,, nor the 1'la.ne~ of those

who recsived the train1n~ in 1991.

Tra1ninq ln the United 6t3te~ has been prov1ded to members of
the SIRI ATl~catl. H!LGP reoord~ of this - training oonsi~t only

'

~

Mar . 20 '90 16:53

si:f-FAX520 s.erits

P. 1

of the student's name. date of course. and the name of the
cour~e a student will attend or has attended. No unit
affiliations are provided bv the El Salvador Armed Forces.
Given a full name, soldiers can be identified as students and
all course data can be provided. In the information provided on .
9 February, USMILGP was given the names of identified Atlacatl
personnel and then provided what speeific training was received
from US sources.
All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to
1977 and from 1980 to the pre~ent have attended the
Salvadoran Cadet Pre_2!lration Course at USARSA or the United
State~ Army Infantry School (USAIS) in one of its five forms
which occurred as part of the course evolution during this time
period. These courses are generally to provide military academy
cadets with practical knowledge of concepts and fundamentals of
military subjects, without regard to their future branch
~pecialization. These five forms are: The
Cadet _Orienta.tion Course •. Combat Arms and Support Servi.ca Sasao.
_
Of f _
1oer__
_
PrE!Paration Cours~ Spanish ocs Cours~ and the
El _ Salvador Cadet Course. Specific data concerning each of these
_
courses is not available at USMILGP.
Information may be
obtained from USARSA or USAIS, Fort Benning, GA. All Atlacatl
officers who are military academy graduates and the maJority of
those who received commissions after serving as non-c.ommiss1oned
offieers received this training.
Three of the four off1cers implicated in this case .attended the
El Salvadoran Cadet Course.
lLT MENDOZA Valleoillos. Yusshy Rene
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
Attended the SpJ1n1sh OCS Course JAN - APR82. conducted at United
States Army Infantry School, Fort Benn1nq. Ga.
2LT GUEVARA Cerritos, Gonzalo

Attended the El_Salvador Cadet Course~SCC) l3JUN - 30SEP88,
conducted at USARSA. Fort Benning, Ga.
Selected company qrade officers and NCO's attend the Small unit _
Traini.n9 __ Mana~ment Course is also conducted at USARSA, Fort
Benning, Ga. Course desoriptions are available from that source.

The course generally is to prepare individuals to plan, conduct,
and manaqe small unit training. It teaches US Army tra1ninq
doctrine, principles, and techniques. The following persons
implicated in this case attended this tr31ning:
SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro

~AXS20 sertes

Mar.20 '90 16:54

P. 2

,.
230CT - 14DEC88

CPL PEREZ Vasquez. Angel
.30SCP - 20NOV87
The names of all others implicated in this ease have been cross
referenced with USMILGP records and no other soldiers implicated
have been found who attended this course.

The $P-_ec~al Forces Officer~Course (SFQQ.)_ is the same course us
Officers attend. It is qiven at the Special Warfare Center
(SWC). · Fort Bragg, NC. The specific course description is not
available at USMILGP but can be obtained from swc. Fort Bragg,
NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct
unconventional warfare. Special Forces Operations. and Foreign
Internal Defense (FID). Individuals are tr31ned to serve 3S an
Operational Detachment -Alpha (ODA) Commander. The following
officer implicated in this ease attended this training from
11NOV88 - 2lJAN89:
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
In addition to the training conducted at us Army installations,
USHI~GP has knowledge of the following additional trainin9
act1vrt1.es that involved the BIRI Atlacatl.
The . first of the!:e is a Desigriate.Q. ..~~rksman Cours.~. supervised by
the lst Brigade Operations. Planning and Assistance, and
Training Team (OPATT). The 1st Brigade OPATTs supervised a
Designa.t .ed. Marksman Course of three weeks duration 91 ven to
Atlacatl soldiers. CEBRI Training Center instructors. and to
member~ of the four other 8IRis. The purpose of the course was
to provide a cadre of instructors to train marksmen capable of
obtaininq a first round hit with their assigned weapons at 500
meter~. There were approximately 20 students, all enlisted. of
which 10 were from the Atlacatl. The course was taught at the
Atlacatl Garrison from 06FEB - 25FEBB9.

The us Trainers (OPATTs) involved were:
MAJ William Council, a Special Forces Officer with approximately
15 vears serv1oe.
.
SFC Robert Jarman. a Special Forces Communications Specialist.
len9th of servioe unknown.
SFC Melchor Becena. a Special Forces Weapons Specialist, with
approximately 12 years of service.
It should be noted that althouqh these soldiers are all Special
Force~ qualified they were assigned as trainers to USMlLGP and
were not there a~ part of a Special Forces Unit.

'·

r ,

Mar.20 '90 16:57

The ~ame instr-uctors supervised a Sn!2er Course from 24APRB9 20MAY89. This course was given at the Atlacatl Garrison to
train personnel for employment as snipers in combat operations.
The Atlac3tl's sniper weapon system was u~ed. There were 36
Atlacatl soldiers who received this tra1nin9.

