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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Document
A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
"Rebuttal (Argument about Jurisdiction)" report regarding the contended "limited" jurisdiction of the Rules Committee
Subject
The topic of the resource
United States--Congress--House--Committee on Rules
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 03.04 Legislative Assistants' Files: James P. McGovern, Box 19 Folder 311
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
undated
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Documents
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0801
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
tgn:7015717
El Salvador
Moakley Commission
Rules Committee
-
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Omeka Image File
The metadata element set that was included in the `files_images` table in previous versions of Omeka. These elements are common to all image files.
Bit Depth
8
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1
Height
785
Width
1000
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples of still images are: paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type "text" to images of textual materials.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Group photograph of members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules, , 8/8/1986
Subject
The topic of the resource
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Pepper, Claude, 1900-1989
Legislators--United States
United States--Congress--House--Committee on Rules
Description
An account of the resource
Pictured (left to right): John Joseph Moakley seated behind desk at right, Chairman of Committee Representative Claude Pepper (D-FL) seated behind desk in center, Representative David Bonior (D-MI) standing between John Joseph Moakley and Claude Pepper
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Series 10.02 Photographs: Congressional Photographs, Box 5 Folder 75
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
8 August 1986
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPG
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Still image
Photographs
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0321
Joe Moakley
Rules Committee
U.S. Congress
-
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Omeka Image File
The metadata element set that was included in the `files_images` table in previous versions of Omeka. These elements are common to all image files.
Bit Depth
8
Channels
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Height
1000
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples of still images are: paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type "text" to images of textual materials.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
John Joseph Moakley as Rules Committee Chair with gavel, 1989
Subject
The topic of the resource
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
United States--Congress--House--Committee on Rules
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 10.02 Photographs: Congressional Photographs, Box 2 Folder 42
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1980s
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPG
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Still image
Photographs
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0091
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
tgn:7015717
Joe Moakley
Rules Committee
U.S. Congress
-
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Omeka Image File
The metadata element set that was included in the `files_images` table in previous versions of Omeka. These elements are common to all image files.
Bit Depth
8
Channels
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples of still images are: paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type "text" to images of textual materials.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
John Joseph Moakley with interns in Rules Committee room, 1990s
Subject
The topic of the resource
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
United States--Congress--House--Committee on Rules
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 10.05 Photographs: People Photographs, Box 5 Folder 86
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1990s
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPG
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Still image
Photographs
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0061
Joe Moakley
Rules Committee
U.S. Congress
-
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Omeka Image File
The metadata element set that was included in the `files_images` table in previous versions of Omeka. These elements are common to all image files.
Bit Depth
8
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples of still images are: paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type "text" to images of textual materials.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Moakley staff member Jack Dooling (Rules Committee), left, talking with Tip O'Neill
Subject
The topic of the resource
O'Neill, Tip
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Series 10.05 Photographs: People Photographs, Box 4 Folder 46
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
undated
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPG
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Still image
Photographs
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0358
Rules Committee
Tip O'Neill
-
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516f08d6d2cd0f7fa7d5155d0292ad90
Omeka Image File
The metadata element set that was included in the `files_images` table in previous versions of Omeka. These elements are common to all image files.
Bit Depth
8
Channels
3
Height
773
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1000
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Still Image
A static visual representation. Examples of still images are: paintings, drawings, graphic designs, plans and maps. Recommended best practice is to assign the type "text" to images of textual materials.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Moakley staff member Jack Dooling (Rules Committee), right, with Tip O'Neill
Subject
The topic of the resource
O'Neill, Tip
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Series 10.05 Photographs: People Photographs, Box 4 Folder 46
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
undated
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
Copyright is retained by the creators of items in this collection, or their descendants, as stipulated by United States copyright law. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
JPG
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Still image
Photographs
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-0359
Rules Committee
Tip O'Neill
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/11079/archive/files/e9224c4d63e20fe822aa35e90fa31111.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=aoeCU4vsbKFzGfazFIgEoRVGfkKtJpqUSI-6QWvDd%7EJjQg1lyQhzVyg3F38PsaF6zb4QlpDCs3Y7nxUs4VFZnlTHg4bY1QIPU9AiEMJS5%7Eg44jJgfgAD2v9E%7EKlFI5hsTHVMHLdxz38rUgBAB4tXrUDCCx0DZTJRll1VaDWeXh8R1ymtQqEc3TYxYcSOsZe2H595lWUOt1EybXuRLBYlq4Nd5Tq4IIkxvSCvxrW4Es3VFL-g73XU7FdlJ6JRZMojU8VMnL%7EHVySrHvMXsu6BfmjntpkJrb-n7BfIPSpEtP9ok81jZXpbgDcpB5gCH56ipOI13JkPAR3ac2yR9Y0zuA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
Document
A resource containing textual data. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
DI-1254
Title
A name given to the resource
Opening Statement of Congressman John Joseph Moakley before the Subcommittee on Rules of the House regarding H.R. 618 and H.R. 1409
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
undated
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Description
An account of the resource
The legislation, introduced by Congressman John Joseph Moakley, recommended a temporary stay of deportation for Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees as well as a review of conditions in those countries.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 03.04 Legislative Assistant Files: Jim McGovern, Box 2 Folder 38
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Documents
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
PDF
Language
A language of the resource
English
Subject
The topic of the resource
El Salvador--Politics and government--1979-1992
Emigration & immigration
United States--Foreign Relations--El Salvador
United States--Emigration and immigration--Government policy--History
Relation
A related resource
<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
El Salvador
Foreign relations
Immigration policy
Refugees
Rules Committee
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https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/11079/archive/files/129c6b29fbcc64d3e0364ea36f070650.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=QSEBenBw4pSwK2dqHFfO6LKPHAJodysb2L0ZbJcnBv0HzfcGpN8UBd8wrAM-MyS7Nxf1uo0YIAm0k0-5wf5g-2PeSUnwz3ysK2c6dJdCJOVxMqBrLmHH3tR1E0e3BNzwBM%7E%7EVM%7Es2Neu6eqqgzscpI0DiDahQBbX115BboO85IVlhDa%7EqbrBNPm8rUBygYK7BOluIottczBXOJhMRVlF2ZSXibJi6XWMxfB9U85EY-4NKDK28KtA8yaDkCscmd-XicBxU2bnfFJv-GaG7mR93t52djkY5DxmYpe%7ET51JD3ESubcPlM%7EZYO2Z-26894CE%7ECnLe3dCmNYyYlyjGcfvhQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
2d34898f237b87061a524bead11c045c
PDF Text
Text
REPUBLICAN BROKEN PROMISES
from the House Rules Committee Democrats:
"We very specifically made the decision early on in our Contract
with America that we would bring up all ten bills under open
rules."
Speaker-elect Newt Gingrich told reporters November 11, 1994
Roll Call, February 13, 1995
'Chairman' Solomon Says He Plans to Grant Open Rules on 75 Percent
of Bills Next Year
Roll Call, November 28, 1994
- -
---
________________________________________________________ _
APPLYING REPUBLICAN DEFINITIONS
TO REPUBLICAN RULES IN 104TH CONGRESS
REPUBLICANS PROMISED
REPUBLICANS DELIVERED
Number
of rules
Percent
of total
Number
of rules
Percent
of total
Open
21
70%
7
23%
Restrictive
9
30%
23
76%
APPLYING REPUBLICAN DEFINITIONS
TO REPUBLICAN RULES ON CONTRACT ITEMS
REPUBLICANS PROMISED
REPUBLICANS DELIVERED
Number
of rules
Percent
of total
Number
of rules
Percent
of total
Open
24
100%
8
33%
Restrictive
0
0%
16
66%
In the 103rd Congress, Republicans defined restrictive rules as
follows:
Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of
amendments which can be offered, and include so called
modified open and modified closed rules as well as completely
closed rules and rules providing for consideration in the
House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole.
�TALKING POINTS ON FLOOR PROCEDURE IN THE
104TH CONGRESS
FROM THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE DEMOCRATS
** In the
103rd Congress the Republicans defined restrictive rules as
follows:
Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of
amendments which can be offered, and include so called
modified open and modified closed rules as well as completely
closed rules and rules providing for consideration in the House
as opposed to the Com1nittee of the Whole
However, in the 104th Congress the Republicans have changed their
math. Now modified open rules are put into the "non-restrictive"
column when they present their tables.
** Using the Republican scoring method, bills in this Congress have
been considered under a restrictive process 74% of the time and under
an open process only 26% of the time. On Contract legislation the
Republicans have used a restrictive process 67% of the time and an
open one just 33% of the time.
** Not included in this chart are three bills which should have been
placed on the Suspension Calendar (they were in the 103rd Congress)
which were brought up under open rules.
** They were not included because the Democrats, when in the
majority, would not bring non-controversial Suspension Calendar bills
before the House under special rules.
** In this Congress when these bills were considered, no amendments
were offered and only one required a recorded vote which was 427-01 (H.R. 400).
** The bills are H.R. 101, R.R. 400 and R.R. 440.
�&'
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•••
•••'-'
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-.•.
