File #3447: "di-0836_ref.pdf"

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draft statement on El Salvador
This is, I suspedt, the final statement that I will make as
Chairman of the Speaker's Special Task Force on El Salvador.
The Task Force was created to monitor the investigation." into
the murder of six Jesuit priests, their cook and her daughter
at the University of''";Central America almost exactly two..,;years
ago. Since the Task Force was created, we have issued one
main report supplemented by occasional statements on my part
and interim reports from staff.
I do not intend to repeat, in this statement, what we have
said before. I want, instead, to complete the record to the.
extent that rules of confidentiality and good faith allow me
to do so. I find this necessary because of a statement from
the Government of El Salvador that the "Jesuits trial showed
that our criminal justice system works." And I find it
necessary to respond to a book length rebuttal of our work
that was issued by something called the Central America
Lawyers Group. According to that group, none of whose names
are listed in the publication, "the Moakley Commission
indicts the entire El Salvador Armed Forces as being
responsible for the murders of the priests, yet presents no
evidence of any specific orders, general policy, or
permissive environment fostered by the High Command
demonstrating institutional guilt."
I cannot respond to this criticism without explaining more
completely the basis for some of the statements I have made
concerning the investigation in the Jesuits' case and the
subsequent trial. I have contended, for example, that
high-ranking military officers knew soon after the crimes
were committed who was responsible but failed to come forward
with that information. I have also stated my belief in the
possibility--not the certainty, but the possibility--that the
murders were ordered by senior officers other than Col.
Benavides, the man who has been charged--and now
convicted--of doing so. Although I have cited a number of
reasons in previous statements for my beliefs, other
information has not been cited because the sources of that
information were not willing to be identified. Today, for
reasons of completeness, I will cite that portion of the
information provided to us in confidence that I believe is
most credible and that is most central to the statements I
have made in previous reports.
Before doing so, however, I want to mention a couple of other
things for the record.
First, I believe that those in El Salvador and in the United
States who have suggested that our Embassy orchestrated-, a
cover-up of this murder case simply do not know what they are
talking about. There is no question that the Embassy made

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some poor judgments during the difficult and often chaotic
process of monitoring this investigation. But Ambassador
,. Walker, his legal officer during most of the investigation,
Richard Chidester, and other key Embassy personnel devoted
thousand~-of hotirs to this case and to the ~ffortto see that
justice would be done. Although the Ambassador is restrained
by his position and responsibilities from detailing many of
these efforts, I know that he has acted consistently and at
times courageously in the pursuit of the truth.
Second, I want to acknowledge the fact that, despite my
criticisms, the Salvadoran judicial system is making
important progress. The Jesuits' trial, the recent
indictments of a number of wealthy Salvadorans in a bank
fraud case, and the resolution of the Zona Rosa case
involving the murder of U.S. marines--all represent important
steps forward. In addition, reforms resulting from the peace
negotiations should provide the judicial system with
important additional resources and should lead to the
development, in time, of a professional civilian
investigative capability. The conviction of Col. Alfredo
Benavides in the Jesuits' case does, indeed, prove that a
high-ranking Salvadoran military officer can be held
accountable for the murders of prominent people provided
there is sufficient international attention and pressure
brought to bear on the case. This is indeed a limited
accomplishment, but it is an accomplishment nevertheless.
Third, I want to give credit once again to the President of
the Supreme Court, Mauricio Gutierrez Castro and the judge in
the Jesuits' case, Ricardo Zamora, for their courage and
skill in pushing that case forward. And although I have been
critical of President Alfredo Cristiani at times, I do give
him credit for encouraging the military to cooperate in the
investigation and for the symbolic importance of his
willingness to testify personally in the case. I believe the
President was genuinely shocked by the murders of the
Jesuits; that he made a sincere effort at the outset to push
the investigation forward; and that he insisted--at critical
moments early in 1990--that the armed forces accept
responsibility for the crimes. Without his efforts, I do not
believe that the most direct perpetrators of the crimes would
ever have been identified.
Finally, I want to extend my thanks to those in the
Salvadoran armed forces who did come forward
voluntarily--albeit confidentially--with information in this
case. In saying this, I do not mean those who simply passed
on rumors or who offered information in return for favors of
some sort. I am speaking of individuals who are experienced,
respected and serious people who understand the harm done to
the Salvadoran armed forces by the murders of the Jesuits,
and who do not share the view that military officers in that

country should be above the law. It is these individuals who
are the source of much of the information described below.
I want it understood that these people incurred great
personal risk ·in talking to the Task Force. ·Although I
encouraged them to come forward and testify officially
concerning their knowledge in the case, they refused to do
so. All cited the risk of retribution against themselves or
their families by extreme rightwing elements of the armed
forces. Some said they had already been warned not to talk.
Some said they would violate the confidences of others if
they were to speak openly. None expressed faith in the
protective capabilities of the United States. None wanted to
leave El Salvador. And none expressed faith in the ability of
the judicial system to convict high-ranking officers. _even
with the evidence they could provide.
Below is a summary of information about two central points
that has been provided to the task force by these
confidential sources, but which was not included specifically
in previous reports:
The Earlier Meeting
1) According to these sources, the decision to murder the
Jesuits was made at a small meeting of officers held at the
Salvadoran Military School on the afternoon prior to the
murders (November 15, 1989). Among those present were Col.
Benavides, commander of the military school; Gen. Jose Rafael
Bustillo, then head of the Salvadoran Air Force (now assigned
to the Salvadoran Embassy in Israel); Gen. Emilio Ponce, then
Chief of Staff and now Minister of Defense; Gen. Orlando
Zepeda, deputy Minister of Defense; and Col. Elena Fuentes,
commander of the First Brigade. Reportedly, the initiative
for the murders came from General Bustillo, while the
reactions of the others ranged from support to reluctant
acceptance to silence.
The direct and circumstantial evidence supporting this
version of events includes:
-- an allegedly eyewitness account of the meeting by an
individual known to have been present at the military school
that afternoon;
-- confirmation by another individual that the officers
listed above were at the military school on the afternoon of
November 15th;
-- the fact that the unit that carried out the murders was
issued uniforms without insignias or other identifying
characteristics late on the afternoon of November 15th;