The names of the Atlacatl soldiers who received this tra1n1ng
are:
ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06 - 25FEB89
SGT

CPT

I

PVT

EDWIN ERNESTO RODAS TRUJILLO
HECTOR EDUARDO ESCAMILLA BARRERA
VALENTIN SERGIO MARTINEZ CRUZ
AGUSTIN AGUILAR HERNANDEZ
ANTONIO ARISTIDES GOMEZ CORNELIO
LUIS FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ HERNANDEZ
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTINEZ CORDERO
MIGUEL ANGEL MOLINA RENDEROS
MIGUEL ANGEL MARTINEZ GARCIA
FRANCISCO ARRIAZA ZAMORA
SNIPER COURSE
24APR-22MAY89

ISMAEL DOLORES MELGAR
JOSE ORLANDO VENTURA VELASQUEZ
RAUL RAFAEL VALLE
ROLANDO DE JESUS ABARCA
JUAN FRANCISCO BARRIENTOS CHACON
JOSE LUIS TOBAR ZELADA
BENJAMIN ALCIDES FUNES CHICAS
HERBERT WALTER GUADRON FUENTES
FERNANDO LOPEZ ALFARO
JOSE EMILIO CARTAGENA DUENAS
JOSE VITELIO MALDONADO MEJIA
NICOLAS GARCIA LIU
DANIEL FUENTES SANOS
DANIEL MARTINEZ JACOBO
EDGARD OSWALDO PALACIOS
ALBERTO QUIJANO CALLES .
JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ ARDON
ELIAS PAVES GUZMAN
JUAN ANTONIO GALVEZ ARIAS
MOISES ROSALES CASTELLANO
ELISEO FLORES MANCIA
JOSE ADAN LIEVANO SIGUENZA
MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN
OSCAR ARMANDO TRIGUEROS
MIGUEL ANGEL ESCALANTE

.a.

Mar.20 '90 16:59

JOSE NOE NUNEZ AVELAR
FERMIN ALFREDO PINEDA
FRANCISCO ARMANDO HERRERA
MARIO ~ENE AQUINO CATATA
SONIA PERDOMO LIMA
SANTOS PEREZ FLORES
MANUEL DE JESUS DIAZ LOPEZ
MARIO DE JESUS CARBAJAL
JOSE ISRAEL BAUTISTA GUZMAN
OSCAR ARMANDO HERNANDEZ
FRANCISCO MEDRANO SERRANO
The final activity is the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne>
Deployment for Training (OFT) exercise conducted from 10 20NOV89. The purpose of this DFT was to test a Special Forces
Detachment in their ability to execute their primary special
forces mission of training foreign armies. As part of the
detachment's evaluation, training was given to approximately 150
soldiers from the Atlacatl in order to evaluate the language and
teaching skills of the Detachment. The training was stopped
beoau$e of the 11NOV89 Communist offensive ·in which the Atlaoatl
was oommitted to combat on 13NOV89. The traininq conducted from
11 - 13NOV89 was in dismounted Infantry Patrol ·Techniques.
Weapons Training, and day and night practical exercises of the~e
subjeots.
The training provided as part of the DFT included:

Organization of Combat Patrols
Duties and Responsibilities of Patrol Members
Military Troop Leading Procedures
Combat Orders
Patrol Base Activities
Immediate Action Drills
TechniQues of Fire and Maneuver
Rapid Fire Techniques (Firing without looking through
sights>
Preparation or Arms and Equipment for a Patrol
M16 Zero Fire (Procedure to align sight of the M16 to the
soldier's view of the target)
Practical Exercise in Combat. Orders
After 14NOVS9. the Detachment trained Atlacatl personnel that
remained behind to secure the base in various subjects. USMILGP
doe~ not have a detailed list of the training conducted by them
after 13NOVB9 nor of what personnel w~re trained. This
information may be available from the 7th Special Forces Group
(Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC. Listed below i~ the information
available at USMlLGP:

P. 1

Mar.20 '90 17:00

DA.TE
15NOV89

16NOV89
17NOV89
17NOV89
l9NOV89

P. 2

SUBJECT ._ TAUGHT

NO ... OF __
PERSONS_ TRA_
I~!;p

Communications Training
Weapons Tng (Ml6; G-3,FN>
Mortar Tn9 (SlMM and 60MM)
Map Reading
Medical Tn9
Mortar Tng
Map Reading
Weapons Tng
Mortar Tng
Mortar Tng
Mortar Tng

6
80
12
10
10
30
10
20

40
40
20

The personnel that conducted the training were:

I

OPT David C. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton D. Re~d. Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Detachment Operations Sergeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Speoial Forces Engineer Specialist,
Detaohment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo. Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detaohment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gav, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist,
Detachment Intelligence Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detaohment Medical Sergeant SSG Mario Rodriguez, Special Forces Weapons Speo~alist,
Detachment Light We~pons Sergeant
SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Foroes Commun1oat1ons Specialist.
Detaohment Communications Chief
SSG Daniels. Brilev, Special Forces Medical Specialist.
Detachment Medical Specialist
SSG Reves Lopez, Special Foroes Weapons Specialist. Detachment
Light Weapons Sergeant.
SSG Randal Whitely, Special Forces Communioat1ons Specialist,
Detachment Communications Sergeant.
SSG Laurence J. Cardass, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG Richard J. MeGu1nne5s. Special Forces Operations Sergeant.
Exercise Evaluator.
The length of service of these 1ndiv1duals is not available at
USMILGP.
It 1s important to note that this was not tra1nin9 for the
Atlaoatl but the annual evaluation of the Special Forces

Mar.20 '90 17:01

P. 3

.
.Detachment in its ability to conduct Foreign Internal Defense
training missions.
It is al~o possible that training conducted by Mobile Training
Teams CMTT) has been attended by members of the Atlaeatl.
Records of · such training and names of soldiers who would have
attended this training are not available at USHILGP. Further
information about MTT's mav be available from the US Army
Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA).
No other information of US ~ponsored training is on record at
USMILGP El Salvador.