BILL#
TITLE
RESOLUTION#
PROCESS USED FOR FLOOR
CONSIDERATION
AMENDMENTS IN ORDER
H.R. 1
•CONTRACT•
Compliance
H.Res. 6
Closed
None
H.Res. 6
Opening Day Rules Package
H.Res. 5
Closed; contained a closed rule on H.R. 1
within the closed rule
None
H.R. 5
Unfunded Mandates
H.Res. 38
Restrictive; Motion adopted over Democratic
objection in the Committee of the Whole to
limit_ debate on section 4; Pre-printing gets
preference
NIA
HJ.Res. 2
• CONTRACT•
Balanced Budget
H.Res. 44
Restrictive; only certain substitutes
2R;4D
H.Res. 43
Committee Hearings Scheduling
H.Res. 43 (OJ)
Restrictive; considered in House no
amendments
NIA
H.R. 2
• CONIRACT•
Line Item Veto
H.Res. 55
Open; Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
H.R. 665
• CONIRACT•
Victim Restitution Act of 1995
H.Res. 61
Open; Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
H.R. 666
• CONIRACT•
Exclusionary Rule Refonn Act of
1995
H.Res. 60
Open; Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
H.R. 667
• CONTRACT•
Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of
1995
H.Res. 63
Restrictive; 10hr. Time Cap on amendments
NIA
H.R. 668
• CONTRACT•
The Criminal Alien Deportation
Improvement Act
H.Res. 69
Open; Pre-printing gets preference; Contains
self-executing provision
NIA
H.R. 728
H.Res. 79
Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments;
Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
• CONTRACT•
Local Government Law Enforcement
Block Grants
H.R. 7
National Security Revitalization Act
H.Res. 83
Restrictive; 10 hr. Time Cap on amendments;
Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
Death Penalty/Habeas
NIA
Restrictive; brought up under UC with a 6 hr.
time cap on amendments
NIA
S.2
Senate Compliance
NIA
Closed; Put on suspension calendar over
Democratic objection
None
H.R. 831
To Pennanently Extend the Health
Insurance Deduction for the SelfEmployed
H.Res. 88
• CON1RACT •
• CONTRACT•
H.R. 729
• CONTRACT•
Restrictive; makes in order only the Gibbons
amendment; waives all points of order;
Contains self-executing provision
10
--,
�The Paperwork Reduction Act
H.Res. 91
H.R. 889
Emergency Supplemental/Rescinding
Certain Budget Authority
H.Res. 92
Restrictive; makes in order only the Obey
substitute
lD
H.R. 450
•CONTRACT*
Regulatory Moratorium
H.Res. 93
Restrictive; 10hr. Time Cap on amendments;
Pre-printing gets preference
NIA
H.R. 1022
* CONTRACT*
Risk Assessment
H.Res. 96
Restrictive; 10hr. Time Cap on amendments
NIA
H.R. 926
•CONTRACT*
Regulatory Flexibility
H.Res. 100
Open
NIA
H.R. 925
• CONTRACT*
Private Property Protection Act
H.Res. 101
Restrictive; 12hr. time cap on amendments;
Re.quires Members to pre-print their
amendments in the Record prior to the bill's
consideration for amendment. waives
germaneness and budget act points of order as
well as points of order concerning appropriating
on a legislative bill against the committee
substitute used as base text.
lD
H.R. 1058
•CONTRACT•
Securities Litigation Reform Act
H.Res. 105
Restrictive; 8 hr. ti.me cap on amendments;
Pre-printing gets preference; Makes in order the
Wyden amendment and waives gennaness
against it.
ID
H.R. 988
•CONTRACT*
The Attorney Accountability Act of
1995
H.Res. 104
Restrictive; 7 hr. time cap on amendments;
Pre-printing gets preference.
NIA
H.R. 956
•CONTRACT•
Product Liability and Legal Reform
Act
H.Res. 109
Restrictive; makes in order only 15 gennane
amendments and denies 64 germane
amendments from being considered.
SD; 7R
H.R. 1158
Making Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescissions
H.Res. 115
Restrictive; Combines emergency H.R. 1158
& nonemergency 1159 and strikes the abortion
provision; makes in order only pre-printed
NIA
H.R. 830
• CONTRACT*
Open
amendments that include offsets within the
same chapter (deeper cuts in programs already
cut); waives points of order against three
amendments; waives cl 2 of rule XXI against
the bill. cl 2. XXI and cl 7 of rule XVI against
the substitute; waives cl 2(e) of rule XXI
against the amendments in the Record; 10 hr
time cap on amendments. 30 minutes debate on
each amendment.
...
,,.
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�HJ.Res. 73
• CON1'RACT •
Tenn Limits
H.Rcs. 116
Restrictive; Makes in order only 4
amendments considered under a "Queen of the
Hill" procedure and denies 21 germane
amendments from being considered.
lD; 3R
H.R. 4
•CONTRACT•
Welfare Refonn
H.Res. 119
Restrictive; Makes in order only 31 perfecting
amendments and two substitutes; Denies 130
gennane amendments from being considered;
The substitutes are to be considered under a
"Queen of the Hill" procedure; All points of
order are waived against the amendments.
5D; 26R
H.R. 1271
• CONTRACT*
Family Privacy Act
H.Res. 125
Open
NIA
H.Res. 126
Open
NIA
H.R. 660
f OrrJ,._,A< :(Housing for Older Persons Act
H.R. 1215
• CONTRACT*
The Contract With America Tax
Relief Act of 1995
H.Res. 129
H.R. 483
Medicare Select Extension
H.Res. 130
Restrictive; Self Executes language that makes
cuts contingent on the adoption of a
balanced budget plan and strikes section 3006.
Makes in order only one substitute. Waives all
points of order against the bill, substitute made
in order as original text and Gephardt
substitute.
1D
Restrictive; waives cl 2(1)(6) of rule XI
against the bill; makes H.R. 1391 in order as
original text; makes in order only the Dingell
substitute; allows Commerce Committee to file
a report on the bill at any time.
ID
tax
• Contract Bills, 67% restrictive; 33% open.
•• All legislation, 74% restrictive; 26% open.
••• Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments which can be offered, and include so called modified open and modified closed rules as well as completely
closed rules and rules providing for consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole. This definition of restrictive rule is taken from the Republican chart of
resolutions reported from the Rules Committee in the 103rd Congress.
•••• Not included in this chart are three bills which should have been placed on the Suspension Calendar. H.R. 101, H.R. 400, H.R. 440
�SPECIAL REPORT
100DAYS ...
And Counting
Passage of Contract Bills
F
ollowing are the votes the House took on passage of
bills incorporating the "Contract With America."
Also with each vote, listed by vote number, is the president's position on the bill, when available, and a reference to the Weekly Report story about the action. (R Republicans; D - Democrats; ND - Northern Democrats; SD - Southern Democrats; I - Independent)
6. H Res 6. Rules of the House - Committee Staff
Cuts. Adopted 416-12: R 224-0; D 191-12 (ND 132-7, SD 59-5);
I 1-0, Jan. 4. (p. 13)
7. H Res 6. Rules of the House - Baseline Budgeting.
Adopted 421-6: R 225-0; D 195-6 (ND 132-5, SD 63-1); I 1-0,
Jan. 4. (p. 13)
8. H Res 6. Rules of the House - Term Limits for
Speaker and Chairmen. Adopted 355-74: R 228-0; D 127-73
(ND 80-56, SD 47-17); I 0-1, Jan. 4. (p. 13)
9. H R.~s 6. Rules of the House - Proxy Voting Ban.
Adopted 418-13: R 228-0; D 189-13 (ND 128-11, SD 61-2); I 1-0,
Jan. 4. (p. 13)
(
118. HR 668. Criminal Alien Deportation. Passed 380-20:
R 216-1; D 163-19 (ND 116-13, SD 47-6); I 1-0, Feb. 10. (p. 456)
129. HR 728. Anti-Crime Block Grants. Passed 238-192:
R 220-9; D 18-182 (ND 6-130, SD 12-52); I 0-1, Feb. 14. A "nay"
was a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 530)
145. HR 7. National Security. Passed 241-181: R 223-4; D
18-176 (ND 6-130, SD 12-46); I 0-1, Feb. 16. A "nay" was a vote
in support of the president's position. (p. 535)
157. HR 830. Paperwork Reduction. Passed 418-0: R
228-0; D 189-0 (ND 131-0, SD 58-0); I 1-0, Feb. 22. A "yea" was
a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 608)
'
174. HR 450. Regulatory Moratorium. Passed 276-146:
R 225-2; D 51-143 (ND 20-115, SD 31-28); I 0-1, Feb. 24. A
"nay" was a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 610)
183. HR 1022. Risk Assessment. Passed 286-141: R 2262; D 60-138 (ND 23-113, SD 37-25); I 0-1, Feb. 28. A "nay" was
a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 679)
187. HR 926. Regulatory Overhaul. Passed 415-15: R
228-0; D 186-15 (ND 127-11, SD 59-4); I 1-0, March l..(p. 679)
~
10. H Res 6. Rules of the House - Open Committee
Meetings. Adopted 431-0: R 227-0; D 203-0 (ND 139-0, SD 640); I 1-0, Jan. 4. (p. 13)
197. HR 925. Private Property Rights. Passed 277-148: R
205-23; D 72-124 (ND 33-103, SD 39-21); I 0-1, March 3. A "nay"
was a vote in support of the president's position. (pp. 680, 679)
-11. H Res 6. Rules of the House - Tax Increase
Limitation. Adopted 279-152: R 227-0; D 52-151 (ND 23-116,
SD 29-35); I 0-1, Jan. 4. (p. 1.'3)