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-- the secret destruction, by military officers, of the logs
indicating the identity of those who came and went from the
military school that afternoon;
-- rep-ortedly, the fact -that the logs had- been destroyed was
conveyed to Gen. Ponce in January, 1990, but was not passed
on by him to the then Minister of Defense. As a result,
disclosure that the logs had been destroyed was delayed for
three months;
-- reportedly, Col. Benavides told officers at the military
school on the night of the 15th that he had "received the
green light" ("tengo la verde") to conduct an operation
against the Jesuits. This implies that he did not make the
decision himself;,
-- one of those present at the meeting with Col. Benavides
later directly accused Gen. Ponce and the high command, in
their presence, of being responsible for ordering the
murders;
-- reportedly, Gen. Bustillo told senior Air Force officers,
also on the night of November 15th, that a decision had been
made to kill the Jesuit priests (citing specifically, Father
Ellacuria, the best known of the priests); and
-- reportedly, Gen. Ponce told a meeting of senior officers
on December 10, 1990 that "we would not be here if I had not
made the decision that I did"; to which Gen. Bustillo
responded "we have done well, but we must continue to take a
hard line".
The incident described above might also explain the statement
of a U.S. military officer assigned to the Embassy in San
Salvador that he had been told by Salvadoran Col. Carlos
Aviles, on the afternoon of November 15th, that "something
was going to go down at the UCA" that night. The American
officer subsequently told the FBI that he must have been
wrong about hearing that statement because Col. Aviles was
not in the country on November 15th. The fact is, however,
that Col. Aviles returned to El Salvador on November 14th and
might have known at least generally about a decision made the
following afternoon to kill the Jesuits on the night of the
15th. At the time of the murders, Col. Aviles was serving as
the chief of psychological operations on the staff of Gen.
Ponce.
Coverup
2. There is a substantial amount of circumstantial evidence,
described in our earlier reports, to indicate that senior
military officers in El Salvador must have known, soon after
the murders, which unit was involved. This evidence pertains
to the number of soldiers involved in carrying out the

murders; the operational chain of command on the night of the
murders; the close relationship that exists among senior
officers; the roLEl~_o,f military intelligence in event$-~-,.,immediately prior to, and subsequent to; the-murders; the
-destruction of ev±dence at the military school and -scf'"on.
Just as an example, the Task Force interviewed one officer
who claimed to have been told by a colleague on the day after
the murders which unit had carried it out. The colleague had
served in one of the units placed around the periphery of the
UCA on the night the murders took place. When asked about the
failure of officers with information to come forward, the
officer told the Task Force that "in El Salvador, you talk
until you find out the truth; but when you find out the
truth, you shut up."
More specifically, the Task Force has not previously
disclosed information that one of those later accused of the
crimes reportedly confessed his involvement in the murders to
his commanding officer in mid-December, 1989. That
information was reportedly then passed on to General Ponce,
but it was not turned over to those investigating the case.

I offer this information, as I say, to provide additional
substantiation to statements made in earlier reports. Those
statements concern 1) my view that it is possible--not
certain, but very possible--that senior officers other than
Col. Benavides ordered the murders; and 2) my conviction that
a coverup of the crimes was attempted and that this coverup
involved officials at the highest levels. For reasons
detailed in earlier reports, the coverup did not fully
succeed because of 1) international pressure; 2) disclosures
made by a U.S. military officer in early January, 1990; 3)
President Cristiani's insistence that the military take
responsibility for the crimes; and 4) good, preliminary
police work carried out by El Salvador's Special
Investigations Unit.
One additional point: the Task Force received information
that I believe is reliable concerning threats made against
the lives of several of the Salvadoran officials involved in
pushing for progress in this investigation. One of those
threats was directed against President Cristiani. There are
also widespread suspicions in El Salvador about the deaths of
three military officers connected with the Jesuits' case.
In part because of the threat of violence; in part because of
the limited control exercised by civilian authorities over
the military; and in part because both the U.S. and civilian
authorities in El Salvador need to use the leverage they do
have over the military to keep the peace process on track; I

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am under no illusion that the Government of El Salvador is
likely to take further steps to investigate this case, or to
examine seriously the,- possibility that tG>p milLtary .of.f-icers
ordered the crimes. I do recommend very strongly, however,
- that Congress··-and the Administration bear this-·tnformation in
mind when~making further decisions with respect to U.S.
policy in El Salvador. In this connection, I note that the
information described above--as well as other information
bearing on shortcomings in the investigation--is known to the
Executive branch.

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