Mar.20 '90 17:02

~AX520 ;erte;

P. 4

ISStJE 2: Detailed information relating to time, location,
nature, and_evolution of us training for every member of the
Atlacatl who received US training.

RESPONSE:

Providing the evolution of US supervised training for each and
every per$On who may have ever received such trainin~ within the
Atl&catl is not within the capability of the USMILGP. The
USMILGP does not maintain an accountability for the thousands
of soldiers who come in contact ~ith US sponsored or advised
unit train1n9 within EL Salvador. FMS and IMET funded
individual traininq provided in the us is accounted for within
the USMILGP by name, course and course dates. The Salvadoran
military does not provide unit information and there has n·o t
been a need to have that information.
·
Additionally, there has been no formal training relation with
the Atlaoatl. There are no ·US Military trainers assigned to the
Atlacatl nor have there ever been US trainers assigned to the
Atlacatl. A US trainer is assigned to the CEBRI Training Center
which is located near the Atlacatl. This trainer is not
assigned to nor doe~ he work with the Atlacatl.
Subsequent to our response on 9 February, we identified that us
trainers trained 1,383 soldiers of the BIRl Atlacatl in 1981 in
El Sdlvador. This information was provided to USSOUTHCOM on
22FE890.
The training included Basic Inf4ntry training for
individual soldiers and progressed to Comp~ny Level Operations.
In 1983 only 250 soldiers of the 1,383 trained in 1981 remained
on active duty. The Atlacatl's current personnel turn over rate
is 64%. It is doubtful that many enlisted soldiers trained in
1981 are still on active duty today. Officers remain in service
for much longer periods and are subject to rotation on an almost
annual basis. It is possible that there are officers assiqned
to the Atlacatl that received training in 1981. It is unlikely
that they have been at the Atlaoatl since 1981 without a break
in service.
In any event, USMILGP does not have any reoords
indicating the speo1fio training given in 1981, the names of the
personnel who gave the training, the unit of the personnel who
gave the training, nor the names of the personnel who received
the training.
USMILGP has no records of any Mobile Training Team that may have
provided training to the Atlaoatl. It is possible such training
may have oocurred. If so, the information would be available
from the US Army Security Assistanoe Agenoy for Latin America,
Quarry Heights. Panama.
The summary of the courses given in the February response was
intended to answer paragraph three of Congressman Moakley•s
26JAN90 reqtie~t for 1nformation. which request~ a description of
any US mil1t~ry pro~rams or cl&$S8$ in which COL Guillermo
ft~
nthRr militArv

- -~A~----

Mar . 20 '90 17:04

si:N="AX520 series

·· - - ·

- ------

All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy since
approximately 1983 attended the Commando _C_Ran9erj_Q_perat1ons __
9.9._
lff.§~ at _the US Army School of the Americas (USARSA). Spec1 f 1c
course descriptions are not available at USMILGPi this
information can be obtained from USARSA, Fort Benning. GA. The
following individual implicated in the Jesuit case attended the
Commando Course:
1LT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene. LT Mendoza is not a
member of the Atlacatl.
Training was conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. from 28APR l5JUN88. This course develops leadership skill$ by requiring
students to perform effectively as small unit leaders. Training
is in light infantry tactics, airborne, airmobile, and
amphibious operations.
All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to
1977 and 1980 to present have attended the The Salvador Cadet
Pr:._e...2,aration Q9_~ at USARSA or the United States Infantry
School CUSAIS) in one of its fiv~ forms which occurred as part
of the course evolution during th"is time periods. These ooun~es
are generally to provide military academy cadets with practical
kn.Q,wledge of conoepts and fundamentals of military subjects,
without regard to their future branch specialization. The tive
form!S .ire: The Cadet Orientation__ Course,. Combat Arms a.nd
~ o r t Service Basic.._ Offioer Preparation_ Course,
~~ish ocs Course,. and the El Salvador Cadet Course. Specific
data concerning eaoh of these oourses- is not available at
USMILGP. Information may be obtained ·from USARSA or USAIS, Fort
Benning, GA. All Atlaoatl officers who · are military academy
graduates and the majority of those who received commissions
after serving as non-oommissioned officers received this
training.
Three of the four offioers implicated in this ca~e attended the
Cadet Course.

lLT MENDOZA Valleoillos, Yusshy Rene
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
Attended the Sp~sh OCS Course ·JAN - APR82, conducted at United
States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

2LT GUEVARA Cerritos, Gonzalo
Attended the E__ Salvador Cadet Course _li:SCQ.l. 13JUN - 30SEP88,
l
conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.
Selected Company Grade Officers and NCOs attend the Sma~l.Unit Training Management Course also conducted st USARSA, Fort
Benning, Ga. Course descriptions are available from that
~ource . .Th~ course generally is to prepare individuals to plan,
oonduot, and m3nage small unit training. It teaches US Army