199. HR 9. Omnibus Regulatory Overhaul. Passed 277141: R 219-8; D 58-132 (ND 23-110, SD 35-22); I 0-1, March 3. A
"nay" was a vote in support o_f the president's position. (p. 679)r
12. H Res 6. Rules of the House - House Audit.
Adopted 430-1: R 228-0; D 201-1 (ND 138-1, SD 63-0); I 1-0,
Jan. 4. (p. 13)
207. HR 988. Civil Litigation. Passed 232-193: R 216-11;
D 16-181 (ND 4-133, SD 12-48); I 0-1, March 7. (p. 745)
15. HR 1. Congressional Compliance. Passed 429-0: R
229-0; D 199-0 (ND 137-0, SD 63-0); I 1-0, Jan. 5. (p. 16)
51. H J Res 1. Balanced-Budget Constitutional
Amendment. Passed 300-132: R 228-2; D 72-129 (ND 34-105,
SD 38-24); I 0-1, Jan. 26. A "nay" was a vote in support of the
president's position. (p. 266)
83. HR 5. Unfunded Mandates. Passed 360-74: R 230-0; D
130-73 (ND 79-60, SD 51-13); I 0-1, Feb. 1. (p. 361)
95. HR 2. Line-Item Veto. Passed 294-134: R 223-4; D 71129 (ND 44-94, SD 27-35); I 0-1, Feb. 6. (p. 441)
97. HR 665. Victim Restitution. Passed 431-0: R 229-0; D
201-0 (ND 139-0, SD 62-0); I 1-0, Feb. 7. A "yea" was a vote in
support of the president's position. (p. 455)
103. HR 666. Exclusionary Rule. Passed 289-142: R 2207; D 69-134 (ND 36-103, SD 33-31); I 0-1, Feb. 8. A "nay" was a
vote in support of the president's position. (p. 455)
216. HR 1058. Securities Litigation. Passed 325-99: R
226-0; D 99-98 (ND 57-80, SD 42-18); I 0-1, March 8. (p. 744)
229. HR 956. Product Liability. Passed 265-161: R 220-6;
D 45-154 (ND 18-120, SD 27-34); I 0-1, March 10. (p. 744)
269. HR 4. Welfare Overhaul. Passed 234-199: R 225-5; D
9-193 (ND 3-135, SD 6-58); I 0-1, March 24. A "nay" was a vote
in support of the president's position. (p. 872)
277. HJ Res 73. Term Limits Constitutional Amendment. Rejected 227-204: R 189-40; D 38-163 (ND 22-117, SD 1646); I 0-1, March 29. A two-thirds majority vote of those present
and voting (288 in this case) is required to pass a joint resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. (p. 918)
283. HR 1240. Child Sex Crimes Prevention. Passed 4170: R 225-0; D 191-0 (ND 132-0, SD 59-0); I 1-0, April 4. A "yea" was
a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 1030)
287. HR 1271. Family Privacy Protection. Passed 418-7:
R 225-0; D 192-7 (ND 132-4, SD 60-3); I 1-0, April 4. (p. 1030)
109. HR 729. Death Penalty Appeals. Passed 297-132: R
226-1; D 71-130 (ND 34-103, SD 37-27); I 0-1, Feb. 8. (p. 456)
295. HR 1215. Tax and Spending Cuts. Passed 246-188: R
219-11; D 27-176 (ND9-130, SD 18-46); I 0-1, April 5, 1995. A "nay"
was a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 1010)
117. HR 667. Prison Construction. Passed 265-156: R
206-20; D 59-135 (ND 28-106, SD 31-29); I 0-1, Feb. 10. A "nay"
was a vote in support of the president's position. (p. 456)
297. HR 660. Senior Citizens' Housing. Passed 424-5: R
228-0; D 195-5 (ND 136-2, SD 59-3); I 1-0, April 6. (p. 1030)
1006 -
:\PRIL 8. 1995
CQ
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15: 49
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P.02
THE AMENDMENT PROCESS UNDER SPECIAL RULES
REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 1
193RD CONGRESS V. 104TH CONGRESS
(As of April 5. 1995)
Rule Tvpe
'
103rd Congress
104th Congress
Number Percent
Number
of rules
of rules
Percent
of total
of total
Open/M:odified-open2
46
44%
21
49
47%
8
9
9%
0
0%
TOTALS:
104
100%
29
100%
I
28%
Closed4
I
72%
Modified Closed3
f
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i.
I:
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1
This table applies only to rules which provide for the original consideration of bills. joint
resolutions or budget resolutions and which provide for an amendment process. It does not apply
to special rules which only waive points of order against appropriations bills which are already
privileged and are considered under an open amendment process under House rules.
l:l
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2
An open rule is one under which any Member may offer a gennane ame.ndment under the
five-minute rule. A modified open rule is one under which any Member may offer a gennane
amendment under the five·minute rule subject only to an overall time limit on the ameng.ment
process and/or a requirement that the amendment be pre·printed in the Congressional Record.
3
A modified closed rule is one under which the .Rules Committee limits the amendments
that may be offered only to those amendments designated in the special rule or the Rules
Committee report to accompany it, or which preclude amendments to a particular portion of a
bill, even though the rest of the bill may be completely open to amendment.
4
A closed rule is one under which no amendments may be offered (other than amendments
recommended by the committee in reporting the bill).
.:
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SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 104TH CONGRESS
(As of April S, 199S)
H. Res. No~ Ru!e TY.Re
(Date rept.)
_)-..•
ROLL CALL NH-:SF'HPER
..•.
•
I
H. Res. 38
·_.(1/18/95)
0
Bill No.
Subject
Disposition.
of Rule
H.R. 5 --Unfunded Mandate Reform
A: 350-71
(1/19/95)
MC
H. Con. Res. 17- Social Security
H.J. Res. 1 • Balanced Budget Amndt
A: 255-172
(1/25/95)
H. Res. 51
(1/31/95)
0
H.R. 101 - Land Transfer, Taos Pueblo
Indians
A: voice vote
((2/1/95)
'j.
H. Res. 52
(1/31/95)
0
H.R. 400 - Land Exchange, Arctic Nat'l.
Park & Preserve
A: voice vote
(2/1/95)
I
H. Res. 53 ·
(1/31/95)
0
H.R. 440 - Land Conveyance. Butte
County. Calif.
A: voice vote
(2/1/95)
H. Res. 55
0
H.R. 2 - Line Item Veto
A: voice vote
(2/2/95)
H. Res. 60
(2/6/95)
0
H.R. 665 - Victim Restitution
H. Res. 61
0
H. Res. 44
(1/24/95)
(2/1/95)
I
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!
I:
A: voice vote
'
(2n/9S)
l,1
l'
H.R. 666 • Exclusionary Rule Reform
(2/6/95)
H. Res. 63
it
A: voice vote
(2n/9s)
MO
H.R. 667 - Violent Criminal Incarceration
(2/8/95)
A: voice vote
(2/9/95)
H. Res. 69
(2/9/95)
0
· H. Res. 79
MO
H.R. 728 • Law Enforcement Block Grants
MO
H.R. 7 • National Security Revitalization
PQ: 229·100;
A:227-127
(2/15/95)
I
lq
I,
I
!'
(
'I
A: voice vote
(2/10/95)
H. Res. 83
I·
..(2/10/95)
H.R. 668 - Criminal Alien Deportation
A: voice vote
(2/10/95)
1:.
1.:
,..
Ii:
~2/13/95)
it:'
'I
I:
H. Res. 88
MC
H.R. 831 · Health Insurance Deductibility
PQ: 230-191
A: 229-188
('1./21/95)
H.R. 830 - Paperwork Reduction Act
A: voice vote
('2/16/95)
H. Res. 91
0
(2/21/95)
H. Res. 92
(2121/95)
(2/22/95)
MC
H.R. 889 - Defense Supplemental
A:282-144
(2/22/95)
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3
H. Res. No. Rule Type
Bill No.
Sublect
{Date rept.)
Disposition
of Rule
H. Res. 93
.(2/22/95)
MO
H.R. 450 - Regulatory Transition Act
A: 252-175
(2/~3/95)
H. Res. 96
MO
H.R. 1022 - Risk Assessment
A: 253-165
.(2/34/95)
(2/27/95)
H. Res. 100
(2/27/95)
0
H.R. 926 - Regulatory Refonn & Relief Act
A: voice vote
(2/28/95)
H. Res. 101
~2/28/95)
MO
H.R. 925 - Private Property Protection Act
A: 271-151
H. Res. 104
(3/3/95)
MO
H.R. 988 - Attorney Accountability Act
H. Res. 103
MO
H.R. 1058 - Securities Litigation Refonn
(3/3/95)
H Res. 105
MO
(3/1/95)
A: 257-155
(3n/9S)
(3/6/95)
H. Res. 108
(3/6/9S)
H. Res. 109
Debate
A: voice vote
(3/6/95)
H.R 956 - Product Liability Reform
A: voice vote
(3/8/95)
PQ: 234-191
MC
(3/8/95)
A: 247-181
(3/9/95)
H. Res. 11.S
(3/14/95)
•
H.Res. 116
(3/15/95)
MO
H.R. 1158 - Making Emergency Supp. Approps.
A: 242-190
(3/15/95)
MC
H.J.Res. 73 - Tenn LirnitS Const. AmdmL
A: voice vote
(3/28/95)
H.Res. 117
(3/16/95)
Debate
H.R. 4 - Personal Responsibility Act of 1995
A: voice vote
(3/21/95)
H.Res. 119
MC
~
A: 217-211
(3/22/95)
(3/21/95)
H.Res. 125
(4/3/95)
0
H.R. 1271 - Family Privacy Protection Act
H.Res. 126
(4/3/95)
0
H.R. 660 - Older Persons Housin£ Act
...
A: 423-1
(4/4/95)
l
I
I
I
�APR-11-199::,
15: 51
FROM
TO
ROLL CALL t lEWSPAPER
2255373
P.05
4
H. Res. No. Rule Tvpe
Bill No.
Subject
(Date rept.)
H.Res. 128
of Rule
MC
(4/4/95)
H.Res. 130
(4/S/95)
Dispositio!l
H.R. 1215 • Contract With America Tax Relief
Act of 1995
MC
A: 228-204
(4/5/95)
H.R. 483 - Medicare Select Expansion
Codes: 0-open; MO-modified open; MC-modified closed: C-<;losed: A-adoption vote: PQ-previous question vote.
Source: Notices of Action Taken. Committee on Rules. 104th Congress
�'We very specifically made the decision early on
in our Contract with America that we would bring
up all ten bills under open rules."
Speaker-elect Newt Gingrich told reporters
November 11, 1994
Roll Call, February 13, 1995
'Chairman' Solomon Says He Plans to Grant Open
Rules on 75 Percent of Bills Next Year
Roll Call, November 28, 1994
�
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The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Press package for Roll Call from the House Rules Committee Democrats on "Republican Broken Promises"
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Series 07.03 Press Releases, Box 6 Folder 246
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Text
REMARKS OF
CONGRESSMAN JOE MOAKLEY
BEFORE THE
6th ANNUAL FALL MEETING
GoVERNMENT REGULATION AND COMPETITION DEPARTMENT
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
Monday, September 12th, 1983
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this forum and I commend
the Association for the speed with which it has acted to afford the members
of this committee with an opportunity to weigh the impact of the three recent
Supreme Court decisions which nullify the legislative veto. Particularly in
recent years, the veto has been viewed by Congress and by the business community as an important tool in keeping the regulatory process accountable. And
I think it is important that both Congress and thed business community respond
cautiously to the present challenge.
BACKGROUND
The sweeping Supreme Court decision in the matter of Immigration and
Naturalization Service -v- Chadha appeared, on first reading, to invalidate
all forms of the legislative veto. And the summary decisions in the subsequent rulings on the vetoes applicable to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission certainly tend to confirm the
broadest reading of Chadha.
But the ruling deals with a matter so focused at the inner subtleties
-
1 -
�of relations between the executive and legislative branches, that it is
hardly surprising that much public, official, and media discussion has substantially distorted both the significance and the effect of the decision.
In some respects, the Chadha decision means a good deal more than has been
recognized yet and, in others, may mean a good deal less.
Use of the veto
Although my position has been characterized in opposition to the legislative veto, I think it is very important to understand that no one is really
an opponent of the veto.
Members of Congress have simply had honest differ-
ences on how and where it should be applied.
Every President since Herbert Hoover has argued that the veto is unconstitutional, yet each of them has proposed a veto at one point or another.
The former chairman of the Committee on Rules, Congressman Bolling, was
charged last year with killing the veto, but he is the author of the model
for all modern vetoes, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974.
The question for Members has been the application of the veto in particular contexts. And I suspect that nearly every Member has voted both for
and against the concept. So the Supreme Court decision should delight no one.
Certainly, the decision is a significant one and will force some very
fundamental changes in the manner in which our government operates. But
assertions that the decision strikes a devastating blow to the Congress as
regards its power relative to the President misgauges the lonq range effects
•
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2 -
�of the way Congress will handle this new balance in future leqislation. But
it also misjudges even the immediate consequences of what the decision really
means with respect to about 300 statutes touched by it.
The legislative veto has been in use for over 50 years and both Congress
and the President have found the device convenient.
Typically the way the
device has come into being is that Congress and the President reach an agreement that the executive will be granted a specific power, which would not
exist except for the enactment of the law, and Congress ties a limitation to
that delegation -- that the executive decision will be subject congressional
nullification.
It is important to note that the legislative record is rather clear
that all Administrations, notwithstanding their official posture of
opposition to the veto, have been the authors of such compromises nearly as
often as Congress.
In general, the approach is rather convenient. The President obtains
some political advantage in that the fundamental principle of legislative
physics -- inertia -- is turned to his advantage. The President is freed
from having to send-up a recommendation and wait for the whole process of
enactment to run its course through subcommittees, committees, and the floor
in each House and through conference. Instead, the Executive issues a proposed regulation (or some other form of executive action) and, if any step
of the nullification process falters during a set number of days, the matter
becomes effective as the functional equivalent of law. Congress, for its
part, retains roughly the same degree of control i t would have had in the
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3 -
�normal legislative process but structures the situation, where speed or
flexibility is needed, to compensate for its own institutional weaknesses.
In this context, t_he veto works best when it is enacted as part of a
negotiated agreement between the branches to improve management flexibility
or response to emergency situations.
The best examples of the former are laws which have given the Executive
authority to temporarily defer spending or implement less than departmental
reorganizations, subject to congressional nullification.
The War Powers Act
is the best and strongest example of the latter.
Historically, the courts have been very reluctant to intervene in these
kinds of political agreements between the other branches. Indeed, as recently
as 1978, the Supreme Court allowed to stand a lower court ruling which affirmed
a law which had allowed the President to adjust federal pay scales annually,
subject to a legislative veto.
Expanded use of the veto
Increasingly, however, there has been alarm about the proliferation in
the uses to which the legislative veto has been put. The veto is on weakest
grounds when foisted by Congress for its own convenience or inability to face
hard choices. And such uses have become disturbingly more common in recent
years than the cautious "power sharing" agreements between the branches
which gave birth to the device.
And suddenly, in the past few years, congressional exuberance with the
device has led to the birth of proposals for a "generic" legislative veto --
-
4 -
�a proposed law which would give Congress the power to review and nullify
each regulation issued by the entire government.
The issue reached a head last year when the Senate passed the proposal
69 to 25. A similar House proposal, which was not acted on, was co-sponored
by a substantial majority of the House.
The results of such a proposal could have been disturbing and the potential for genuine paralysis in entire, important segments of the regulatory
process was the great risk posed by a broad, generic veto.
Certainly, the business community has legitimate qreviences aqainst
poorly considered federal regulations. It has equal greviences against poorly
considered laws. And to expect a Congress that can barely pass a few hundred
laws iri a year to seriously review 7,000 regulations, is the answer to neither
problem.
Unlike the hundreds of specifically linked agreements enacted since
1932, a generic veto is nothing more or less than an unconstitutional effort
to turn the entire process of national government on its head, transferring
to each branch the functions for which i t has the least expertise and
legitimacy.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the use of the legislative veto
was a runaway train and there was increasing doubt of any ability to restrain
the device to its traditional and accepted uses. It was in response to this
trend, I believe, that the Supreme Court has now been forced to intervene in
a matter it had successfully sought to avoid deciding for a generation.
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5 -
�In this regard, the decision should not be viewed as a disaster or as
a victory for anyone.
EFFECT OF THE COURT DECISION
Congress, admittedly, has lost a tool which has, in its better applications, proved useful and efficient. But, by restraining Conqress from
immersing itself in every item of regulation and adjudication, the court has
saved Congress from drowning in detail i t lacks the institutional capacity
to manage, and freed i t to act within the scope of its legitimate role for
shaping national policy.
Clearly, the Chadha decision will force vast institutional adjustments
to be made by Congress to prepare itself to work effectively under this new
arrangement but I sincerely believe the long term effects could be salutary
for Congress, the President and the Nation.
Specific legislation
In the long run, the Congress will be strengthened in relation to the
President, the bureaucracy, and the courts. It will be forced to write laws
with greater specificity. Far less substance will be left for regulatory or
judicial interpretation and powers of a legislative character will be delegated with narrower limitation both as to scope and duration.
Severability
But, I believe that initial discussion of the decision has even more
significantly misjudged the short term effects.
The specific decision of the court applies to a single provision of the
-
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�immigration laws and found that provision unconstitutional. To the extent
that the ruling is interpreted as having "shifted" power from the legislative
branch to the executive, however, that is correct only because the court
was able, in this case, to make two findings; the operative language of the
ruling is, "We hold that the Congressional veto provision in section 244(c)(2)
is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional."
The grounds on which the Court held the veto unconstitutional are so
broad as to make clear the intention of the court that its decision would
govern lower courts in the review of all the 300 provisions of law that have
used the veto. And that review will probably take a decade or more.
It seems doubtful that any of these laws will survive subsequent
challenge; in the Chadha decision, the Supreme Court has left itself and the
lower courts almost no room to maneuver on that matter.
The particular law had authorized the Attorney-General to suspend deportation of aliens in certain cases, and had provided that Congress could overrule that determination. By the court finding the veto unconstitutional,
Congress loses its power to review those determinations.
By the court finding that review severable from the delegation, the
Attorney General retains his powers. But, had the court been unable to find
the two propositions severable, the entire arrangement would have fallen
and the Attorney General would have been able to suspend deportations only
by requesting that Congress pass a bill for the relief of the individual in
question.
-
7 -
�As the courts begin to sort out the 300 remaining laws, Chadha will
turn out to have been a rather exceptional case and the findinq of severability will be impossible in the majority of cases.
Under a 1967 law, previously noted, Congress gave the President authority
to revise the federal pay schedules annually, subject to congressional disapproval. On the same constitutional basis on which Chadha was later decided,
a group of federal jurists sued for a pay raise proposed by the President but
disapproved by Congress. The court ruled that it was inconceivable that
Congress would have given the President the power to adjust pay if the determination were not subject to congressional review. The court was able to
rule that the two matters were not severable and, if the veto of the President's authority was unconstitutional, that authority would fall with it. As
a result, i t was possible to hold that no claim existed without reaching the
constitutional merits and, on appeal, the Supreme Court declined to review
the case.
I think that this model is likely to be repeated in most court reviews
sterning from the Chadha decision. And the manner in which it is repeated
will satisfy no one. One of the most effective and articulate supporters of
the veto, Congressman Levitas of Georgia, pointed out that the veto is neither
conservative nor liberal, neither pro-business nor pro-environment. "It is,"
he astutely observed, "a two-edged sword." And I would echo his observation
in predicting the effect of the unraveling of the legislative veto, as
Chadha is applied to future cases.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, for ex-
-
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�ample, establishes a flexible system for cooperative action between the
President and Congress to rescind or defer federal spending. There is no
question that the one House veto of Presidential proposals for deferrals is
embraced by the Chadha decision. However, the Act contains no severability
clause and the legislative history clearly documents that Congress would
never have granted deferral authority absent a congressional review
mechanism -- indeed, the bill was written in response to President Nixon's
use of impoundments and restraint of that power was the clear, unequivocal
purpose of the Act.
Therefore, under Chadha, what is lost is i t not Congress' power to
review spending decisions, but the President's authority to make them.
But
this is not something that should delight anyone. Althouqh attempts have
been made to use deferral authority for substantive purposes and some
proposals have been disapproved, the general use of the device is purely
ministerial and Congress has permitted more than 3/4ths of the proposals to
take effect. In the wake of Chadha~ the President is legally required to
obligate appropriations, even if everyone involved is in clear agreement that
the appropriation is in excess of the amount needed.
It is clear that a
decision must be made quickly on how to resolve such a disaster within the
terms of the Supreme Court decision, but i t is equally clear that i t is
Congress which decides what that resolution is to be.
At the end of the last session, an appropriation was made for the
MX
missile but i t could be spent only if Congress subsequently approved the
release of the money. The method by which that approval was made is clearly
-
9 -
�overturned by the Chadha decision and the history of the law is that the
appropriation would not have been made in the absence of the review (the
review provision was adopted as an amendment that rejected a straight appropriation). And so the only proper legal course open to the President at this
moment to handle MX funding is to come to Congress again for an appropriation
everyone already thought he had.
The same situation will hold equally true for agencies and other
instrumentalities of the federal government who now may think the Chadha
decision frees them from congressional interference.
Those who would argue that the power of the D. C. City Council to make
laws is severable from the congressional review of those laws will find
little comfort in the legislative history of the enactment of Home Rule
legislation, and will find that issue further complicated by a specific
constitutional requirement that Congress "exercise exclusive Legislation in
"
all Cases whatsoever, over such District
Li~ited effect on severable delegations
Undoubtedly, some cases will be discovered where it will be possible to
find delegations severable from the congressional review mechanism applicable
to determination under the delegation.
But, even in such cases, the effect
of such shifts of power are likely to be smaller than expected.
A clear example would be the Federal Trade Commission. The severability
of a veto, adopted in the context of a routine 1980 authorization, for an
agency established in 1914, left little doubt that congressional authority
-
10 -
�to overrule regulations of the Federal Trade Commission was voided by Chadha,
as the Court confirmed in its summary decision on that matter.
But, neither, is there any question that the ability of the Commission
to issue rules at all, and indeed the very existence of the F'IC beyond
September 30th depends entirely on the enactment of a pending authorization
to which any change in the Federal Trade Act is probably germane.