P. 5

Mar.20 '90 17:06

~AX520 urles

t-' ,

per$ons implicated in this case attended this training:
SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro
230CT - l4DEC88
CPL PEREZ Va$quez, Anqel
30SEP - 20NOV87
The Special .Forces_Officer's_Course. CSFOCl is the same course US
Officers attend. It is given at the Special Warfare Center
(SWC), Fort Bragg, NC. The specific course description is ·not
available at USMILGP but can be obtained from SWC, Fort Bragg,
NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct
unconventional warfare, Special Forces Operations, and Foreign
Internal Defense (Fl u ). Individuals are trained to serve as an
Operational Detaohment - Alpha (ODA) Commander. The following
officer implicated in this case attended this training from
llNOV88 - 21JAN89:
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
In ~ddition to the training conducted at US Army installations,
USMILGP has knowledqe of the following additional training
activities that involved the- BIR! Atlacatl.
· ····· ..... . ..
The first of these is a Desl9nate~ Mar~sman Course supervised by
the 1st Brigade Operations, Planning and Assistance, and
Training Team (OPATT}. The 1£t Brigade OPATTs supervised a
Designated Marksman Course of three weeks duration given to
Atlacatl soldier~, CEBRI Training Center instruotors. and to
member~ of the 4 other BIRis. The purpose of the course was to
provide a cadre of instructors to train marksmen oapable of
obtaining a first round hit with their assigned weapons at SOOm.
There were approximately 20 students. all enlisted. of which 10
were from the Atlac3tl. The course was taught at the Atlaoatl
Garrison from 06FEB - 2SFE889.
The US Trainers COPATTs) involved were:
MAJ William Council. a Special Forces Officer with approximately
15 years service.
SFC Robert Jarman. a Special Forces Commun1oat1ons Specialist.
length of service unknown.
SFC Melchor Becena, a Special Forces We4pon~ Specialist. with
approximately 12 years of service.
It should be noted that although these soldiers are all Special
Forces qualifJed they were assi9ned as tr31ners to USMILGP and
were not there as part of a Special Forces Unit.
The same instructors supervised a Sn1p..!9_r__Q~~ from 24APR89 ~OMAY89. Th1~ course was 91ven at the Atlaoatl Garrison to
train personnel for employment as snipers in combat operations.
The Atlac~tl ' s sniper weapon system was used. There were 36
Atla6atl soldiers who reieived this tra1n1n~.

6

P. 1

Mar , 20 '90 17 : 08

The names of the Atlacatl soldier~ who received this training
are:
ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06-25FEB89

SGT

CPT

EDWIN ERNESTO RODAS TRUJILLO
HECTOR EDUARDO ESCAMILLA BARRERA
VALENTIN SERGIO MARTINEZ CRUZ
AGUSTIN AGUILAR HERNANDEZ
ANTONIO ARISTIDES GOMEZ CORNELIO
LUIS FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ HERNANDEZ
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTINEZ CORDERO
MIGUEL ANGEL MOLINA RENDEROS
MIGUEL ANGEL MARTINEZ GARCIA
FRANCISCO ARRIAZA ZAMORA
SNIPER COURSE
24APR-22MAY89

PVT

ISMAEL DOLORES MELGAR

JOSE ORLANDO VENTURA VELASQUEZ

RAUL RAFAEL VALLE
ROLANDO OE JESUS ABARCA
JUAN FRANCISCO BARRIENTOS CHACON
JOSE LUIS TOBAR ZELADA
BENJAMIN ALCIOES FUNES CHICAS
HERBERT WALTER GUADRON FUENTES
FERNANDO LOPEZ ALFARO
JOSE EMILIO CARTAGENA DUENAS
JOSE VITELIO MALDONADO MEJIA
NtCOLAS GARCIA LIU
DANIEL FUENTES SANOS
DANIEL MARTINEZ JACOBO
EDGARD OSWALDO PALACIOS
AL8ERTO QUIJANO CALLES
JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ ARDON
ELIAS PAYES GUZMAN
JUAN ANTONIO GALVEZ ARIAS
MOISES ROSALES CASTELLANO
ELISEO FLORES MANCIA
JOSE ADAN LIEVANO SIGUENZA
MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN
OSCAR ARMANDO TRIGUEROS
MIGUEL ANGEL ESCALANTE
JOSE NOE NUNEZ AVELAR

FERMIN ALFREDO PINEDA
FRANCISCO ARMANDO HERRERA
MARIO RENE AQUINO CATATA
SONIA PERDOMO LIMA
SANTOS PEREZ FLORES
MANUEL DE JESUS DIAZ LOPEZ
MARIO DE JESUS CARBAJAL
JOSE 1SRAEL BAUTISTA GUZMAN
OSCAR ARMANDO HERNANDEZ
FRANCISCO MEDRANO SERRANO

Mar.20 '90 1?:10

P, 2

None of the~e soldiers are assigned to the Reconnaissance
Pl~toon nor do their names appear among those currently
impl1.cated.