Likewise, the Nuclear Waste bill, adopted last year, authorized the
Secretary of Energy to fix a tax on nucle r generation of electricity to be
placed in a trust fund for the development of a nuclear waste repository,
subject to an legislative veto. During consideration of that bill, an amendment was adopted which required Congress to act by law, rather than a veto,
to overturn state objections to siting decisions; the legislative history of
the bill confirms that this change was made in response to constitutional
reservations about the veto. That history, combined with an unequivocal
severability clause, might permit the tax to stand without congressional
review. But, although the delegation of taxing powers to the executive is an
extraordinary precedent, I am inclined to believe that Congress will find i t
has lost rather little power. The executive wins freewheeling authority to
tax utilities and deposit the proceeds in a trust fund. But any expenditure
from that fund remains totally subject to the congressional authorization and
appropriation process, and to any requirements -- including alterations in
the tax -- which Congress may chose to place in such bills.
RESPONSES TO CHADHA
In fashioning institutional remedies to the current situation, I would
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11 -
�hope that all.branches of government have reqistered a valuable lesson to be
learned from Chadha. The process of government is
and quite leqitimately
a political one. And the Nation is best served when that process is allowed
to work, even with some tensions, with flexibility and a fair regard by each
branch for the legitimate role of the others.
Throughout their history, the appropriations committees have handled
routine adjustments during a fiscal year through a process known as reprogrammings. The system is clearly not sanctioned by the Chadha decision, but
that doesn't matter because the system is beyond the reach of the courts as
long as both branches operate in good faith. Slightly simplified, the process
is that, if the Administration wants to transfer money from one purpose to a
related one within the same appropriation, a letter is sent to the relevent
subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriation Committees. The commmittees vote on the matter and the Administration abides by the decision. The
committees are aware that the Administration is under no statutory obligation
to comply with arbitrary instructions and the Administration is aware that
appropriations run for only a year and are usually revised to reflect any
difficulties the committees have noted during the prior appropriation.
But there is no rule of Congress nor any federal law on the subject for
any court to review. It is simply an accommodation based on restraint and
a decent respect by each branch for the responsibilities and privileges of
the other.
Where understood practices and comities between the branches are stretched
beyond their understood terms, the branch damaged must be expected to respond
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12 -
�with all the powers within its reach. The survival of our constitutional
system requires that self-defense.
Presidential impoundment powers had actually proven useful tools for
fiscal flexibility which served the purposes of both branches for a generation, under a variety of Democratic and Republican Presidents and Democratic
and Republican congressional chambers. But, President Nixon dramatically
abused the system. Indeed i t is not unreasonable to characterize his actions
as an attempt to use impoundment to qive the Presidency something the Constitution had deliberately denied i t -- an item veto of appropriations. In 1974,
Congress responded to the constitutional threat by extinguishing impoundment
powers and replacing i t with the comparatively cumbersome congressional
budget process.
The development of the War Powers Resolution is a case of obviously
similar retrenchment of an _informal sys tern stretched too far.
The legislative veto, likewise, proved a useful and effective tool to
both branches to provide comparable administrative and regulatory flexibility.
But the zealousness with which Congress attempted to toss it onto a variety
of laws began to shift the constitutional balance in such a manner that the
Supreme Court was forced to rule more sweepingly than i t might have wanted,
on an issue I suspect i t would have preferred not to address at all.
Indeed,
the record is rather clear that in 1978 the Supreme Court "ducked" a case
that presented an opportunity to rule on the identical issues posed by the
Chadha case.
- 13 -
�I am not distraught over the current situation, for reasons I think I
have outlined clearly. But, as we survey the results of the Chadha decision,
i t is rather clear that. the courts' attempts to side-step the issue in previous years was wise and that the interests of neither the President nor
Congress have been advanced by this definitive constitutional resolution of
the issues.
The immediate task involves all three branches and will be facilitiated
by the greatest possible caution and restraint by each.
No single committee of Congress can undertake these next steps. They
involve the entire institution and I am aware of no committee which does not
have some law within its jurisdiction touched by Chadha. It is not necessary
that all these laws be repealed or modified by Congress, nor that most of
them become subject to judicial rulings.
In some cases, resolution will be forced on Congress.
For example, at
some point an individual will appear before the District of Columbia courts,
charged with a matter which would not be a crime save that the previous Congress overturned a revision of certain D.
c.
criminal ordinance. The in-
dividual's attorneys will argue his case on constitutional grounds. Under
Chadha, the congressional review mechanism is likely to fall, although there
are constitutional peculiarities unique to that veto which could separate
the case.
Whether the courts strike down only the veto or the entire Horne
Rule delegation, the Committee on the District of Columbia will face a inescapable responsibility to fashion a legislative remedy.
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14 -
�Other vetoes will never be tested. The courts cannot rule hypothetically
and issues must actually exist to be tested. We could hardly dispa.tch an
ambassador-at-large to obtain the consent of some nation to an invasion because our government needs to bring a test case of the War Powers Resolution.
So, although i t is not wholely satisfactory, we have to face the fact
that we know as much today as we probably will ever know about the status
of the War Powers Resolution. It is unlikely that the Committee on Foreiqn
Affairs will be able to fashion a revision of the law within the terms of
Chadha, but it is obviously required that the matter be examined.
Informal alternatives
In many cases, a decision will be made deliberately to avoid any
clarification. It is possible that Congress and the President will simply decide, for example, to observe all the procedures of title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, as a political accommodation. As
I have stated, I expect that the congressional review of deferrals under
title X would be struck down under the Chadha decision. But the nonseverability of Presidential deferral authority is sufficiently clear that
neither branch has any incentive to test the law. So long as both branches
operate with some comity, and avoid any effort to use the deferral section
to deal entitlements, I am inclined to doubt that their accommodation can
ever come within reach of the courts.
Similar determinations to seek no judicial resolution, and to simply
abide by the terms of statutes of doubtful constitutionality, may turn out
to be an appropriate response in many other cases. Various "project authoriza-
- 15 -
�tion" powers exercised by the public works committees of each House, and similar fiscal controls exercised by other committees, have worked efficiently
over the years and there is little reason to abandon them.
But, even in cases in which it is determined to leave a matter undecided,
it is important that even that decision be reached as the result of careful
committee review.
Review of veto laws and bills
I hope that each committee of the Congress will promptly begin a
review of all of the laws within its jurisdiction touched by the court
decision to clarify these issues. In addition, I would strongly urge committees to review pending legislation very carefully. The Chadha decision is
unequivocal and puts Congress on clear public notice of how the federal
judiciary will rule in these matters. An argument of nonseverability will be
very difficult to sustain in the case of any delegation, which involves a
suspect review mechanism, enacted subsequently to the Supreme Court ruling.
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
In addition to these individual statutory and legislative reviews, I
expect that the subcommittees of the Committee on Rules, will initiate
hearings immediately after the August recess to study some of the broader
institutional issues posed by the Chadha decision.
Personally, I think Congress should reserve judgement on these institutional responses pending a substantial process of information gathering
along the lines of my subcommittee hearings and the ones being conducted by
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16 -
�the House Judiciary Committee in considering regulatory reform. However, i t
might be appropriate to comment on some of the propositions that are likely
to be discussed:
Constitutional amendment
When any proposition is declared unconstitutional, the first response
naturally will be to examine the possibility of a constitutional amendment.
As a matter purely of arithmetic, this approach seems possible; certainly
the veto has always enjoyed two-thirds support in each House and nearly
three-quarters of the states vest similar powers in their legislatures.
But I suspect that efforts to draft a workable proposal will prove impossible. The one resolution (H. J. Res. 313) which has been introduced, for
example, is limited in its applicablity to regulations. That approach would
resolve the issue that has presented Congress with the least difficulty, without resolving the more sensitive and difficult issues raised by war powers,
national emergencies, export controls, and other executive actions. If an
attempt is made to broaden it, a constitutional amendment would move directly
against the heart of the Constitution, the separation of powers doctrine. If
an attempt is made to narrow it, we are faced with the difficulty of constitutionally defining the term regulations.
I think that a constitutional amendment will prove impossible, if only
because no one will be able to find a satisfactory manner in which one can be
drafted.
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�Statutory nullification and approval
By focusing so strongly on the presentation clause in Chadha, the Court
appeared to be pointing the way toward joint resolutions, submitted to the
President in the same manner as bills, as a constitutional alternative to the
traditional legislative veto.
Selecting between the use of approval or disapproval resolutions, however, raises difficult questions of political balance.
Joint resolutions of disapproval, if they pertain to actions which the
President is likely to seek to uphold, shift the balance of power dramatically
by delegating powers of a legislative character and then leaving the Congress
able to influence those legislative actions only by majorities sufficient to
override a Presidential veto.
I would cite the authorization, appropriation and impoundment process
as a clear example of a case in which such an arrangement would be a matter
of poor policy. The funding process of government is that funds are authorized
by law and then appropriated in a subsequent Act. Title X of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act provides authority for the President to
propose to defer spending, subject to nullification by a one-House veto. If
that system needs to be revised, I think Congress should hesitate before it
considers a system that would require i t to pass three laws to get money
spent.
But, in the case of regulations of some independent agencies (over which
the President may have even less control than Congress) statutory nullifica-
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�tion may sometimes prove appropriate. In many cases, Congress and the Pres ident are likely to be in agreement about a rule.
Joint resolutions of approval, on the other hand, retain significant
policy powers in the Congress, but could lead Congress toward further and
dangerous involvement in the smallest details of national government.
Political factors, in the long run, will tend to work against the joint
resolution of approval, particularly as a tool of regulatory oversight. Those
subject to federal regulation, have found the legislative veto attractive,
over the years. They get a full shot at lobbying their position through the
regulatory process. If they win, the matter is resolved to their satisfaction;
if they lose, they can move on without prejudice to seek a resolution of disapproval, if the rule is subject to legislative veto. Again, if they win,
their victory is absolute. But, if they lose, the statute customarily carries
a provision indicating that congressional inaction on, or even rejection of,
a resolution of disapproval has no meaning; so they open their third fight in
the courts on a relatively equal footing. Even before Chadha, the legal community was beginning to have qualms about the veto, as both the appeals court in
this circuit and the Supreme Court began to ignore this disclaimer and note
congressional inaction under veto laws in certain rulings. But a joint resolution of approval goes even further. To the extent that it enacts a regulation into law, i t shelters the regulation from many of the judicial challenqes
i t might overwise face. Forced to chose between Congress and the courts as a
sole forum for appeal of rules, regulated communities may decide that Capitol
Hill is not the arena in which they chose to fight.
-
19 -
�I can imagine certain emergency powers, like exercises under the War
Powers Resolution, for which joint resolutions of approval might be appropriate solutions to the issues posed by Chadha.
But, in most cases, I would caution against such an approach. As
traditionally drafted, legislative vetoes laws have served not only as a
limitation on agency exercises but, also, as rules of Congress to limit
congressional review of those exercises. My greatest criticism of the veto is
that it has locked Congress into "yes or no" responses to delicate and complicated issues. The rebuttal to my position, obviously has been that the
matter is placed before Congress in a form that i t can only approve or disapprove by concurrent resolution; to improve it, we would have to act by
statute. Now that the courts have made clear that we only can act by statute,
anyway," all arguments for the rules of the House that customarily attach to
vetoes disappear.
Although there are precedents that indicate it has not always been so,
the President's right to propose legislation is undoubted in the modern
practice.
And the authority of Congress to respond legislatively to such a
communication is equally undoubted. To pass a law authorizing the executive
to issue a rule or make any other proposal and to say Congress can pass a
joint resolution enacting the recommendation, is a self-evident restatement
of the Constitution. So what is the point of bothering to write such laws?
If they follow the traditional form of previous legislative vetoes, the answer
would be to impose a form of "closed rule" on congressional action on the
recommendation.
-
20 -
�The House would be unlikley to adopt a closed rule on a bill yet to be
written by one of its committees. And i t ought be even more hesitant to
write into law a closed rule to allow entities outside of Congress to propose classes of law over which Congress surrenders its traditional powers to
consider and perfect.
In the short run, however, both joint resolutions of approval and of
disapproval will be popular and the choice between them will pose difficult
questions for the Congress. When the House considered the authorization for
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (H. R. 2668) i t faced the first task
of sorting out these options. An amendment providing for approval resolutions
was offerred by Congressma Levitas of Georgia and one providing for disapproval resolutions by the subcommittee chairman, Congressman Waxman of
California. The House provided a disquieting indication of how ready i t is to
face the challenges of Chadha by adopting both amendments.
Severabili ty
Over the years, i t has become almost customary to include in Acts of
Congress provisions known as "savings provisions" or "severabili ty clauses."
In light of the three recent Supreme Court decisions on the veto, i t seems
rather clear that this has not been an intelligent policy.
If a portion of a law is held invalid, i t should be up to Congress,
alone, to examine the remainder and determine the extent to which i t wishes
to renew that matter and the extent to which i t wishes to change it. Savings
provisions are a dangerously open invitation to the courts to assume that
legislative function.
-
21 -
�The Federal Trade Commission was established in 1914; it was qiven requlatory powers in 1974; and the veto was added in 1980. The history strongly
suggests severability. But the other two cases decided by the Court provide
no such history. The court relied far to glibly on the presence of a savings
provision in the ruling in Chadha, in which i t decided to hold component subsections of a coherent, linked section severable from each other. As Justice
White noted in dissent, "Surely, Congress would want the naturalization provisions of the Act to be severable from the deportation section. But this
does not support preserving §244 [the provision which authorizes the Attorney
General to suspend certain deportations] without legi sla ti ve veto • • • "
It is possible that the Committee on Rules should propose a rule of the
House which prohibits savings clauses, places limitations on their use, or,
at least, impose substantial reporting requirements on committees which wish
to propose them. Indeed, i t might be suggested that, in some cases, committees
should be required to consider the possibility of "_!}on severability" clauses,
so that the courts and Congress are both required to review laws in their
totality.
Delegations
The modern administrative state has required substantial delegation of
legislative powers to the executive. And the legislative veto has been an
entirely understandable response to the imbalance that has caused. In the
absence of the legislative veto, Congress is going to have to examine those
delegations it has already made and those it proposes to make with considerably
more caution.
- 22 -
�One of the matters I would expect my subcommittee to review is the possibility that the rules of the House might impose requirements on committees,
in handling bills authorizing delegations of a legislative character, to report in some detail to the House on the need for doing so and the committee's
intent in how those authorities will be used.
Regulatory Reform and the Bumpers Amendment
The area of response to Chadha which lies within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary is the matter of regulatory reform, and the always
controversial proposition which accompanies i t -- the Bumper amendment. I
would urge Congress to act with considerable caution on such responses.
Most regulatory reform proposals are designed to increase the powers
of the President or the courts over the regulatory process. In the wake of
the Chadha decision, which clearly weakens congressional authority over
regulation in comparison to the other branches, I think Congress should be
reluctant to heap new regulatory powers on these other branches.
I do not dispute the need for regulatory reform. But I think Congress
needs to make some important institutional responses to Chadha before i t
will be appropriate to proceed with regulatory reform proposals, particularly
those which increase Presidential and 0MB control over rulemaking, without
appropriate congressional authorities to balance those review powers.
The proposal, known as the Bumpers amendment, to allow the courts.of
the United States to independently review regulations, seems to present
little merit at this point. The Chadha decisions, and a number of rulings
- 23 -
�in the regulatory area, make i t clear that the courts already have rather
more power over regulatory affairs than is probably appropriate.
I would strongly urge Congress, in weighing the Bumpers amendment, to
realize that the the most compelling separation of powers danger that faces
this country does not concern the "unelected bureaucrats." We've done fairly
well in dealing with the federal bureaucrary and have adequate leqislative
powers in reserve to redress any grevience which may arise there.
But, we
are today confronted with a federal judiciary, which has shown little
reluctance to move forcefully in areas heretofore assumed to be of a legislative character. And Congress would be ill-advised to expand those powers over
regulation, pending some very serious thought about the current balance of
powers between the branches.
Oversight
In the last two Congresses, the Committee on Rules and the Committee on
the Judiciary have dealt with the issue of regulatory reform from very
different perspectives of what the real problems are, much less their solutions. I am hopeful that the Chadha decision has created a climate in which
the linked issues of regulatory reform and congressional reform can be
addressed in a more coordinated fashion.
It continues to be my contention that the root source of most complaints
about the regulatory process lies in the statutes which govern the agencies
and the manner in which Congress writes those laws. And any regulatory reform
proposal that does not address the need for major structural changes in congressional oversight and lawmaking is doomed to failure. In the last Con-
- 24 -
�gress, I put forward H. R. 1, as a vehicle by which the two committees could
conduct a coordinated review of administrative, congressional, and judicial
aspects of regulatory reform.
The central aspect of H. R. 1, from the vantage point of the Committee on
Rules, was the proposal for the establishment of a select committee to re-
view all federal agency rulemaking. The proposal was a modification of prior
recommendations by Congressman Kindness of Ohio, who had put forward a bill
{H. R. 14222, 95th Congress) to establish a joint committee to conduct such
reviews.
H. R. 1 would have established a select committee with broad authority
to review proposed and existing federal agency rules, which would enable the
House to address the most fundamental complaints about regulation (conflict,
duplication, and overlap) in a manner not possible under the existing cornrnittee structure. The majority of state legislatures and all national legislatures, which have legislative review laws, have found i t appropriate to
establish specific committees for this purpose.
The bill authorized the committee to report to the House joint resolutions to disapprove pending rules. Although a majority of House the preferred
the convenience of one or two House vetoes, Congress is on clear notice,
under Chadha, that it has to act by joint resolution. To the extent that a
joint resolution may be perceived as a weaker tool, I would think Conaress
would seek to establish a stronger "handle" to operate that tool. So this
proposal would appear to be more attractive in the wake of Chadha. If that
perception is now shared by the other body, I would have no objection to
- 25 -
�returning to the earlier recommendation of the gentleman from Ohio for a
joint commit tee.
The most serious internal objection to the select or joint committee
approach would concern the jurisdiction of standing committees. But, based on
my committee's examination of the practice of other legislatures, I would
exf)ect that such a committee would recommend minor regulatory improvements to
the agencies, and legislative improvements to the standing committees, to
minimize conflict, duplication, and overlap, far more often than it would
report disapproval resolutions.
SUMMARY
The genius of our constitutional system is that the Presidency, the
Congress, and the Courts will always exist and have to work together. In the
resolution of any confrontation, even one as sweeping as Chadha, the question
is whether the three, in reaching accommodations that replace the veto, have
learned the lessons of recent history and can apply them with comity and with
common sense.
- 26 -
�
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Remarks of Congressman John Joseph Moakley before the National Association of Manufacturers about the legislative veto
Date
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12 September 1983
Creator
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Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Description
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Congressman Moakley discusses his stance on the use of the legislative veto and the implications of the Supreme Court ruling on INS v Chadha.
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<p>View the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/about/moakley-archive-and-institute/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p></p>
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PDF
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English
Subject
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Legislative veto--United States--Congresses
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DI-1280
Legislative Veto
Rules Committee
-
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84efa12016603913a49890c88f203ac6
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Title
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Report HQ 163-0, Section 290, Serials 19180, "Request for Documents from the Honorable John Joseph Moakley, Chairman, Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Relating to Human Rights Violations in El Salvador," 30 January 1990
Subject
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Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Human rights--El Salvador
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 03.04 Legislative Assistants' Files: James P. McGovern, Box 25 Folder 362
Date
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30 January 1990
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<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
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PDF
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English
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DI-0917
Coverage
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tgn:7005441
El Salvador
Foreign relations
Human rights
Rules Committee
-
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342cda7fe5179b28d77b4fc58ee48557
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Title
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Title
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Report HQ 163-61055, Bulky 67, "Request for Documents from the Honorable John Joseph Moakley, Chairman, Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Relating to Human Rights Violations in El Salvador," circa 1990
Subject
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Jesuits--El Salvador
Assassination--Investigation--El Salvador
Human rights--El Salvador
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
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United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 03.04 Legislative Assistants' Files: James P. McGovern, Box 30 Folder 395
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circa 1990
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Public domain. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute.
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<p>View the <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100.pdf">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p> </p>
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PDF
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English
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Text
Documents
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DI-0924
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tgn:7005441
El Salvador
Foreign relations
Human rights
Jesuit murder investigation
Moakley Commission
Rules Committee
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PDF Text
Text
Speech by Congressman Joe Moakley (D-MA)
Opening Day Rules Package
January 3, 200~
THANK YOU AND HAPPY NEW YEAR, M SPEAKER.