.J

I

The final activity of which USMILGP has records is the 7th
Special Force~ Group (Airborne) Deployment for Training CDFT>
exercise conducted from 10 - 20NOV89. The purpose of this OFT
was to test a Special Forces Detachment in their ability to
execute their primary special forces mission of training foreign
armies. As part of the detachment's evaluation. training was
given to approximately 150 soldiers from the Atlaoatl in order
to ev3luate the language and teaching skills of the Detachment.
The training wa~ stopped because of the 11NOVS9 Communist
offensive in which the Atlacatl was committed to combat on
13NOV89. The training conducted from 11 - 13NOVS9 was in
dismounted Infantry Patrol Techniques, Weapons Trainin~. and dav
and night pract1.cal exercises of these subjects.
The training provided a$ part of the OFT included:
Organization of Combat Patrols
Duties and Responsibilities of Patrol Members
Military Troop Leading Procedures
Combat Orders
Patrol Base Activities
Immediate Action Drills
Techniques of Fire and Maneuver
Rapid Fire Technique~ <Firing without lookin~ through
sights>
Preparation or Arms and Equipment for a P~trol
M16 Zero Fire (Procedure to align sight ot · the Ml6 to the
~oldier's view of the target)
Practicsl Exercise in Combat Orders

..

The personnel who received the training were:
COMMANDO SECTION
lLT
2LT
SGT

CPL

PVT

Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Co. Commander /
Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos. Seotion Commander ./
Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel
Oscar Rafael Molina Aguilar
Jose Napoleon Argumedo Gutierrez
Antonio Ramiro Avalos Varqas v'
Ri~oberto Antonio Loarca Penate
Tomas Zarpate ~astillo /
Angel Perez Vasquez./
Marcos Gonzalez Rodriquez
Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
An9el Ceraf1n Melendez Ramos
An~el Rafael Machuca Mendoza
Angel Chavez Moran
Baltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
Edwin Leonel Alberto ·Men .)ivar
H~ctor Antonio Guerrero Maravilla

i',

...,.._..

lnes Orlando Garcia Menjivar
I~1·ael S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jose Francisco Monterro$a Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio /
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Joee Lui~ Martinez Carpio
Jose Hernand Tadeo Santos
Juan Naroi$O Sosa Delqado
Jorge Amiloar Reves Perez
Jose Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Francisco Chicas Aviles
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Gu:man Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
M19uel Angel Soriano Cornejo
Manuel Oscar Garay Linares
Neftaly Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Je$US Palma Chamul
Orlando Martinez Dubon
Oscar Nariano Amava Grimaldi v
Oswaldo de Jesus Ar9ueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argueta Villatoro
Odume Oswaldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rene Zelada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
·- Salvador Alonso Torres Sachez
Victor Antonio Delgado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Luis Ernesto Salguero Mendoza

-

After 14NOV89, the Detachment trained Atlaoatl personnel thatremained behind to secure the base, in various subJects.
USMILGP does not have a detailed list of the training conducted
by the after 13NOV89 nor of what personnel were trained. This
information mav be available from the 7th Special Forc~s Group
{Airborne), Fort Bra99, NC. Li$ted below is the information
available at USMILGP:
D~I.[

15NOV89

16NOV89
17NOV89
17NOV89

l9NOV89

SUBJECT_ TAUGfiT

NO OF PERSONS TRAINED

Communications Training
Weapons Tng (M16; G-3.FN)
Mortar Tng C81MM and 60MM)
Map Reading
Medical Tn9
Mortar Tnq
Map Reading
Weapons Tn9
Mortar Tn9
Mortar Tng
Mortar Tn9

6

6

80
12
10

10
50

10
20

40
40
20

Mer.20 '90 17:12

si:t-FAXS20 s e r 1e s

The personnel that conducted the training were:

II

CPT David C. Akins. ~pecial Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton D. Read, Special Forces Operations Sergeant.
Detachment Operations Serqeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist.
Oet3ohment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Force$ Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist.
Detachment Intelliqenoe Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodriguez. Special Forces Weapons Specialist.
Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant ·
SSG Mark L. Alexander. Special Forces Commun1cat1ons Specialist.
Detachment Communications Chief
SSG Daniel S. Briley, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Specialist
SSG Reyes Lopez. Special Forces Weapons- Spec-ialiet-, .. De.tactimen.t : ..
Light Weapons Sergeant.
SSG Randal Whitely, Special Foroes Communications Speoiali~t.
Detachment Communioat1ons Sergeant.
SSG Laurenoe J. Carda~s, Speoial Forces Medical Specialist.
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG Riohard J. McGuinness, Special Forces Operations Sergeant.
Exercise Evaluator.

No other records of US sponsored training is on record at
USMILGP El Salvador.
The length of servioe of these individuals is not available at
USMILGP.
It is important to note that this was not training for the
Atlacatl but the annual evaluation of the Detachment in its
ab1l1ty to conduct Foreign Internal Defense tra1n1nq missions.

P. 3

P. 4

--------

SAl'FAX520 ; ; r i u

Mar.20 '90 17:13

1SSUE J: A detailed description of human rights tra1n1nq qiven:
1dent1f1cation of which and how many persons received numan
r1qht$ training.
RESPONSE:
Human rights issues have been and continue to be a central issue
1n the US militarv effort in El Salvador.
The very presence of
US M1l1tary Advisors is a reminder to the Salvadoran Armed
Forces of the US Government·~ oommitment 3nd ins~~tence on numAn
rights.
Specifically in El Salvador, all officers and NCO's at the CEMFA
8a~10 Training Center for the last three years have received
human rights training bv in$truotors from the International
Human Rights Commission, and troops since May 88. The material
is taught to the approximately 4000 basic trainees trained at
CEMFA annually. The USMILGP does not have a lesson plan for the