M SPEAKER, LAST FALL'S ELECTION WAS A RECORD BREAKER,
VOTES FOR EVERYTHING FROM PRESIDENT DOWN TO STATE
LEGISLATORS WERE CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE. IF THE
VOTERS TOLD US ANYTHING ON NOVEMBER 7TH, IT WAS TO
WORK TOGETHER. THE ONLY MANDATE THIS CONGRESS AND
THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE IS TO PUT ASIDE OUR DIFFERENCES
AND GET THINGS DONE.
BUT, M SPEAKER, THAT MANDATE OF COOPERATION IS NOT
REFLECTED IN THIS REPUBLICAN RULES PACKAGE.
THIS RULES PACKAGE SKEWS COMMITTEE RATIOS SO MUCH IN
FAVOR OF THE REPUBLICANS YOU WOULD THINK THEY HAD
WON BY A LANDSLIDE WHILE IN FACT, M SPEAKER, THEIR
MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE IS LESS THAN 2°/o.
MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT IF THE REPUBLICANS IN
CONGRESS HAVE BARELY MORE THAN 50o/o OF THE SEATS, THE
REPUBLICANS SHOULD GET NO MORE THAN 51 °/o OF THE
COMMITTEE SLOTS AND RESOURCES. ONE LOOK AT THIS
RULES PACKAGE SHOWS THAT IS NOT THE CASE.
-1-
�M SPEAKER, I ASK UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO INSERT 2 CHARTS
IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD DETAILING THE SKEWED
COMMITTEE RATIOS.
LAST CONGRESS, WHEN THEY WERE ENTITLED TO 51 °/o OF THE
SEATS, MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES TOOK 59°/o OF THE SEATS
ON WAYS AND MEANS,
THEY TOOK 57%, OF THE SEATS ON JUDICIARY,
AND THEY TOOK ALMOST 56°/o OF THE SEATS ON THE BUDGET
COMMITTEE.
M SPEAKER, IN ADDITION TO BEING UNFAIR, THOSE
COMMITTEE RATIOS DENIED MILLIONS OF AMERICANS THEIR
RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION ON CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES. AND, MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES ARE ABOUT
TO DO IT AGAIN THIS CONGRESS, WHEN THEIR MAJORITY IS
EVEN SLIMMER.
LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY, MR. SPEAKER: IF THE RATIOS ON THE
COMMITTEES WERE TO REFLECT THE RA TIO IN THE HOUSE
THIS CONGRESS, 58 MORE DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS WOULD
HAVE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES SEATED AT THE COMMITTEE
TABLES.
-2-
�EVEN MY DEAR FRIEND, MY CHAIRMAN, MR. DREIER, SIGNED A
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT SAYING THAT "COMMITTEE SEATS
SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO REFLECT THE OVERALL RATIO" IN
THE HOUSE.
UP UNTIL 6 YEARS AGO, MY REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES
REGULARLY INCLUDED REQUIREMENTS FOR FAIR COMMITTEE
RATIOS IN THEIR RULES PACKAGES. THAT IS, M SPEAKER,
UNTIL THEY WERE IN THE MAJORITY.
AND, M SPEAKER, WHILE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS WILL LOSE
THEIR VOICE IN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, MILLIONS
MORE LOST THEIR VOICES DURING THIS ELECTION.
PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANYTHING ELSE WE DO IN
WASHINGTON WILL BE RESTORING AMERICANS' CONFIDENCE
IN THE ELECTION PROCESS. BUT, M SPEAKER, THAT TOO IS
MISSING FROM THIS REPUBLICAN RULES PACKAGE.
NOWHERE IS THERE A MENTION OF WHAT HAPPENED DURING
THIS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
NOWHERE IS THERE A CALL ON CONGRESS TO FIX OUR FLAWED
ELECTION PROCESS. NOWHERE IS THERE A RECOGNITION OF
THE URGENT NEED TO RESTORE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE IN
AMERICAN ELECTIONS.
-3-
�M SPEAKER, IN JUST 3 DAYS, A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
WILL COUNT THE VOTES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS AND
DECLARE THE WINNER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
MILLIONS OF AMERICANS ARE QUESTIONING OUR ELECTIONS
AND DEMANDING ACTION AND, M SPEAKER, THIS RULES
PACKAGE FAILS TO TAKE ANY ACTION ON THEIR BEHALF.
THAT IS WHY, M SPEAKER, I AM URGING MY COLLEAGUES TO
SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC RULES PACKAGE. OUR RULES
PACKAGE INCLUDES THE REPUBLICAN PROPOSALS FOR
COMMITTEE RATIOS FROM THE 102N° AND 103RD CONGRESSES.
OUR RULES PACKAGE ALSO TAKES STEPS TO REFORM OUR
ELECTION PROCESS. IT GIVES THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
UNTIL MARCH 1 TO RECOMMEND WAYS TO ENSURE THAT ALL
ELIGIBLE AMERICANS WHO VOTE SHALL HAVE THEIR VOTES
COUNTED -- ESPECIALLY OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO VOTE
BY ABSENTEE BALLOTS.
M SPEAKER, EVEN THOUGH THE NEXT SET OF FEDERAL
ELECTIONS IS 2 YEARS OFF, WE NEED TO GET STARTED RIGHT
AWAY MAKING SURE EVERYONE'S VOTE IS COUNTED AND
COUNTED FAIRLY. FAIR ELECTIONS ARE THE FOUNDATION ON
WHICH OUR DEMOCRACY IS BUILT AND THERE IS NOTHING
-4-
�THE GROWING DISPARITY IN COMMITTEE SLOTS UNDER
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
51 . DEMOCRATIC
I
49
I
MAJORITY
MAJORITY
,
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-
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47
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431
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37
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35 ......----....,------------------~---,-----~---~----,---..---------------,--~
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105 106
107
CONGRESS
•MINORITY
PARTY
HOUSE
SEATS 0/o
-MINORITY
PARTY
COMMITTEE
SLOTS 0/o
�January 3, 2001
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
have votes on matters of important
questions.
You have also done some other
things. You have continued to constrain the minority in its ability to
write reports critical of what they conceive to be wrongdoing or failures in
legislation by saying to it that only 2
days will exist for the minority to
come forward with complaints with the
content of legislation. Is this the kind
of good will? Is this the kind of cooperation, conciliation, and is it the
kind of action that we are hearing
when we are talking about having compromise and cooperation and bipartisanship? I think not. If we are to work
together, and I would remind my colleagues on the majority side, there are
only a few seats' difference between the
Members on this side and on the other
side. If you want to have a President
who was elected by the narrowest margin in history and whose tenure as a legitimate President is, in fact, open to
question because of the curious manipulations of the Supreme Court and because of the way in which the election
in Florida was conducted and counted
and handled to succeed and to be able
to talk about bipartisanship and cooperation, this is not the way that you
begin the affairs of this Congress.
I did not intend to make an angry
speech, and I would like my colleagues
to know this is not an angry speech.
This is a speech of sorrow and sadness
because the majority is throwing away
the good will that they are going to
need to have a bipartisan Congress run
with cooperation, conciliation, and
compromise which the American people both need and want.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 21/2
minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. CASTLE).
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to ask some questions, perhaps in
the form of a colloquy, of the chairman
of the Committee on Rules about the
changes which we are facing between
committees. I am a member of the
Banking Committee and the details
elude me. First about the insurance
question. In establishing the question
on financial services, this resolution
:1.dds a term, and I quote, "insurance
5enerally" to the jurisdiction of that
committee. However, no such jurisdiction existed in rule X in the 106th Con~Tess.
Can you describe for me what the
term "insurance generally" is intended
to convey?
D 1500
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, will the
~entleman yield?
Mr. CASTLE. I yield to the gen~leman from California.
Mr. DREIER. Let me say, and I
~hank the gentleman for his question,
natters relating to insurance generally
1.re intended to include matters, for ex-
that are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity; the national treatment of insurance companies, auto insurance, life insurance and
property and casualty insurance.
However, as I mentioned previously
in my statement, existing health insurance jurisdiction is not transferred as a
result of this change. Furthermore, the
existing jurisdiction of other committees with respect to matters relating to
crop insurance, worker's compensation,
insurance antitrust matters, veterans'
life and health insurance and national
social security are not affected by this
change.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, let me
ask next about some securities issues.
Regarding securities and exchanges,
does the transfer of this jurisdiction to
the Committee on Financial Services
include underwriting, dealing, and
market making?
Mr. DREIER. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. CASTLE. Another question. Does
it include accounting standards applicable to capital raising under applicable securities laws and the Securities
Act of 1933?
Mr. DREIER. Once again, the gentleman is correct.
Mr. CASTLE. Does it include exchanges, investment companies, and
investment advisors?
Mr. DREIER. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. CASTLE. Does it include jurisdiction over the Public Utilities Holding Company Act?
Mr. DREIER. As I mentioned previously in my statement, this change is
not intended to convey to the Committee on Financial Services jurisdiction over matters relating to regulation and SEC oversight of multistate
public utility holding companies and
their subsidiaries which remain essentially matters of energy policy.
Mr. CASTLE. I thank the gentleman
very much for clarification on these
issues.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield
3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), the co-chair of the
Democratic Steering Committee and
the ranking member on the Committee
on House Administration.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, as all of us
know, this House is now divided by its
narrowest margin since the 83rd Congress when Republicans held 221 seats
and Democrats 213. Today, our Republican friends hold a bare five-seat majority, 221 to 212. Thus, if we are to accomplish anything, bipartisanship, as
President-elect Bush talked ad nauseam about in the campaign, is a sine
qua non. It cannot be mere rhetorical
window dressing.
Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I regret
to say the first day of the 107th Congress we have missed an opportunity to
demonstrate our commitment to bipar-
H13
and the committee slots available to
its Members elected by the American
public, Republicans and Democrats, to
represent them. Simply put, there are
not enough committee slots available
to the minority party, which now controls 49 percent of this body. Nevertheless, the allocation of committee slots
has remained unchanged, 55 percent for
the majority, 45 percent for the minority.
Now let me call attention to this
chart. It is probably a little difficult to
understand, but what it tracks is minority representation, not majority;
whether Democrats were in the majority or Republicans were in the majority. One will note, up to the 104th Congress, when Democrats were in control,
the percentage of committee slots allocated and the percentages in the House
tracked one another. One will note
that when the minority got more slots
in the House, they went up. When they
got less, they went down.
The point is, it was fair. It was representative and it gave to minority
members the opportunity to do what
they said they wanted to do, represent
Americans.