course of 1nstruct1on with which to provide a detailed
description of the course content.
No US trainer 1s assiqned to the Atlacatl; therefore. it is not
known what human rights training- 1s given at the Atlaeatl. In
the pa$t, eaoh SIR! has been responsible for training their own
basic trainees. The CEBRI Training Center, which has been
operational for approximately a year, teaches Law of Land
Warfare. The cour~e of instruction is still undergoing
revi~ions to standardize the training with that given at the
CEMFA Training Center. As quickly as the International Human
Rights Commiss1on 1s capable of producing a standardized lesson
plan. the exact training given will be available.
Human rights training is an integral part of many training
course~ conducted at USARSA as well as other US trainin9
center$. A detailed description of the human rights training
received by Salvadoran students as a result of US tr3in1ng is
not available at USMILGP. This information 1s available from
the School of the Americas (USARSA}, Fort Benning, GA; the US
Army Infantry Center (USAIC), Fort Benning, GA: the US Army
Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA). Quarry
Heiqhts. PN; and other US Tra1ning Centers. Additionally,
information about human rights training given by Mobile Training
Teams to El Salvador may be available from the US Army Seour1ty
A~sistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA).
An example of training received at US training center is the
Cadet Course (8 courses, one per vear) at USARSA whioh ha~
included a block of 1nstruction 1n human riqhts since 1982. All
cadets from the Esouela M1litar, the Salv3doran military
academy, receive thi5 tra1n1ng. Therefore. in effect, almost
all

~alvado~an

o~~ioo~•

haye

~oooiYo~

h~MAn

~i•h~o

~r•in~n~.

This tr3in1nq 1s reinforced e3oh time an officer goes to a US
School.

.

......

ISSUE 4: Specific tra1ninq provided since the beq1nn1ng of l98S
to Atlacatl per~onnel assi~ned to the unit involved 1n the
ma~~acre.
RESPONSE :
The 9 Februarv response stated that since 1988 the only traininq
given to the Atlac~tl was a three ~eek Desi9nated Marksman
cour~e and a Sn1~er Course~ Both of these cour~es were taught
at the Atlacatl garrison. The response also stated that 10
Atlacatl soldiers attended the DesUJnated. Ma.rksman Cou_rse and
that approximately 30 attended the sniper Cour~e._ We have since
been able to determine the actual number of 5tudents for the
Sn!_P~r Cou_rse was 36.
The names of the!ie students a,·e:

ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06-2SFEB89
SGT

Ill
'

CPT

..

EDWIN ERNESTO RODAS TRUJiLLO
HECTOR EDUARDO ESCAMILLA BARRERA
VALENTIN SERGIO MARTINEZ CRUZ
AGUSTIN AGUILAR HERNANDEZ
ANTONIO ARISTI.DES GOMEZ CORNELIO
LUIS FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ HERNANDEZ
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTINEZ CORDERO
MI GUEL ANGEL MOL l NA RENDE ROS
MIGUEL ANGEL MARTINEZ GARCIA
FRANCISCO ARRIAZA ZAMORA
SNIPER COURSE
24APR-2·2MAY89

PVT

ISMAEL DOLORES MELGAR
JOSE ORLANDO VENTURA VELASQUEZ
RAUL RAFAEL VALLE
ROLANDO OE JESUS ABARCA
JUAN FRANCISCO BARRIENTOS CHACON
JOSE LUIS TOBAR ZELADA
BENJAMIN ALCIDES FUNES CHICAS
HERBERT WALTER GUADRON FUENTES
FERNANDO LOPEZ ALFARO
JOSE EMILIO CARTAGENA DUENAS
JOSE VITELIO MALDONADO MEJIA
NICOLAS GARCIA LIU
DANIEL FUENTES BANOS
DANIEL MARTINEZ JACOBO
EDGARD OSWALDO PALACIOS
ALBERTO QUIJANO CALLES
JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ ARDON
ELIAS PAYES GUZMAN
JUAN ANTONIO GALVEZ ARIAS
MOISES ROSALES CASTELLANO
ELISEO FLORES MANCIA
J.OSE AOAN LIEVANO S.IGUENZA
MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN
n ~ ~AQ A~MANDO TRJGU~ROR

Mer.20 ·~ 1·n1,

MIGUEL ANGEL ESCALANTE
JOSE NOE NUNEZ AVELAR
FERMIN ALFREDO PINEDA
FRANCISCO ARMANDO HERRERA
MARIO RENE AQUINO CATATA
SONIA PERDOMO LIMA
SANTOS PEREZ FLORES
MANUEL DE JESUS DIAZ LOPEZ
MARIO DE JESUS CARBAJAL
JOSE ISRAEL BAUTISTA GUZMAN
OSCAR ARMANDO HERNANDEZ
FRANCISCO MEDRANO SERRANO
None of the students are assigned to the unit involved in the
Jesuit killings and none of their names appear on the list of
the soldiers implicated in this incident. ·
The US Trainers involved were:
MAJ William Council, a Special Forces Officer with approximately
15 years servic•.
SFC Robert Jarman, a Special Forces Communications Specialist,
length of service unknown.
SFC Melchor Becena, a Special Forces Weapons Specialist, with
approximately 12 years of service.