Now I would call the attention of my
colleagues, and I would hope the
former governor of Delaware, who is
one of the fairest members in this
House, would look at this stark contrast; and I would say here is the 104th
Congress, the 105th, the 106th, the
107th. One will note that the minority
line has been flat lined, notwithstanding the fact that we have picked
up in each of the last four elections additional seats and made the difference
between the majority and minority
parties smaller; but the line has not
changed.
The majority line has gone up in
terms of their percentage, and the variance. That is not fair. It is also, I
would say to the chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from
California (Mr. DREIER), contrary to
his representations when he was in the
minority. In my calculations, we would
need an additional 64 seats in order for
us to be allocated the number of seats
that we are entitled to as a result of
our percentage in the minority.
What is being done is contrary to the
rhetoric. It will not further bipartisanship, and I would ask that that be corrected as we move ahead in the next
few days.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from
Thibodaux, Louisiana (Mr. TAUZIN).
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, let me
first acknowledge, as did the ranking
minority member of the Committee on
Commerce, our extraordinary disappointment in the jurisdictional
transfer from the Committee on Commerce to this new Committee on Financial Services. It is important, as
the chairman has said. to know. how-
�RATIOS
Last Congress
Republicans
Democrats
223
212
51.3%
Agriculture
27-24
53%
Appropriations
34-27
55.7% (+4.4% instead of +2.2%)
Armed Services
32-28
53.3% (+2% instead of 1.2%)
Banking
32-28
53.3% (+2% instead of 1.3%)
Budget
24-19
55.8% (+4.3% instead of 1%)
Commerce
29-24
54.7% (+3.4% instead of 1.9%)
Education
27-22
55.1% (+3.8% instead of 5.5%)
Government Reform
24-20
54.5% (+3.2% instead of +3.3%)
(+ 1.7% instead of .9%)
House Administration 6-3
66.7% (+15.4% instead of3.6%)
International Relations 26-23
53.1% (+1.8% instead of .5%)
Judiciary
21-16
56.8% (+5.5% instead of .5%)
Resources
28-24
53.8% (+2.5 instead of 5.5%)
Rules
9-4
69.1% (+17.9% instead of 9.5%)
Science
25-22
53.2% (+1.9% instead of .5%)
Small Business
19-17
52.8% (+1.5% instead of .5%)
Transportation
41-34
54.7% (+2.4% instead of 3%)
Veterans
17-14
54.8% (+3.6% instead of .5%)
Ways and Means
23-16
59%
(+7.7% instead of 3.5%)
18
. Committees 1999 Republicans took a greater share than 1993 Democrats.
14 where
. 4 where l 993Democrats took a greater share from 1999 Republicans.
. 15 of 18 committees in 1999 exceed 2% over House %.
•
8 of 18 committees in 1993 exceed 2% over House % .
�RATIOS
1993-994
Democrats
Republicans
259
176
59.5%
Agriculture
29-19
60.4% (+.9%)
Appropriations
37-23
61.7% (+2.2%)
Armed Services
34-22
60.7% (1.2%)
Banking
31-20
60.8% (+1.3%)
Budget
26-17
60.5% (+ 1.0%)
Education
28-15
65%
Energy and Commerce
27-17
61.4% (+1.9%)
Foreign Affairs
27-18
60%
Government Operations
27-16
62.8% (+3.3%)
House Administration
12-7
63.1% (+3.6%)
Judiciary
21-14
60%
(+.5%)
"N"aturalResources
28-15
65%
(+5.5%)
Rules
9-4
69%
(+9.5%)
Science
33-22
60%
(+.5%)
Small Business
27-18
60%
(+.5%)
Transportation
40-24
62.5% (+3%)
Veterans
21-14
60%
(+.5%)
Ways and Means
24-14
63%
(+3.5%)
Under 2% overage
Over2% overage
10
8
(+5.5%)
(+.5%)
�W fa11
·1
IN Io L-
Aff/or
co,w0
If Republicans, with a 51.3% majority in the House, maintain the same committees
at the same size they were in the 1061h Congress but used a committee ratio
reflecting the ratio in the House (and keep all Republicans currently on each
committee), the following numbers of additional Democrats would have committee
seats:
ADDED
DEMOCRATIC SEATS
COMMITTEE
NEW
RATIO
Agriculture
27-26
+ 2 Democrats
Appropriations
34-33
+6 Democrats
Armed Services
32-31
+ 3 Democrats
Banking
32-31
+ 3 Democrats
Budget
24-23
+4 Democrats
Commerce
29-28
+4 Democrats
Education
27-26
+4 Democrats
Government Reform
24-23
+4 Democrats
House Administration
6-5
+ 2 Democrats
International Relations
26-25
+2 Democrats
Judiciary
21-20
+4 Democrats
Resources
28-27
+ 3 Democrats
Science
25-24
+ 2 Democrats
Small Business
19-18
+1 Democrat
Transportation
41-40
+6 Democrats
Veterans
17-16
+ 2 Democrats
Ways and Means
23-22
+6 Democrats
s!
~
�House Committee Party Ratios
106thC
ss
101S1 Mouse Memoers
Total Committee Seats
DJfferenceln
D lstrlbutlon of seats
Members
Percent
Percentage
IUI.AI
""'-All 1.11an NlaJornv (Rl Mtnorltv (D)
MaJorl~ (R) Mlnorltv (DJ maemncent
,w,:,
~~;:ii
l~
:, l •.ia>
~11
4U.:»l
1
835
83
458
375
54.BS
44.91
51
3
7
27
34
24
52.94
65.74
4
5
5
32
32
5.
29
19
24
5
5
3
3
5
4
27
22
55.10
24
19
64.55
6
a
66.67
47.06
44.26
46.67
45.00
44.19
45.28
44.90
43.18
33.33
5
3
% Commfttee m1.Jarlty
% House maforltv
2
3.59
1
1.68
4.,47
2.07
2.07
Committee
Aarlcullura
atfons
Armed Serdces
Banklna & Financial SiJrvices
.
~
;
Budaet
-Cmrmmce
61
60
60
43
53
49
44
Education & the Workforce
Govemmsn I Reform
House Adm lnlslrat1011
lnlematfcnal RelsWons
JudJclsrv
Resources
I
9
49
37
62
Rutes
Sc.'ence
Sma/J Buslr1ess
Smndaros of Qffk{al Conduct
Tnmsoortation & Jnfrastructu.ra
Veterans' Arratrs
Wavs & Me,ans
Permanent Seled on Jnte/Naence
13
47
36
10
75
2
0
7
24
27
53.33
53.33
ss.a1
54.72
26
23
53.06
21
16
56.76
28
24
53.SS
9
4
25
22
17
69.23
53.19
52.78
19
5
41
31
3
17
39
7
16
2
23
9
Source for data ara CofigrtJsslan.11 Ysrtow Book, and VJ!al Sttrl#sttcs on Congress, 1999-2000..
Delsgales and Aesklenl Commissioner are lnclu:ie<I In 'he oorrmltlae tallos.
For consJsr.snct, WlCanclas are C04.lnled h overa11 tctal and pa~ lclals.
Pe,centa~as wara calc:ulated by oorrput•r, and reftact roun:llng.
In aome fmtanoes, publlshed source may lndlcala unfilled vacency.
Rafios do oot re41Ed Jl0$l·alection reslgnalions.
27
28
5
34
14
16
7
60.00
54.67
64.84
68.97
56.25
46.94
43.24
46.15
30.77
46.81
47.22
50.00
45.33
45.16
41.03
43.76
4.55
3.45
3.84
1
3.28
15.40
1.60
5.49
2.58
17.97
1.93
1.51
-1.26
3.40
3.57
7.71
4.99
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Speech by Congressman John Joseph Moakley (D-MA) on the Opening Day Rules Package
Date
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03 January 2001
Creator
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Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 08.01 Speeches: Congressional Speeches, Box 7 Folder 462
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<p>View the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/about/moakley-archive-and-institute/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=97CD508C4A7F337052ABBE22F85910A0E44681B1">finding aid to the John Joseph Moakley Papers</a> for more information (PDF).</p>
<p></p>
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Copyright Suffolk University. This item is made available for research and educational purposes by the Moakley Archive & Institute. Prior permission is required for any commercial use.
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Documents
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PDF
Language
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English
Subject
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United States--Congress
United States --Congress-- House--Committee on Rules
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DI-1281
Rules Committee
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/11079/archive/files/88e4522a44e67b47b4cdaf642361b2f9.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=veBXF5JOJcpSqL4CiuDaHmpFPgmbC97syFWvEj4U4DTRnW4KUjv12hYBumJCfev47-qvQ6RiSdWtQ-q5fFvWF9dOG9OchgPvH457OsRaJkDImEk6dfp9zL6et7fbf6%7EEMAl2JENPfM8GpAY-yWRV1fHIkpvqLDKoBaqS10dp2EyDzjWbHXX22btxPSlRGM%7EWwVVRsfh-JHsADP9bfLgbbw2r0P%7EodB-sco7wbBkELYvPsURXRwBrTcViOlHzT46nozo0jipuuhccWbe4pEBrkffO%7EKYzRiEkpI-9YDdpkFQY0PwJ60sFvqMjdkDosWd5xRMBQ3U%7EnfMVO5-5JQYtVw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
8e910b758bd1e123527e5ae0d7b25a8f
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Title
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Description
An account of the resource
The Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers document Joe Moakley’s early life, his World War II service, his terms served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate, and his service in the United States Congress. The majority of the collection covers Moakley’s congressional career from 1973 until 2001. <br /><br />Use the <a href="https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/libraries/moakley-archive/moakley-papers/ms100_pdftxt.pdf?la=en&hash=B12D6C6C7164568D0537E426483AB65CC5DFF80D" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">finding aid</a> for a summary of the entire collection, including non-digitized materials. <a href="http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/MoakleyArchive/ms100_findingaid.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"></a>
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Statement by John Joseph Moakley before the House Committee regarding rules on U.S. military aid to El Salvador, 6 June 1991
Subject
The topic of the resource
United States--Foreign Relations--El Salvador
Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Military assistance, American--El Salvador
Creator
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Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001
Source
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Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, 1926-2001 (MS100)
Series 03.04 Legislative Assistants' Files: James P. McGovern, Box 20 Folder 319
Date
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6 June 1991
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<p> </p>
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PDF
Language
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English
Type
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Text
Documents
Identifier
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DI-0847
El Salvador
Foreign relations
Joe Moakley
Legislation
Military aid
Rules Committee