As previously stated, USMILGP has no record of any other
training given to the Atlacatl by USMILGP sponsored trainers.
The Atlacatl did participate in the 7th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) Deployment for Training lOFT) exercise beginning on
11NOV89, which was an exercise evaluating the Special Forces
Detachment's ability to perform its primary mission of trainin9
foreign armies. As part of the evaluation of the Detachment.
members of the Atlacatl, to include those implicated in this
oa~e. received two days of training in dismounted infantry
patrolling techniques before the Atlaoatl was sent into comba~
during the communist offensive. Listed below are the general
topics covered prior to the Atlacatl's departure to combat
operations on 13NOV89:
Or93nization of Combat Patrols
Out1es and Responsibilities : of Patrol Members
Military r,-oop Leading Procedures
Combat Orders
Patrol Base Aotivities
Immediate Aotion Drills
Techniques of Fire and Maneuver
Rapid Fire Techniques (Firing without lookinq through
sig h ts)
Preparation or Arms and Equipment for a Patrol
Ml6 Zero Fire <Procedure to align sight of the Ml6 to
soldier view of target)
Pract1oal Exercise in · Combat Orders
TkA ~n11owinQ 1s a li$t of personnel implicated in the Je~u1t

P. 7

Mar.20 '90 17 : 18

,.

COMMANDO SE Cl I .ON.

lLT
2LT
SGT

CPL

PVT

Jo~e Ricardo Espinoza Guerra. Co. Commander
Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos. Section Commander
O~car Armando Solorzano Esquivel
Osoar Rafael Molina Aguilar
Jo$e Napoleon Argumedo Gutierrez
Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
Rigoberto Antonio Loarca Penate
Tomas Zarpate Castillo
Angel Perez Vasquez
Marcos Gonzalez Rodriguez
Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
Angel Cerafin Melendez Ramos
Angel Rafael Machuca Mendoza
Angel Chavez Moran
B~ltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
Edwin Leonel Alberto Menjivar
Hector Antonio Guerrero Maravilla
Ines Orlando G.aroia Menjivar
Israel S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jo~e Francisco Monterro$a Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Asoencio
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Jose Lu1s Martinez Carpio .
Jo~e Hernand Tadeo Santos
Juan Narciso Sosa Delgado
Jorge Amiloar Reyes Perez
Jose Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Francisco Chicas Aviles
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Guzman Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
Miguel Angel Soriano Cornejo
Manuel Oscar Garay Linares
Neft4lY Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Jesus Palma Chamul
Orlando M~rtinez Dubon
O$ear Nariano Amaya Grimaldi
O~waldo de Jesus Argueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argueta Villatoro
Odume O~waldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rene Zelada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
Salvador Alon~o Torres Sachez
Victor ~ntonio Delqado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Lui~ Ernesto Salguero Mendoza

·-

P, 8

The following is a list of the personnel who conducted the
training:
CPT David c. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton o. Read. Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Detachment Operations Sergeant
SFC M3rcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist.
Detachment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo. Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Speci3list.
Detachment Intell19enoe Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodriguez. Special Forces Weapons Speciali~t.
Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Hark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Speciali$t,
Detaohment Communications Chief
SSG Oaviel s. Briley. Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detaohment Medical Speoialist
SSG Reyes Lopez. Special Forces Weapons Specialist. DetaohmentLiqht Weapons Sergeant.
SSG ·Randal Whitelv, Special Forces Communications Specialist,
Detachment Communications Sergeant.
SSG Laurence J. Cardass, Speoial Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG R1ohard J. MoGuinness, Special Foroes Operations Sergeant,
Exercise Evaluator.
Per$Onnel tr3ined with IMET and FMS funds are identified at
USMILGP by name only. The names of all personnel implicated in
this oase have been cross referenced with all available USMILGP
training records. The following has been determined.
All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy since
approximately 1983 attended the Commando CRan9~J?~rations
Course. This course is taught as a single course of instruction
and is also an inte9ral part of the Salvadoran Cadet Course.
Specific course descriptions are not available at USMILGP. This
information can be obtained from the United States Army Sohool
of the Americas CUSARSA). Though not a member of the Atlaoatl,
the following individual implicated in this oase· attended the
Commando Course:
lLT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene
Training WA$ conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. from 28APR
-l5JUN88. As stated earlier this cour~e develops leadership
~kills by requiring students to perform effectively ~s small
unit leaders. Training is in light infantry taot1es. airborne.
a1rmobile, ~nd a~phibious _
operation~.
All ornduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to
. .. - .. -••o"~Q~ thA ~~lvadoran Cadet

-

Preparation Course in one of its five ·forms which occurred .is
part of the course evaluation during this time period. These
courses are generallv to provide military academy cadets with
practical knowledge of concept$ and fundamental$ of military
~ubject~. without regard to their future branch specialization.
The names of the Cadet Cour~e have been:
Cadet._Orient3_t1on Course_, Combat_Arms and Support Service Basio.
.
Ba.s ic . Off 1.cer Preparation Course _Spec1 f.iQ.,_ ~anish ocs Q.2.rn.
and the El Salvador Cadet Course. Specific data concerning each
of these courses is not available at USMILGP. Information may
be obtained from USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.
Three of the four officers implicated in this case attended the
Cadet Course.

lLT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
Attended the~ nish OCS Course JAN - APR82, conducted at the us
Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

2LT GUEVARA Cerritos. Gonzalo
Attended .the El Salvador Cadet Cog!:.§~SCC1 13JUN - 30SEP88. ·
conduoted·at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

..

Seleoted company grade officers and NCO's attend the
Small Unit Training Management Cours~ also conduoted at USARSA,
Fort Benning, Ga. A course description is available from that

~ource. Generallv. the course is to prepare individuals to
plan, conduot, and manage small unit training. It teaohes US
Army training doctrine, principles, and teoh~iques. The
following persons implicated in this case attended this
training:
SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro
230CT - 14DEC88
CPT PEREZ Va~quez, Angel

30SEP - 20NOV87
The ~.2._~cJal Forces Off 10.er 's Course ( SFOC > is the same oour~e US

Officers attend. It is given at the Specia1·warfara Center
(SWC), Fort Bragg, NC. Specific course descriptions are not
available at USMILGP but can be obtained from swc, Fort Bragg,
NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct
unconventional warfare, Special Forces Operations, and Foreign
Internal Defen~e (FIO). Individuals are trained to serve as an
Operational Detachment - Alpha CODA) Commander. The individual
implicated in this caee who attended this training is:
lLT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ric3rdo

11NOV88 - 21JAN89
Since 29APR88 we have located only two individuals from the
Atlao3tl who have been trained at a location where a US Advisor

'VI

"'l.W...

,.
is a~signed to ~upport training.
The two individuals were
trained as acto r s.
The training's purpose was in how to put on
"Skits" at civic actions. Students were trained in how to put
on clown acts for children at Government and Armv sponsored
civic actions to aid the people of conflictive area~.

._,

6

Mar.20 '90 17:23

P.'

ISSUE 5: Information on all US trainin9 of military personnel
charged 1n the massacre.
RESPONSE:

Members of the Atlacatl charged in the Jesuit kill1n9s have
received the following training from the United States:
COL Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, no US training on record~
at USMILGP El Salvador.
J

LT Yusshy Rene Mendoza Vallecillos, SalvadoTan_ocs Course JAN APR82 given at the US Army Infantry School. Fort Benning. GA.
and the Comm.a ndo Course 28APR - 15JUN88, 91 ven at USARSA. Fort
8enn1n9, Ga.
LT Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Salvadoran OCS Course JAN APR82 given at US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. and
the Special Forces_Officer's Course llNOV88 - 21JAN89, given at

Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC.

2L T Gonzalo Guevara Cerri to~, El Salvador_.Cadet Course 13JUN 30SEP88

given at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.
SGT Antonio Ramiro
50SEP - l4DEC8S.

·~

Avalos Vargas, Small_Un1t Tra1nin.9_Hanagement

CPL Angel Perez Vasquez, Small Unit Train1n.9....Mana9ement., :SOSEP The Smal.l _Unit _TrainiJt9.... MaQAg~ment course 1s given at
USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

20NOV87.

The following individuals implicated in the case 1n question
participated in 2 days of the 7th Special Fo~ces Group
(Airborne> Deployment For Training (DFT) exercise from 11 1:5NOV89:

lLT

2LT

SGT

CPL

PVT

Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Co. Commander
Gonzalo Guovara Cerritos, section Commander
Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel
Oscar Rafael Molina A9uilar
Jose Napol•on Argumedo Gutierrez
Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
Rigoberto Antonio Loarca Penate
Tomas Zarpata Castillo
Angel Perez Vasquez
H~roos Gonzalez Rodriguez
Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
Angel Cerafin Melendez Ramos
Angel Rafael Maohuoa Mendoza
Angel Chavez Moran
Baltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
Edwin Leonel Alberto Menjivar
Hector Antonio Guerrero Maravilla

9' pc

· "

.

'

Ines Orlando Garcia MenJivar
Israel S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jo$e Franoisoo Monterrosa Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Jose Luis Martinez Carpio
Jose Hernand Tadeo Santos
Juan Naroiso Sosa Delgado
Jorge Amiloar Reyes Perez
Jo~e Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Franoisoo Chicas Aviles
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Guzman Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
Miguel Angel Soriano CorneJo
Manuel Osoar Garay Linares
Neftaly Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Jesus Palma Chamul
Orlando Martinez Dubon
Osoar Nariano Amaya Grimaldi
Oswaldo de Jesus Argueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argueta Villatoro
Odume Oswaldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rene· ·-z-elada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
Salvador Alonso Torre~ B~chez
Victor Antonio Delgado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Luis Ernesto Salguero Mendoza
The following is a list of the personnel who conducted the
train1n9:
OPT David C. Akins. Special Foroes Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton O. Read, Special Foroes Operations Sergeant,
Detaohment Operations Sergeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces En9ineer Specialist,
Detachment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Sas-Gav, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist.
Detaohment Intell19ence Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodri9uez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist,
Detaohment Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Speoialist.
Detachment Commun1cat1ons Chief
SSG Daviel s. Briley. Special Forces Medical Speoial1st.
3

,.
Detachment Medical Special1~t
SSG Reye~ Lopez, Special Forces Weapons Spec1al1st, Detachment
Liqht Weapon~ Sergesnt.
SSG Randal Whitely. Special Forces Communications Specialist,
Detachment communioat1ons Sergeant.
SSG Laurence J. Cardass. Special Forces Medical Specialist.
Detachment ~edio~l Specialist
MSG Richard J. HcGuinness. Special Forces Operations Sergeant.
Exercise Evaluator.
USMILGP has no other record of US training being received by
individuals implicated in the Jesuit killings.

4